McGriff v. Superintendent Keyser

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 12, 2021·No. 7:17-cv-07307·Unknown

Opinion

USDC SDNY MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT DOCUMENT McGriff v. Superintendent Keyser et al. BLED DSO BLED DOC #: 7:17-cv-07307-NSR-PED DATE FILED: _10/12/2021 The Court has reviewed Defendants’ request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 98), Plaintiff's letter requesting that the Court wait to address the request until Plaintiff was released on September 23, 2021 and could procure an attorney (ECF No. 99), and Plaintiffs letter notifying the Court of his new address (ECF No. 100).

The Court waives the pre-motion conference requirement and grants Defendants leave to file their proposed motion for summary judgment as follows: moving papers shall be served (not filed) on December 15, 2021; opposition papers shall be served (not filed) on January 14, 2022; reply papers shall be served on January 31, 2022. All motion papers shall be filed on the reply date, January 31, 2022. If Plaintiff has not obtained counsel by the reply date, Defendants shall file all motion papers, including Plaintiff's opposition papers. If Plaintiff has obtained counsel by the reply date, parties shall file their own papers. The parties shall provide two hard courtesy copies of all motion papers to Chambers as they are served. The Court has set the briefing schedule to afford Plaintiff time to find counsel. If Plaintiff is unable to comply with the current briefing schedule, he must timely seek an extension of his deadline to serve his opposition papers. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF No. 98 and 93, to mail a copy of this order to pro se Plaintiff at the address on ECF, and to show service on the docket. Dated: October 12, 2021 SO ORDERED: White Plains, NY ee Ohya HON-NECSONS. ROMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

\ RS gris S~CRerrset >” STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LETITIA JAMES DIVISION OF STATE COUNSEL ATTORNEY GENERAL LITIGATION BUREAU DIRECT DIAL: (212) 416-6551 September 15, 2021 Via ECF Honorable Nelson S. Roman United States District Judge Southern District of New York 300 Quarropas Street White Plains, New York 10601 Re: McGriff v. Keyser, No. 17 Civ. 7307 (NSR) Dear Judge Roman: This Office represents defendants William Keyser, Anthony Polizzi, and Stephen Keyser, (collectively “Defendants”) in the above-referenced matter. Pursuant to Judge Davison’s Order on August 4, 2021, and Your Honor’s Individual Practices, I write to respectfully request that the Court schedule a pre-motion conference in order to discuss the Defendants’ anticipated motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, an inmate at Sullivan Correctional Facility (“Sullivan”), alleges that on October 19, 2015, Defendant Keyser wrote a misbehavior report charging him with drug possession and smuggling contraband. (Dkt. No. 32, | 8,12). Plaintiff was placed in SHU pending a hearing before Defendant Hearing Officer Polizzi, who found Plaintiff guilty and sentenced him to 45 days keeplock. Plaintiff contends that he did not receive due process at his disciplinary hearing, and that the conditions in SHU, where there was ongoing construction during the day, violated the Eighth Amendment. The sole claims remaining in this case are due process claims concerning the conduct of the disciplinary hearing against Defendants Polizzi and Keyser, and an Eight Amendment claim concerning the conditions in SHU against Defendant Superintendent Keyser. These claims are all meritless. 1. Plaintiff’?s Eighth Amendment Claim Fails Because He Failed to Exhaust his Administrative Remedies Prior to Filing this Action The Second Circuit has expressly held that the clear language of § 1997e(a) requires that exhaustion be completed prior to commencement of an action in court. Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001). Exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes.” Porter _v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Compliance with the particular prison’s administrative grievance procedure “define[s] the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The exhaustion must be “[p]roper,” meaning that it must “compl[y] with an agency’s deadlines and 28 LIBERTY ST., NEW YORK N.Y. 10005 * PHONE (212) 416-8610 * FAX (212) 416-6075 *NOT FOR SERVICE OF PAPERS HTTP://WWW.AG.NY.GOV

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). An inmate grievance procedure pursuant to DOCCS Directive 4040 requires an inmates to follow a three-step process (§ 701.5(a)-(b); 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.5 (a)-(b). Plaintiff admits that he did not file a grievance concerning the noise while in SHU, and alleges that he grieved regarding the dusty food but did not receive any response at the time he commenced this action. Plaintiff thus failed to exhaust his Eighth Amendment claims, and they should be dismissed.

2. Defendant Superintendent Keyser was not Personally Involved in Any Constitutional Violation

“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To hold a prison official liable under § 1983 “requires a showing of more than the linkage in the prison chain of command.” Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985). Instead, plaintiffs must allege non-conclusory facts sufficient to establish that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Here, the only factual allegations in the Amended Complaint concerning Superintendent Keyser is that he was told, during rounds and by one letter, of the dusty food and noise issues in SHU. He is sued simply because of the high-ranking position he holds within DOCCS. This is insufficient to state a claim as a matter of law. See Ayers, 780 F.2d at 201. Additionally, receiving a letter from an inmate does not render the official personally involved with respect to the subject matter of the letter. Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1997). 3. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged a Deprivation of A Liberty Interest

The Second Circuit has instructed that “[r]estrictive confinements of less than 101 days do not generally raise a liberty interest … .” Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133- 134 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was only sentenced to 45 days in keeplock, and there are no facts alleged to indicate that his keeplock confinement was unusual or different from routine restrictive confinement in keeplock or SHU. The allegations concerning dusty food and noise relate only to the pre-hearing time spent in SHU. He has thus failed to allege a liberty interest implicating the Due Process Clause, and the Court need proceed no further.

4. Plaintiff Received All the Process That Was Due In Any Event

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Jones v. Bock
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Davis v. Barrett
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Neal v. Goord
267 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2001)