McIntosh v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.

470 So. 2d 184, 1985 La. App. LEXIS 8799
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 8, 1985
DocketNo. CA-2741
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 470 So. 2d 184 (McIntosh v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McIntosh v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 470 So. 2d 184, 1985 La. App. LEXIS 8799 (La. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

GULOTTA, Judge.

In this Jones Act and maritime tort claim by a worker injured on an offshore drilling platform, plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his suit on exceptions of prescription. We affirm.

Malcolm McIntosh was injured on July 25, 1977, while working on an oil drilling platform known as the “Piper Alpha” in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland. Almost three years later, on July 20, 1980, McIntosh filed a Jones Act and maritime tort claim in the Civil District Court in Orleans Parish against Occidental Petroleum Corporation, et al. (owners of the platform), Bawden Drilling, U.K., Ltd., et al. (plaintiffs employer), and J. Ray McDer-mott & Co., Inc., et al. (designers and manufacturers of the platform).

After extensive discovery, all defendants filed exceptions of one year prescription on the grounds that the alleged accident had occurred on a fixed drilling platform that was not a “vessel” within the meaning of the Jones Act and federal maritime law, and that plaintiffs claim was therefore subject to the one-year prescriptive period for tort suits under Louisiana law. The defendant designers and builders of the platform also filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they were [186]*186not involved in the design or construction of the equipment that allegedly had caused plaintiffs injury. The trial judge granted the exceptions and the motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs claims against all defendants.

Appealing, plaintiff, contends the trial judge erred in determining as a matter of law that the drilling platform was not a “vessel”. According to plaintiff this factual question should have been submitted to the jury. Plaintiff claims the facts and inferences from the evidence in the instant case create a reasonable dispute whether the platform is a “special purpose structure” capable of floatation that can be accorded the status of a vessel under the Jones Act. We disagree.

In order to recover benefits under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must be a “seaman” who has, inter alia, a connection with a “vessel in navigation”. Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.1984). Although the question of seaman status, even in marginal cases, is ordinarily submitted to the jury, it can be determined by the judge where the underlying facts are undisputed and the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the worker is not a seaman. Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co., Inc., supra; Beard v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 515 (5th Cir.1979). Rodrigue v. O’Neal, 430 So.2d 1235 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983).

In the determining whether or not a particular structure or facility is a Jones Act vessel, the controlling considerations are the purpose for which the facility was constructed and the business in which it is engaged. Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co., Inc., supra; Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Serv., 575 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.1978); Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company, 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir.1975), cert denied H.B. Buster Hughes, Inc. v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 777, 46 L.Ed.2d 639 (1976). Although the term “vessel” traditionally refers to a structure designed or utilized for “transportation of passengers, cargo or equipment from place to place across navigable waters”, factors such as its size, its ability to float, permanence of its fixation to the shore or bottom, and movement or capability of movement across navigable waters are not conclusive. Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 868, 94 S.Ct. 175, 38 L.Ed.2d 116 (1973); Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co., Inc., supra. “Special purpose craft” used in the oil and gas business have sometimes satisfied the criteria for vessel status, even though quite different from traditional ships and barges. Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Serv., supra; Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co., Inc., supra.

The evidence in connection with the exceptions of prescription and the motion for summary judgment establish the following undisputed facts concerning the drilling platform. The platform is a self-contained structure designed to perform offshore oil drilling and production operations in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland. As the design diagram illustrates (see Appendix I to this opinion), the structure is a massive steel platform standing in 474 feet of water and affixed to the seabed by piles driven hundreds of feet below the ocean floor to support oil drilling and production facilities 78 feet above the water’s surface.

The process for installing the platform at its offshore location took several months during 1975-1976. After assembly on land in Scotland, the supporting platform was welded atop a barge and towed offshore to the drilling site where it was “launched” to float in the water by means of a ballasting system on the four corner legs of the structure. The floating platform was then towed a short distance to its ultimate site, where regulation of the ballast allowed the structure to assume a vertical position on the ocean floor. (See Appendix 2, infra)

After the platform was in final position, a steam hammer drove “erection” piles through four interior legs of the structure to a depth of 114 feet below the sea bed. The buoyancy tanks were then removed and a total of 24 “primary” piles each [187]*187measuring 60 inches in diameter were driven through 65 inch wide pile sleeves around each of the four corner legs of the structure (6 primary piles to each leg) to a depth of 110 feet below the sea bed. The soil within each of primary piles was then drilled out and a total of 24 “insert” piles approximately 48 inches in diameter which were then lowered into the primary piles to a depth 380 feet below the ocean floor. Each “annulus” or gap (between the hole in the sea bed and the insert pile, and between the primary pile and the pile sleeve) was then filled with “grout” or a liquid cement paste to make each series of piles a “unified member”. The above-surface drilling and production modules were then installed on the platform permanently affixed to the sea bed.

In deposition, Michael Barry Green, an engineer formerly associated with McDer-mott in offshore design and construction, characterized the drilling platform as a “large, fixed platform” that was never intended to be moved from its present location. Green testified that the sole useful purpose of the buoyancy and ballasting system of the platform was in the initial positioning of the structure at the location where it would remain for its entire useful life of 20-25 years. He noted that the control panel for regulating the ballast on the structure had been removed very soon after the pile installation started and that the ballasting and venting system in the legs of the platform have probably become corroded.

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470 So. 2d 184, 1985 La. App. LEXIS 8799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcintosh-v-occidental-petroleum-corp-lactapp-1985.