McGowan v. Federal Housing Authority

572 F. App'x 35

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2014
• Docket: 11-2892-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Veronica McGowan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss her amended complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir.2010). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Additionally, “[o]n appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we review conclusions of law de novo.” Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[WJhere, as here, the case is at the pleading stage and no evidentiary hearings have been held,” we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Id. at 83.

Here, we conclude that the district court properly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for substantially the same reasons as those stated in the court’s decision. As the district court indicated, McGowan failed to state a cause of action based on her allegation that the defendants had denied or unduly delayed her application for government housing assistance, primarily because she did not plausibly allege that the defendants’ conduct was discriminatory or unconstitutional in violation of federal law. McGowan has not meaningfully challenged this conclusion on appeal.

We have considered all of McGowan’s contentions on this appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.