McGlothin v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District

829 F. Supp. 853, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21653, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,693, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 985, 1992 WL 516081
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedNovember 30, 1992
DocketCiv. A. J90-0402(L)
StatusPublished

This text of 829 F. Supp. 853 (McGlothin v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGlothin v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 829 F. Supp. 853, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21653, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,693, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 985, 1992 WL 516081 (S.D. Miss. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Deborah McGlothin was employed by the Jackson Municipal Separate School District (the District) as a teacher’s aide from August 1983 until March 17, 1987, when the District discharged her for alleged insubordination, stemming from her willful failure to conform to the dress code of the school to which she was assigned. Following her termination, the plaintiff brought this action against the District 1 alleging that she was terminated because headwraps and hairstyles she wore as an expression of her sincerely held religious beliefs conflicted with the applicable dress code policy. Plaintiff alleged that because the District made no attempt to reasonably accommodate her religious be *855 liefs, the termination of her employment violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg., and the First Amendment to- the United States Constitution. As relief, she sought reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress and attorney’s fees and costs. The case was tried before the court sitting without a jury. Based on the evidence adduced and for the reasons that follow, the court finds and concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish her claims for relief.

The dispute between these parties arose as a result of plaintiffs wearing of head coverings in the classroom, more specifically berets and Afriean-style headwraps, after being told by the principal of her school that this was not considered appropriate attire and was a violation of the school’s dress code. Plaintiff claims that she wore these head coverings as an expression of her religious beliefs, yet defendants terminated her without making any effort to accommodate her beliefs. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that plaintiffs beliefs were not, in fact, rooted in religion, and that even if they were legitimately rooted in religion, the plaintiff failed to so advise the District prior to her termination.

In order to sustain her claim under Title VII, plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment practice, (2) her employer had knowledge of her bona fide religious belief, and (3) some disciplinary action resulted from her failure to comply with the conflicting employment practice. Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir.1982). And to prevail on her First Amendment claim, she must prove that her beliefs regarding wearing head coverings or engaging in certain hair grooming practices were rooted in religion and sincerely held and that the District’s enforcement of the school dress code had a coercive effect which operated to prevent her free exercise of those religious beliefs. Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Emp. Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 731, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1440, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)).

Ms. McGlothin described her religious beliefs in detail at trial, including the nature of her beliefs and the sources of those beliefs. She testified that she holds a deep spiritual belief that she must cover her head as a means of demonstrating spiritual and personal modesty and humility and to protect her spiritual self from disruptive influences or “negative vibes” from the outside. She cited as the source of her beliefs the spiritual teachings of many sources, including the Hebrew-Israelite faith, as well as verses from the Bible. She further testified as to her religious belief regarding the grooming of her hair. She explained that she did not comb or groom her hair using artificial means, but rather relied on finger combing, or intricate finger manipulation of the hair, and the use of herbs and natural oils for cleansing, because she believes that her hair should be allowed to “lock” as a source of spiritual strength and as a demonstration of the depth of her religious commitments. For these beliefs, she also cited teachings from the Hebrew-Israelite faith and Bible scriptures, as well as the teachings of Rastafarian-ism. Because the court finds that plaintiff failed to communicate to defendant that there was a religious basis for her conduct, the court concludes that she cannot sustain either the Title VII or First Amendment claim.

Plaintiff was first hired by the District as an assistant reading instructor in the fall of 1983. During her first year with the District, she worked at McLeod Elementary School, but beginning with the 1984-85 school year and continuing until the date of her termination in March 1987, she was assigned to Whitfield Elementary School. 2 According to the testimony of Kisiah Nolan, the school principal, during the fall of 1984, after the weather had turned cold, she noticed Ms. McGlothin wearing a red beret in the classroom. When Ms. Nolan told Ms. McGlothin that she needed to remove her cap when she *856 entered the building, Ms. McGlothin explained that she needed something on her head since she was in a portable classroom and was constantly going in and out of the building. Ms. Nolan told her at that time that while there was nothing to prevent her from wearing the cap when she went outside, it was not considered appropriate classroom etiquette to wear a covering on her head in the classroom while working with the students. Ms. McGlothin did not immediately remove the beret, but she did begin coming to school without it. Later in the year, however, Ms. Nolan again noticed Ms. McGlothin wearing the beret in the classroom and reminded her of their earlier conversation in which she had informed Ms. McGlothin that she should not wear the beret in the classroom. Ms. McGlothin’s responded to Ms. Nolan’s remarks by asking that Ms. Nolan “put it in writing.”

Following this conversation, according to Ms. Nolan, Ms. McGlothin stopped wearing the beret, but during Black History Month in February 1985, she began wearing African-style headwraps. This prompted Ms. Nolan to reiterate to Ms. McGlothin that she was not to wear head coverings in the classroom. Again, Ms. McGlothin responded that Ms. Nolan should “give it to [her] in writing.”

The following fall, Ms. McGlothin resumed wearing a beret during the winter months and Ms. Nolan again told her that she did not consider it appropriate for Ms. McGlothin to wear a head covering in the classroom. Ms. McGlothin’s response was the same: “Give it to me in writing.” This conversation was repeated three or four times during that school year, as Ms. McGlothin would stop wearing the beret for a period of time but would then start wearing it again. 3

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829 F. Supp. 853, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21653, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,693, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 985, 1992 WL 516081, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcglothin-v-jackson-municipal-separate-school-district-mssd-1992.