McGrail v. McGrail

48 N.J. Eq. 532
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 15, 1891
StatusPublished

This text of 48 N.J. Eq. 532 (McGrail v. McGrail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGrail v. McGrail, 48 N.J. Eq. 532 (N.J. Ct. App. 1891).

Opinion

Greek, V. C.

This bill was filed by the wife against her husband, under the twentieth section of the Divorce act, for support and maintenance, and an order for alimony pendente lite and counsel fee was made. The defendant, under an order, filed an answer to the bill, and with it a cross-bill charging his wife with adultery, committed with one Timothy Conlon, at a designated house in Elizabeth, on the 15th of March, 1890. There was an answer by the wife denying the adultery charged in the cross-bill. Testimony was taken before a master and examiner, and the cause argued on the evidence so taken.

If the husband’s case is established, there is, of course, no reason to examine the evidence to sustain that of the wife. If the testimony given by the husband is to be believed, it is idle to question the guilt of the wife. She and the person named, according to his statement, were discovered under circumstances that leave ho reasonable doubt of the commission of the offence. The husband is a police officer of Elizabeth. He had some years previously separated himself from his wife, leaving her in the possession of a house which he owned, and the rent of which he has allowed her to collect and use. Her conduct, while thus living in a state of separation, was so far from exemplary that her husband’s attention was called to it by the priest and friends, and the unfavorable rumors regarding it are, in a measure, shown not to have been unjust by the testimony of Mrs. Marie Conlon, who resided in the house with her. McGrail’s attention being thus called to the conduct of his wife, he determined to make an investigation. On the night in question he secured the services of two persons, S herring and O’Laughlin, and visited his former home about ten o’clock in the evening, and, after waiting some time, made the discovery he describes. He is corroborated by the two friends who accompanied him; in all particulars by Sherring, and, as to the latter part of the transaction, by O’Laughlin. If the story told by these three is not true, they have entered into a conspiracy to destroy the good name of the wife, and her alleged paramour, by willful and deliberate perjury. [534]*534McGrail is, of course, an interested party, but there is no evidence to impeach his general character for truth and veracity. Sherring is a detective, and it is urged that his testimony is unreliable. It is true that the testimony of a professional detective is, in divorce cases, to be subjected to close scrutiny and received with great caution, but it is not to be unceremoniously thrown out. Hurtzig v. Hurtzig, 17 Stew. Eq. 329; affirmed in 18 Stew. Eq. 869. If corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses or by circumstances, and it is consistent, and not grossly improbable, it should be accorded due weight. One ground for suspicion of such testimony is, that it is to the pecuniary interest of the witness to create situations which will compromise the person he seeks to detect, and to bring about or create facts which he is employed to ascertain, and that his compensation is in a measure dependent on his success in these regards. These elements of distrust do not exist to any extent with, reference to Sherring’s testimony in this case. The situation presented itself, and his compensation, if any, was not dependent on success;. he was called on to go more as a witness than as a detective.

O’Laughlin, the other witness, is a police officer of Elizabeth-, who has no apparent interest in the controversy worthy of consideration, stands unimpeached, and no reason is given why ■ entire reliance should not be placed on his testimony. It is true, he was not present when the other two men went into the room, but his evidence gives substantial corroboration to their account of the transaction.

It is urged by counsel for Mrs. McGrail that the story related is improbable.

The testimony as to the arrangement of the house- is very unsatisfactory. As near as I can ascertain, the house stands some ten feet back from the street; there are three rooms on the first floor, called the front room, the middle room and the kitchen.; there is a piazza and an entrance on the side, presumably into the middle room, and an entrance into the kitchen; a bay-window in the front room, five feet from the ground, faces the street; the side door is partly of glass and there is a window opening on the piazza. Some idea must be had of the arrange[535]*535ment of the house to judge of one objection of improbability, and the above is the most satisfactory I can extract from the evidence. It is too indefinite to base any positive conclusions upon, but sufficient to dispose of one insistment on this head. O’Laughlin testifies that McGrail and Sherring went into the kitchen, while he watched the front door to prevent the escape of any one, and that he heard them break in the kitchen door. Counsel urges that it is incredible that these parties in the front room would have suffered themselves to be detected in the compromising situation sworn to, if McGrail made so much noise getting into the kitchen that O’Laughlin, watching the front doo!r, could have heard him. But this depends entirely on the relative situation of the persons. If the door O’Laughlin watched was the entrance into the middle room, and the doors between that room and the front room, as well as the kitchen, were closed, and if O’Laughlin'stood on the walk at the side of the house, it is altogether probable he could have heard a noise at the kitchen door which the persons in the front room did not hear, particularly as his attention was awake to the noise, and, if the story is true, theirs was not. This objection is effectually disposed of, however, by the fact that the testimony of both Mrs. McGrail and Conlon indicates that the first intimation they had of McGrail’s visit was when he got into the room where they were, and that they did not hear him either getting into the kitchen or coming through the middle room.

It is next urged, that the story of these witnesses is improbable from the fact that the bed clothing was undisturbed. But the bed forms no part of the story as related, and it is altogether too speculative to disbelieve a statement as improbable on a surmise as to what means would probably be selected by the accused for the commission of a crime.

It is further said that the curtain of the front window was up, and that a person in the street could see into the room. But it is one of the uncontradicted parts of the husband’s story that these parties were in the dark when surprised by the entrance of McGrail and Sherring. The visitor, Mrs. Berry, speaks of a light when she was there. Conlon speaks of Mrs. McGrail lighting her visitor out. Yet, a very few minutes after they are [536]*536in the room with the door closed, and it was so dark that the husband and his witness made their discovery by lighting matches, until the lamp was found burning so dimly that it did not even disclose its whereabouts. Neither Mrs. McGrail nor Conlon deny it was dark in the room, nor that McGrail and Sherring lighted matches in order to see. This destroys all the point of the argument, that it was improbable these parties would be guilty of the acts charged, with the window curtain in the condition it was.

Comment is made on the discrepancy of the witnesses as to time. Sherring says he, just after reaching there, heard a clock strike ten, and that it was half-past ten by McGrail’s watch after the trouble was all over. This is the only testimony which pretends to be accurate; the other is simply the opinion of the witnesses.

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Bluebook (online)
48 N.J. Eq. 532, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgrail-v-mcgrail-njch-1891.