McGowan v. State

689 S.W.2d 224, 1985 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1209
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 6, 1985
DocketNo. 194-84
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 689 S.W.2d 224 (McGowan v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGowan v. State, 689 S.W.2d 224, 1985 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1209 (Tex. 1985).

Opinions

CLINTON, Judge,

dissenting.

The court of appeals held that an officer who observed (and was in fact a participant in) the drug transaction for which appellant was convicted could communicate his observations to other officers who could in turn make a valid warrantless arrest of appellant on the authority of Article 14.01, V.A. C.C.P., which reaas in relevant part:

“(a) A peace officer ... may without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace.” [All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.]

The only authority cited for this nou-veau construction of Article 14.01, supra, by the court of appeals is another of its own opinions, Gonzales v. State, 638 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. ref’d). The Court in Gonzales, supra, in turn cited Law v. State, 574 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); and Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).

The most cursory review of Law and Tarpley, both supra, reveal them to deal with situations in which the authority for the warrantless arrests was Article 14.04, V.A.C.C.P. — not Article 14.01.

Article 14.04, supra, by its explicit terms more often than not deals with the transfer of information to the arresting officer by another or others.1

Thus, appellant’s petition for review presents to us a question of first impression, which impresses me as a classic reason for exercising our discretionary review jurisdiction.2

I would grant appellant’s petition for discretionary review to resolve the important question presented thereby, and dissent to the Court’s refusal to do so.

TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., join.

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Related

Astran v. State
780 S.W.2d 447 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
689 S.W.2d 224, 1985 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1209, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgowan-v-state-texcrimapp-1985.