McGuire v. Third Ave. Railroad

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

McGuire v. Third Ave. Railroad

41 N.Y.S. 577, 9 A.D. 529

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 6, 1896

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 41 N.Y.S. 577 (McGuire v. Third Ave. Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McGuire v. Third Ave. Railroad, 41 N.Y.S. 577, 9 A.D. 529 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1896).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Upon a careful review of the evidence, we are of opinion that this case was properly submitted to the jury. We cannot find, as matter of law, that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Nor can it be said that there was no evidence of negligence on the defendant’s part. The situation was a peculiar one. The deceased had exhibited unusual prudence in his preliminary movements. He looked carefully about him, and up and down, before attempting to cross the avenue. He saw the car going uptown, and he stopped and waited for it to pass. He then proceeded. But his progress and view were obstructed by a brewery wagon, which passed between him and the car coming down town. This downtown car slowed up to let the brewery wagon pass. As it passed, the gripman started the car up suddenly. The deceased then found himself in a critical position. He was undoubtedly startled, and thrown somewhat off his balance, by the sudden and precipitate start of the cable car. He hesitated, and jumped back. But it was too late, and he was struck by the rapidly advancing car. Whether the deceased saw this car at the moment he attempted to cross, or should have seen it; whether the attempt to cross just as the brewery wagon got out of the way was a mere error of judgment, or a piece of foolhardiness; whether it was even an error of judgment,—were all questions of fact proper for the consideration of the jury. So as to the conduct of the gripman. Whether he saw or should have seen the deceased in time to prevent the accident, and whether he caused an undue or violent propulsion of his car at the critical moment, were questions fairly for the jury. It is, upon the whole, impossible to sustain the defendant’s contention that there was neither evidence of the deceased’s freedom from contributory negligence nor circumstances from which such freedom could be inferred. It is equally impossible to sustain the contention that there was absolutely no evidence from which the gripman’s negligence could properly be found or inferred. There are no exceptions of any importance,—none which call for consideration.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Upon a careful review of the evidence, we are of opinion that this case was properly submitted to the jury. We cannot find, as matter of law, that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Nor can it be said that there was no evidence of negligence on the defendant’s part. The situation was a peculiar one. The deceased had exhibited unusual prudence in his preliminary movements. He looked carefully about him, and up and down, before attempting to cross the avenue. He saw the car going uptown, and he stopped and waited for it to pass. He then proceeded. But his progress and view were obstructed by a brewery wagon, which passed between him and the car coming down town. This downtown car slowed up to let the brewery wagon pass. As it passed, the gripman started the car up suddenly. The deceased then found himself in a critical position. He was undoubtedly startled, and thrown somewhat off his balance, by the sudden and precipitate start of the cable car. He hesitated, and jumped back. But it was too late, and he was struck by the rapidly advancing car. Whether the deceased saw this car at the moment he attempted to cross, or should have seen it; whether the attempt to cross just as the brewery wagon got out of the way was a mere error of judgment, or a piece of foolhardiness; whether it was even an error of judgment,—were all questions of fact proper for the consideration of the jury. So as to the conduct of the gripman. Whether he saw or should have seen the deceased in time to prevent the accident, and whether he caused an undue or violent propulsion of his car at the critical moment, were questions fairly for the jury. It is, upon the whole, impossible to sustain the defendant’s contention that there was neither evidence of the deceased’s freedom from contributory negligence nor circumstances from which such freedom could be inferred. It is equally impossible to sustain the contention that there was absolutely no evidence from which the gripman’s negligence could properly be found or inferred. There are no exceptions of any importance,—none which call for consideration.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

41 N.Y.S. 577, 9 A.D. 529, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcguire-v-third-ave-railroad-nyappdiv-1896.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack