McGinn v. McGinn

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

McGinn v. McGinn

60 A.D.2d 623, 400 N.Y.S.2d 145, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14595

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 19, 1977

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 60 A.D.2d 623 (McGinn v. McGinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McGinn v. McGinn, 60 A.D.2d 623, 400 N.Y.S.2d 145, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14595 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).

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Opinion

In a matrimonial action, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated October 14, 1976, which denied his motion to eliminate his obligation to make alimony payments or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff to contribute to the education expenses of the children of the marriage. Order reversed, without costs or disbursements, and action remanded to Special Term for a hearing in accordance herewith. Defendant-appellant moved to eliminate his obligation to make alimony payments or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff-respondent to contribute to the college education expenses of their children. Although conflicting facts were presented, Special Term denied the application on the merits without a hearing. Such denial, under these circumstances, was an improvident exercise of discretion (see Dostanko v Dostanko, 57 AD2d 885). A hearing is necessary to determine the financial capabilities of the parties in order to properly determine the motion (cf. Matter of Carter v Carter, 58 AD2d 438). Hopkins, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

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In a matrimonial action, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated October 14, 1976, which denied his motion to eliminate his obligation to make alimony payments or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff to contribute to the education expenses of the children of the marriage. Order reversed, without costs or disbursements, and action remanded to Special Term for a hearing in accordance herewith. Defendant-appellant moved to eliminate his obligation to make alimony payments or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff-respondent to contribute to the college education expenses of their children. Although conflicting facts were presented, Special Term denied the application on the merits without a hearing. Such denial, under these circumstances, was an improvident exercise of discretion (see Dostanko v Dostanko, 57 AD2d 885). A hearing is necessary to determine the financial capabilities of the parties in order to properly determine the motion (cf. Matter of Carter v Carter, 58 AD2d 438). Hopkins, J. P., Rabin, Shapiro and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

60 A.D.2d 623, 400 N.Y.S.2d 145, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14595, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcginn-v-mcginn-nyappdiv-1977.

Opinion

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