McGinn v . NH State Prison CV-07-88-JL 08/14/08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James McGinn
v. Civil No. 07-88-JL Opinion No. 2008 DNH 144 Interim Warden, New Hampshire State Prison
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The petitioner, James McGinn, seeks habeas corpus relief
from his 2001 state court conviction for felonious sexual
assault, claiming various constitutional infirmities attendant to
those proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The respondents move
for summary judgment, asserting that McGinn’s petition is barred
by the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1). McGinn objects, arguing that while his petition
was untimely, his late filing is excused by the doctrine of
equitable tolling.
This court has jurisdiction over McGinn’s petition under 42
U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and AEDPA (habeas relief for
state prisoners) in particular. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For
1 the reasons stated below, the court grants the respondents’
motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2001, McGinn was convicted in Rockingham County Superior
Court of five counts of felonious sexual assault. See N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 632-A:3. He was sentenced to consecutive three-and-a-
half to seven year prison terms on two of the counts, and
received suspended sentences on the remaining convictions.
McGinn, represented by counsel,1 brought a timely appeal in the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court
erred in various evidentiary rulings. The court rejected these
arguments, affirming his conviction, and, on August 1 5 , 2002,
denied his motion to reconsider that ruling. On November 1 3 ,
2002--90 days after his motion for reconsideration was denied--
McGinn’s right to petition the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari expired and his conviction became final. See
Sup. C t . R. 1 3 .
1 McGinn was represented by counsel through the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s denial of application for post conviction relief on January 1 3 , 2006.
2 On August 8 , 2003, McGinn moved the state trial court for a
new trial, which was denied, as was his ensuing request for
reconsideration. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
which affirmed the denial of the motion insofar as it challenged
McGinn’s conviction, but remanded the case to the superior court
to determine (1) whether imposing consecutive sentences was an
abuse of discretion, and (2) whether the failure to raise that
issue at sentencing constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. The superior court ultimately concluded that its
sentencing order was a sustainable exercise of discretion and
that trial counsel had not been ineffective. McGinn again sought
review of the superior court’s ruling in the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, but on January 1 3 , 2006, review was denied.
Proceeding pro s e , McGinn filed a habeas petition in this
court on March 2 8 , 2007. The Magistrate Judge recommended that
the petition be dismissed as untimely. This court, based on an
incomplete record of the state court proceedings, rejected the
magistrate’s recommendation and allowed McGinn’s petition to
proceed. The respondents have since moved for summary judgment,
arguing that McGinn’s petition is in fact barred by AEDPA’s
statute of limitations.
3 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must
first identify the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “produce
evidence on which a reasonable finder of fact, under the
appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that
party cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be granted.”
Ayala-Gerena v . Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st
Cir. 1996); see also In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 2 7 , 31 (1st Cir.
2001).
III. ANALYSIS
AEDPA provides for a one-year period of limitations during
which “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court” may apply for federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). The limitations period runs from “the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §
4 2244(d)(1)(A). Finality thus attaches when “the time for a
petition for certiorari [elapses] or a petition for certiorari
[is] finally denied.” Derman v . United States, 298 F.3d 3 4 , 40
(1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Griffith v . Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321
n.6 (1987)). For present purposes, McGinn’s conviction became
final, and the AEDPA period of limitations began to run, when his
right to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari lapsed on
November 1 3 , 2002.
A. Statutory tolling
Under AEDPA, the statutory period is tolled while a state
court prisoner seeks post-conviction relief in state court:
The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent claim or judgment is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitations under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, 267 days elapsed between the date
McGinn’s conviction became final and August 8 , 2008, the date he
moved for a new trial in the superior court. As the First
Circuit has previously noted, however, the filing of post-
conviction relief “does not reset the clock . . . , but merely
stops it temporarily, until the relevant applications for review
are ruled upon.” Trapp v . Spencer, 479 F.3d 5 3 , 58-59 (1st Cir.
5 2007). The limitations period, therefore, began to run once
again on January 1 3 , 2006, when the New Hampshire Supreme Court
declined to review the superior court’s decision on McGinn’s
motion for a new trial on remand,2 and continued to run until he
filed his habeas petition on March 2 8 , 2007, 439 days later.
Even accounting for the periods of tolling, McGinn filed his
habeas petition 709 days after his judgment became final, and
nearly one year after the AEDPA’s limitations period had expired.
B. Equitable tolling
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McGinn v . NH State Prison CV-07-88-JL 08/14/08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James McGinn
v. Civil No. 07-88-JL Opinion No. 2008 DNH 144 Interim Warden, New Hampshire State Prison
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The petitioner, James McGinn, seeks habeas corpus relief
from his 2001 state court conviction for felonious sexual
assault, claiming various constitutional infirmities attendant to
those proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The respondents move
for summary judgment, asserting that McGinn’s petition is barred
by the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1). McGinn objects, arguing that while his petition
was untimely, his late filing is excused by the doctrine of
equitable tolling.
This court has jurisdiction over McGinn’s petition under 42
U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and AEDPA (habeas relief for
state prisoners) in particular. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For
1 the reasons stated below, the court grants the respondents’
motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2001, McGinn was convicted in Rockingham County Superior
Court of five counts of felonious sexual assault. See N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 632-A:3. He was sentenced to consecutive three-and-a-
half to seven year prison terms on two of the counts, and
received suspended sentences on the remaining convictions.
McGinn, represented by counsel,1 brought a timely appeal in the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court
erred in various evidentiary rulings. The court rejected these
arguments, affirming his conviction, and, on August 1 5 , 2002,
denied his motion to reconsider that ruling. On November 1 3 ,
2002--90 days after his motion for reconsideration was denied--
McGinn’s right to petition the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari expired and his conviction became final. See
Sup. C t . R. 1 3 .
1 McGinn was represented by counsel through the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s denial of application for post conviction relief on January 1 3 , 2006.
2 On August 8 , 2003, McGinn moved the state trial court for a
new trial, which was denied, as was his ensuing request for
reconsideration. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
which affirmed the denial of the motion insofar as it challenged
McGinn’s conviction, but remanded the case to the superior court
to determine (1) whether imposing consecutive sentences was an
abuse of discretion, and (2) whether the failure to raise that
issue at sentencing constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. The superior court ultimately concluded that its
sentencing order was a sustainable exercise of discretion and
that trial counsel had not been ineffective. McGinn again sought
review of the superior court’s ruling in the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, but on January 1 3 , 2006, review was denied.
Proceeding pro s e , McGinn filed a habeas petition in this
court on March 2 8 , 2007. The Magistrate Judge recommended that
the petition be dismissed as untimely. This court, based on an
incomplete record of the state court proceedings, rejected the
magistrate’s recommendation and allowed McGinn’s petition to
proceed. The respondents have since moved for summary judgment,
arguing that McGinn’s petition is in fact barred by AEDPA’s
statute of limitations.
3 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must
first identify the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “produce
evidence on which a reasonable finder of fact, under the
appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that
party cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be granted.”
Ayala-Gerena v . Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st
Cir. 1996); see also In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 2 7 , 31 (1st Cir.
2001).
III. ANALYSIS
AEDPA provides for a one-year period of limitations during
which “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court” may apply for federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). The limitations period runs from “the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §
4 2244(d)(1)(A). Finality thus attaches when “the time for a
petition for certiorari [elapses] or a petition for certiorari
[is] finally denied.” Derman v . United States, 298 F.3d 3 4 , 40
(1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Griffith v . Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321
n.6 (1987)). For present purposes, McGinn’s conviction became
final, and the AEDPA period of limitations began to run, when his
right to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari lapsed on
November 1 3 , 2002.
A. Statutory tolling
Under AEDPA, the statutory period is tolled while a state
court prisoner seeks post-conviction relief in state court:
The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent claim or judgment is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitations under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, 267 days elapsed between the date
McGinn’s conviction became final and August 8 , 2008, the date he
moved for a new trial in the superior court. As the First
Circuit has previously noted, however, the filing of post-
conviction relief “does not reset the clock . . . , but merely
stops it temporarily, until the relevant applications for review
are ruled upon.” Trapp v . Spencer, 479 F.3d 5 3 , 58-59 (1st Cir.
5 2007). The limitations period, therefore, began to run once
again on January 1 3 , 2006, when the New Hampshire Supreme Court
declined to review the superior court’s decision on McGinn’s
motion for a new trial on remand,2 and continued to run until he
filed his habeas petition on March 2 8 , 2007, 439 days later.
Even accounting for the periods of tolling, McGinn filed his
habeas petition 709 days after his judgment became final, and
nearly one year after the AEDPA’s limitations period had expired.
B. Equitable tolling
McGinn does not dispute the fact that his habeas petition
was untimely. His argument is that, as a pro se petitioner, he
“is entitled to equitable tolling of the one year limitations
period due to his good faith misinterpretation of the applicable
AEDPA rules.” Under his misunderstanding of the law, McGinn
believed “he had one year from the end of all timely filed state
court litigation to file this petition . . . plus the 90 days to
file a cert petition.” He argues that, as “he was acting pro s e ,
2 An “application for state postconviction review is . . . not ‘pending’ after the state court’s postconviction review is complete, and § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1-year limitations period during the pendency of a petition for certiorari [or the 90-day period for filing one].” Lawrence v . Florida, 127 S . C t . 1079, 1083 (2007) (the Supreme Court of the United States “is not a part of a State’s post-conviction procedures”).
6 with no legal training and a lay person’s understanding of the
law,” his misunderstanding of the law--and consequent late filing
of his habeas petition--should equitably toll the AEDPA statute
of limitations.
The First Circuit has clearly stated that equitable tolling
of the AEDPA limitations period “is the exception rather than the
rule; resort to its prophylaxis is deemed justified only in
extraordinary circumstances.” Trapp, 479 F.3d at 5 9 ; see also
Brackett v . United States, 270 F.3d 6 0 , 67 (1st Cir. 2001)
(describing equitable tolling as a “narrow safety valve[]”
reserved for “instances of clear injustice”). It is limited to
cases where circumstances out of the petitioner’s control have
prevented him from promptly filing for habeas relief. See
Lattimore v . Dubois, 311 F.3d 4 6 , 55 (1st Cir. 2002). As the
party seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, McGinn
“bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v .
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
Equitable tolling is not appropriate in this case. McGinn
has failed to show that he diligently pursued his rights, and
makes no argument that extraordinary circumstances prevented him
from filing his petition within the limitations period. Instead,
7 McGinn, who filed his habeas petition pro s e , blames his inaction
on a lack of familiarity with the law. The First Circuit has
previously squarely addressed and rejected this very argument:
The petitioner’s assertion that his pro se status somehow entitles him to equitable tolling is wide of the mark. While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, the policy of liberal construction cannot plausibly justify a party’s failure to file a habeas petition on time.
Donovan v . Maine, 276 F.3d 8 7 , 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal
citation omitted); see also Lattimore, 311 F.3d at 55 (“Ignorance
of the law alone, even for incarcerated pro se prisoners, does
not excuse an untimely filing”). McGinn, represented by counsel,
waited 267 days after his direct appeal was denied before filing
for post-conviction relief. Even assuming that McGinn--and his
attorney--mistakenly believed he could not file his pro se habeas
petition until his application for post-conviction relief
concluded, he has failed to offer any explanation for the 439
days that passed before he actually filed his petition. In light
of these unexplained delays, McGinn cannot claim the benefit of
equitable tolling. See Neverson v . Farquharson, 366 F.3d 3 2 , 42
(1st Cir. 2004) (equitable tolling is “not available to rescue a
litigant from his own lack of due diligence”).
In support of his request for equitable tolling, McGinn
argues that “until the decision in Trapp [which was decided March
8 1 , only a few weeks before McGinn filed this petition on March
2 8 , 2007], it was not as clear that the one year AEDPA limitation
period covered the time before and after completion of timely
collateral challenges in state court.” The court rejects this
argument. As mentioned earlier, AEDPA clearly states, and has
stated since its enactment in 1996, that the “time during which a
properly filed application for State post-conviction [relief] is
pending shall not be counted towards any limitations period”
established by AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Indeed, dating
back to 2001, the Supreme Court has recognized that AEDPA’s
tolling provision “protect[s] a state prisoner’s ability later to
apply for federal habeas relief while state remedies are being
pursued.” Duncan v . Walker, 533 U.S. 167, (2001); see Delaney v .
Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7 , 11 (1st Cir. 2001). In light of this clear
statement of the law, coupled with the fact that McGinn was
represented by counsel while he pursued post-conviction relief,
the court rejects the argument that neither he nor his counsel
could decipher the tolling provision of Section 2244(d)(2). See
Trapp, 479 F.3d at 60 (“Generally, in civil cases, ‘garden-
variety’ attorney negligence, even if excusable, is not grounds
for equitable tolling.”).
9 IV. CONCLUSION
McGinn’s petition is necessarily dismissed as untimely since
it was filed beyond the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year
limitations period. Therefore, for the reasons stated above,
being careful “to avoid upsetting the ‘strong concern for
finality’ embodied in § 2254,” Neverson, 366 F.3d at 42 (quoting
Brackett, 270 F.3d at 6 8 ) , the court grants the respondents’
SO ORDERED.
Jt Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge
Date: August 1 4 , 2008
cc: Michael J. Sheehan, Esq. Thomas E . Bocian, Esq. Stephen D. Fuller, Esq.