The opinion of this Court was delivered by
Bell, J.
The defendant having failed to sustain, by proof, his allegation of sale or gift of the articles sought to be recovered by this bill, the contest in this Court is reduced to two questions: first, whether the bill presents sufficient grounds to warrant the interference of a Court of Equity, in this state, under the statute conferring equitable jurisdiction ? Secondly, whether that portion of the decree which covers the surveying instruments and furniture described in the exhibits annexed to the bill can be sustained ?
As to the first point: the defendant insists that the only remedy is at law. Though the action of replevin is, with us, a broader remedy than in England, lying in all cases where one man improperly detains the goods of another, it is in no instance effective to enforce a specific return of chattels, since a claim of property and bond given is always sufficient to defeat reclamation, no matter what may be the eventual issue of the contest. As, therefore, our common-law tribunals are as powerless for such a purpose, as the similar English Courts, the propriety of exerting the equitable jurisdiction now invoked must depend with us on the same reasons that are-deemed sufficient to call it into action there. Here, as there, the inquiry must be whether the law affords adequate redress by a compensation in damages, where the complaint'is of the detention of personal chattels. If not, the aid of a Court of Chancery will always be extended to remedy the injury, by decreeing a return of the thing itself.
The precise ground of this jurisdiction is said to bo the same as that upon which the specific performance of an agreement is enforced, namely, that fruition of the thing, the subject of the agreement, is the object, the failure of -which would be but illy supplied by an award of damages: Lowther v. Lowther, 18 Ves. 389. In the application of tMs rule some difficulty has been experienced. The examples afforded by the English books are usually those cases, where, from the nature of the thing sought after, its [61]*61antiquity, or because of some peculiarity connected with it, it cannot easily, or at all, be replaced. Of these may be instanced, the title-deeds of an estate and other muniments of property; valuable paintings: Lowther v. Lowther, supra; an antique silver altarpiece : Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 8 P. Wms. 389; an ancient horn, the symbol of tenure, by which an estate is held: Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Ves. 273; heir-looms: 3 Ves. & B. 18; and even a finely carved cherry-stone: Ambler, 77. Such articles as these are commonly esteemed not altogether, or perhaps at all, for their intrinsic value, but as being objects of attachment or curiosity, and, therefore, not to be measured in damages by a jury, who cannot enter into the feelings of the owner; so too the impossibility, or even great difficulty of supplying their loss, may put damages out of the question as a medium of redress. But these are not the exclusive reasons why Chancery interferes, for there may be cases in which the thing sought to be recovered is susceptible of reproduction or substitution, and yet where damages could not be so estimated as to cover present loss or compensate its future consequent- inconvenience. And I take it this is always so, where, from the nature of the subject or the immediate object of the parties, no convenient measure of damages can be ascertained; or, where nothing could answer the justice of the case but the performance of a contract in specie. Of this Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 384, furnishes an example in the analogous instance of a contract for the sale of personalty: contracts, which are most commonly left to be dealt with at law. It was a bill to enforce the performance of an agreement for the purchase of several large parcels of growing wood, to be severed by the defendants, who were to have eight years to dispose of it and to pay for it, in six yearly instalments. Lord Hardwicke was, at first, extremely reluctant to entertain the bill, but after discussion came to the conclusion, that, though relating to a personal chattel, it was such an agreement that the plaintiff might come into Chancery for a specific performance. He instanced the case of Taylor v. Neville, which was a bill for the performance of articles for the sale of eight hundred tons of iron, to be paid for in a certain number of years, by instalments, where the decree prayed for was made; and proceeded to observe—“ such sort of contracts as these, differ from those that are immediately to be executed. There are several circumstances which may concur. A man may contract for the purchase of a great quantity of timber, as a ship-carpenter, by reason of the vicinity of the timber; and this is on the part of the [62]*62buyer. On the part of the seller, suppose a man wants to clear his land in order to turn it to a particular sort of husbandry; there nothing can answer the justice of the case but the performance of the contract in specie.” Similar in principle is the case of Falls v. Reid, 13 Ves. 70, where the plaintiffs prayed the restoration of an engraved silver snuff-box, used for many years by a society, as the symbol of their association; and Nutbrown v. Thomson, where a tenant brought a bill against his lessor, who, under pretence of the tenant’s covenant, had repossessed himself of the land, and seized upon the stock of cattle, which by the lease the tenant was to enjoy for seven years. The objection was that the tenant’s remedy, if he was entitled to one at all, was at law, in damages. But how, asked Lord Eldon, are damages to be estimated in such a case ? The direction to a jury must be to give, not the value of the chattels, but their value to the tenant! A similar question may well be propounded in our case. By what standard would you measure the injury the plaintiff may sustain in futuro from being deprived, even for a brief period, of the use of papers essential to the prosecution of his business ? Their intrinsic value might, perhaps, be ascertained by an estimate of the labour necessary to their reproduction, admitting the means to be at hand, and within the power of the plaintiff. But how could a tribunal ascertain the probable loss which, in the mean time, might be sustained ? The present pecuniary injury might be little or nothing, and so possibly of the future; or it might be very great, depending upon the unascertainable events of coming time, as these may be influenced by the misconduct of the defendant. These considerations show, I think, the case is not one for damages. Besides, as many of the maps, plans, surveys, and calculations are said to be copies of private papers, we are by no means satisfied they could be replaced at all. Certainly not without permission of the owners; a risk to which the plaintiff ought not unnecessarily to be exposed. If to those reflections we add the fact that some of these documents are the original work of the plaintiff, of value as being predicated upon data possibly no longer accessible, a'wrong is perpetrated which a chancellor ought not to hesitate in relieving. It is enough for this purpose, that a perfect relief at law is not apparent. The thing to be guarded against is, not the invasion of the defendant’s rights, for he stands here absolutely without any, except the common interest every citizen has in preserving the proper line of distinction that divides the jurisdiction and limits the powers of the [63]*63several Courts.
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The opinion of this Court was delivered by
Bell, J.
The defendant having failed to sustain, by proof, his allegation of sale or gift of the articles sought to be recovered by this bill, the contest in this Court is reduced to two questions: first, whether the bill presents sufficient grounds to warrant the interference of a Court of Equity, in this state, under the statute conferring equitable jurisdiction ? Secondly, whether that portion of the decree which covers the surveying instruments and furniture described in the exhibits annexed to the bill can be sustained ?
As to the first point: the defendant insists that the only remedy is at law. Though the action of replevin is, with us, a broader remedy than in England, lying in all cases where one man improperly detains the goods of another, it is in no instance effective to enforce a specific return of chattels, since a claim of property and bond given is always sufficient to defeat reclamation, no matter what may be the eventual issue of the contest. As, therefore, our common-law tribunals are as powerless for such a purpose, as the similar English Courts, the propriety of exerting the equitable jurisdiction now invoked must depend with us on the same reasons that are-deemed sufficient to call it into action there. Here, as there, the inquiry must be whether the law affords adequate redress by a compensation in damages, where the complaint'is of the detention of personal chattels. If not, the aid of a Court of Chancery will always be extended to remedy the injury, by decreeing a return of the thing itself.
The precise ground of this jurisdiction is said to bo the same as that upon which the specific performance of an agreement is enforced, namely, that fruition of the thing, the subject of the agreement, is the object, the failure of -which would be but illy supplied by an award of damages: Lowther v. Lowther, 18 Ves. 389. In the application of tMs rule some difficulty has been experienced. The examples afforded by the English books are usually those cases, where, from the nature of the thing sought after, its [61]*61antiquity, or because of some peculiarity connected with it, it cannot easily, or at all, be replaced. Of these may be instanced, the title-deeds of an estate and other muniments of property; valuable paintings: Lowther v. Lowther, supra; an antique silver altarpiece : Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 8 P. Wms. 389; an ancient horn, the symbol of tenure, by which an estate is held: Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Ves. 273; heir-looms: 3 Ves. & B. 18; and even a finely carved cherry-stone: Ambler, 77. Such articles as these are commonly esteemed not altogether, or perhaps at all, for their intrinsic value, but as being objects of attachment or curiosity, and, therefore, not to be measured in damages by a jury, who cannot enter into the feelings of the owner; so too the impossibility, or even great difficulty of supplying their loss, may put damages out of the question as a medium of redress. But these are not the exclusive reasons why Chancery interferes, for there may be cases in which the thing sought to be recovered is susceptible of reproduction or substitution, and yet where damages could not be so estimated as to cover present loss or compensate its future consequent- inconvenience. And I take it this is always so, where, from the nature of the subject or the immediate object of the parties, no convenient measure of damages can be ascertained; or, where nothing could answer the justice of the case but the performance of a contract in specie. Of this Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 384, furnishes an example in the analogous instance of a contract for the sale of personalty: contracts, which are most commonly left to be dealt with at law. It was a bill to enforce the performance of an agreement for the purchase of several large parcels of growing wood, to be severed by the defendants, who were to have eight years to dispose of it and to pay for it, in six yearly instalments. Lord Hardwicke was, at first, extremely reluctant to entertain the bill, but after discussion came to the conclusion, that, though relating to a personal chattel, it was such an agreement that the plaintiff might come into Chancery for a specific performance. He instanced the case of Taylor v. Neville, which was a bill for the performance of articles for the sale of eight hundred tons of iron, to be paid for in a certain number of years, by instalments, where the decree prayed for was made; and proceeded to observe—“ such sort of contracts as these, differ from those that are immediately to be executed. There are several circumstances which may concur. A man may contract for the purchase of a great quantity of timber, as a ship-carpenter, by reason of the vicinity of the timber; and this is on the part of the [62]*62buyer. On the part of the seller, suppose a man wants to clear his land in order to turn it to a particular sort of husbandry; there nothing can answer the justice of the case but the performance of the contract in specie.” Similar in principle is the case of Falls v. Reid, 13 Ves. 70, where the plaintiffs prayed the restoration of an engraved silver snuff-box, used for many years by a society, as the symbol of their association; and Nutbrown v. Thomson, where a tenant brought a bill against his lessor, who, under pretence of the tenant’s covenant, had repossessed himself of the land, and seized upon the stock of cattle, which by the lease the tenant was to enjoy for seven years. The objection was that the tenant’s remedy, if he was entitled to one at all, was at law, in damages. But how, asked Lord Eldon, are damages to be estimated in such a case ? The direction to a jury must be to give, not the value of the chattels, but their value to the tenant! A similar question may well be propounded in our case. By what standard would you measure the injury the plaintiff may sustain in futuro from being deprived, even for a brief period, of the use of papers essential to the prosecution of his business ? Their intrinsic value might, perhaps, be ascertained by an estimate of the labour necessary to their reproduction, admitting the means to be at hand, and within the power of the plaintiff. But how could a tribunal ascertain the probable loss which, in the mean time, might be sustained ? The present pecuniary injury might be little or nothing, and so possibly of the future; or it might be very great, depending upon the unascertainable events of coming time, as these may be influenced by the misconduct of the defendant. These considerations show, I think, the case is not one for damages. Besides, as many of the maps, plans, surveys, and calculations are said to be copies of private papers, we are by no means satisfied they could be replaced at all. Certainly not without permission of the owners; a risk to which the plaintiff ought not unnecessarily to be exposed. If to those reflections we add the fact that some of these documents are the original work of the plaintiff, of value as being predicated upon data possibly no longer accessible, a'wrong is perpetrated which a chancellor ought not to hesitate in relieving. It is enough for this purpose, that a perfect relief at law is not apparent. The thing to be guarded against is, not the invasion of the defendant’s rights, for he stands here absolutely without any, except the common interest every citizen has in preserving the proper line of distinction that divides the jurisdiction and limits the powers of the [63]*63several Courts. What is to be avoided is an unnecessary trespass upon the province of the common-law tribunals, and this is to be tested by the simple query whether they offer a full remedy for the wrong complained of?
But there is another ground upon which this proceeding may be sustained. .In Falls v. Reid, the snuff-box was deposited with the defendant, as a member of the society, upon certain terms, to be redelivered upon the happening of certain events. Lord Rosslyn held that under these facts, the defendant was a depositary on an express trust which, upon a common ground of equity, gave the plaintiff title to sue in that Court; and in this he was supported by Lord Eldon, in the subsequent case of Nutbrown v. Thornton. According to the proof in. our case, the papers and documents claimed were left with the defendant under the express understanding that they were to be redelivered whenever the plaintiff should see fit to resume the business of his then profession in this city. It is then the case of direct confidence violated—a spell sufficiently potent to call into vigorous activity the authority invoked.
As to the second question, it is perhaps enough to say, that when once a Court of equity takes cognisance of a litigation, it will dispose of every subject embraced within the circle of contest, whether the question be of remedy or of distinct yet connected topics of dispute. If the jurisdiction once attaches from the nature of, one of the subjects of contest, it may embrace all of them, for equity abhors multiplicity of suits. Thus in the case last cited, the Chancellor ruled that where a person is found wrongfully in possession of a farm, over which the Court had undoubted power, and also in possession of the stock upon it, at the same time and under the effect of the same wrong, the Court will undoubtedly make him account for and deliver back the whole. In the case at bar the surveying instruments and office furniture stand in the same category with the maps, drafts, &c.; were delivered to the defendant at the same time, and are withheld by an exertion of the same wrong. In short, they enter into and make part of the same transaction, and may, therefore, be the objects of the same measure of redress.
Decree affirmed.