McGrath v. Opm

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedMay 29, 2020
Docket19-2187
StatusUnpublished

This text of McGrath v. Opm (McGrath v. Opm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGrath v. Opm, (Fed. Cir. 2020).

Opinion

Case: 19-2187 Document: 30 Page: 1 Filed: 05/29/2020

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

RICHARD J. MCGRATH, Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent ______________________

2019-2187 ______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. DC-0841-18-0798-I-1. ______________________

Decided: May 29, 2020 ______________________

RICHARD J. MCGRATH, Fairfax Station, VA, pro se.

DOUGLAS T. HOFFMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. ______________________

Before CHEN, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-2187 Document: 30 Page: 2 Filed: 05/29/2020

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. Richard McGrath petitions for review of a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board affirming the Office of Personnel Management’s decision declining to credit 87 days of military service toward his retirement annuity un- der the Federal Employee Retirement System. Because the Board’s decision is in accordance with the law and is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. I Mr. McGrath served honorably in the United States Army from July 1, 1968 to April 7, 1976. Mr. McGrath then served a total of 87 days in the Army National Guard of Connecticut between 1977 and 1978. Mr. McGrath was subsequently employed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), where he worked un- til he retired in 2015. When the PTO Human Relations Office calculated Mr. McGrath’s active military service for purposes of estimating his Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) annuity, the PTO included the 87 days of National Guard service. The U.S. Office of Personnel Man- agement (OPM) later calculated Mr. McGrath’s active mil- itary service for FERS and did not credit those 87 days. Mr. McGrath asked OPM to recalculate his FERS annuity to include his National Guard service. OPM responded, stating that the PTO’s inclusion of his 87 days of National Guard duty was in error. In its initial decision of March 28, 2018, OPM found that Mr. McGrath was not entitled to receive credit for his National Guard service in the computation of his FERS an- nuity. OPM affirmed this finding in a final decision on Au- gust 22, 2018. In that final decision, OPM stated that Mr. McGrath’s National Guard service was not creditable because it was not “performed under either a ‘call’ by the President or an ‘order’ by the Secretary of State.” J.A. 231. Case: 19-2187 Document: 30 Page: 3 Filed: 05/29/2020

MCGRATH v. OPM 3

Mr. McGrath appealed OPM’s final decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board. On June 13, 2019, the Administrative Judge affirmed OPM’s final decision. McGrath v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. DC-0841-18-0798-I-1 (M.S.P.B. June 13, 2019). In her decision, the Administrative Judge explained that service in the National Guard was ordinarily not creditable “mili- tary service” under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(1), which provides such credit for “each period of military service.” The stat- utory definition of “military service” at 5 U.S.C. § 8401(31) excludes service in the National Guard, “except when or- dered to active duty in the service of the United States or full-time National Guard duty (as such term is defined in section 101(d) of title 10) if such service interrupts credita- ble civilian service under this subchapter and is followed by reemployment in accordance with chapter 43 of title 38 that occurs on or after August 1, 1990.” The second excep- tion, for full-time National Guard duty, applies only to ser- vice performed after August 1, 1990. The Administrative Judge found that this exception thus did not apply to Mr. McGrath’s service in 1977 and 1978. Mr. McGrath does not contest this finding on appeal. The Administra- tive Judge then determined that Mr. McGrath’s service in the National Guard also did not fit within the first excep- tion, being ordered to active duty in service of the United States. The Administrative Judge held that, for the service to be creditable under the first exception, Mr. McGrath was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that either he or his unit was formally called into service by the President or the Army National Guard of the United States. The Administrative Judge’s initial decision became the final decision of the Board on July 18, 2019. Mr. McGrath timely petitioned for review. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). Case: 19-2187 Document: 30 Page: 4 Filed: 05/29/2020

II Our review of a decision by the Board is limited. The Board’s decision may only be reversed if we conclude that it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Lengerich v. Dep’t of Interior, 454 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Board’s interpreta- tion of statutes, however, is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Lengerich, 454 F.3d at 1370. Mr. McGrath argues that the Board misinterpreted the governing statutes when it determined under what circum- stances service in the National Guard would be creditable. Specifically, Mr. McGrath argues that the Board improp- erly interpreted 10 U.S.C. § 12602, which concerns general compensation and benefits for members of the Army Na- tional Guard of the United States. Mr. McGrath argues that the 87 days of service at issue should be considered “in Federal service as a Reserve of the Army” under either § 12602(a)(1) or (2). In its final decision, the Board considered § 12602 but determined that it did not relieve Mr. McGrath of the re- quirements set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 8401(31). That section provides definitions specific to FERS and explicitly states that creditable military service “does not include service in the National Guard except when ordered to active duty in the service of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 8401(31). We agree with the Board’s interpretation. The provi- sions of 10 U.S.C. § 12602(a) do not render creditable, for purposes of FERS, National Guard service that does not fit within the exceptions provided by 5 U.S.C. § 8401(31). Sec- tion 12602 concerns benefits for reserve components of the Army. Definitions for those purposes may differ from defi- nitions for purposes of FERS, a civil service retirement sys- tem governed by chapter 84 of Title 5. If, as Mr. McGrath Case: 19-2187 Document: 30 Page: 5 Filed: 05/29/2020

MCGRATH v. OPM 5

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Related

Perpich v. Department of Defense
496 U.S. 334 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Lengerich v. Department of the Interior
454 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2006)
William A. Clark v. United States
322 F.3d 1358 (Federal Circuit, 2003)

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