McGhee v. State of Arizona

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: 24-2460
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH MARTIN McGHEE, No. 24-2460 D.C. No. 3:23-cv-08601-SRB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

STATE OF ARIZONA, a sovereign State of the United States of America; RYAN FORSMAN, as an individual and in his official capacity as police officer employed by the City of Flagstaff; DARA RABIN, as a private party state actor; WILLIAM RING, in his official capacity as Coconino County Attorney; AMMON BARKER, in his official capacity as Chief Deputy Coconino County Attorney; COUNTY OF COCONINO, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Joseph Martin McGhee appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging federal and state

law claims pertaining to his arrest and prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Sanders v. City of Pittsburg, 14 F.4th 968, 970 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred McGhee’s

constitutional claims relating to his arrest and prosecution because success on these

claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and McGhee has

not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at

486-87 (holding that if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated”); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996)

(affirming a Heck-based dismissal of § 1983 claims alleging that police officers

lacked probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest and brought unfounded criminal

charges).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as moot McGhee’s

motion for leave to amend the complaint. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home

2 24-2460 Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We decline to address the qualified immunity issues raised by McGhee in

his opening brief that were outside the scope of the district court’s judgment.

McGhee’s motion (Docket Entry Nos. 25, 26) for judicial notice is denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-2460