McGhee v. Grainger County, Tennessee

E.D. Tennessee

McGhee v. Grainger County, Tennessee

DecidedOctober 26, 2022

Docket2:22-cv-00038

StatusUnknown

This text of McGhee v. Grainger County, Tennessee (McGhee v. Grainger County, Tennessee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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McGhee v. Grainger County, Tennessee, (E.D. Tenn. 2022).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

CANDACE MCGHEE and CHASITY ) BAILEY, individually and on behalf of all ) others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) No.: 2:22-CV-38-KAC-CRW ) v. ) ) GRAINER COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ) JAMES HARVILLE, CHRIS HARVILLE, ) LEONARD DALTON, and TRAVIS ) HANK DAVIS, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER CLOSING CASE

Before the Court is the Parties’ “Joint Motion to Dismiss” this action, filed on October 5, 2022 [Doc. 14]. In that motion, joined and signed by all Parties who have appeared in this action, the Parties ask the Court to dismiss this action in its entirety, dismissing the named Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and any claims of yet-unnamed and undefined potential class members without prejudice [Id. at 1]. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide two distinct procedures for dismissal that are relevant here. First, under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). “Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) orders, generally speaking are ‘self-executing’ and do ‘not require judicial approval.’” Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. DeMoisey, 718 F.3d 535, 540 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1301 (6th Cir. 1997)). Second, under Rule 41(a)(2), “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Here, the Parties, through their “Joint Motion to Dismiss” [Doc. 14], have satisfied the requirements for dismissal as a matter of right under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). As such, the Parties’ stipulation of dismissal was effective upon filing on October 5, 2022, and no order from this Court is required. See Exact Software N. Am., Inc., 718 F.3d at 540; see also Dillon-Barber v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,

51 F. App’x 946, 951 (6th Cir. 2002). Because there are no issues remaining in this case, an appropriate judgment shall enter. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Katherine A. Crytzer KATHERINE A. CRYTZER United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

CANDACE MCGHEE and CHASITY ) BAILEY, individually and on behalf of all ) others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) No.: 2:22-CV-38-KAC-CRW ) v. ) ) GRAINER COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ) JAMES HARVILLE, CHRIS HARVILLE, ) LEONARD DALTON, and TRAVIS ) HANK DAVIS, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER CLOSING CASE

Before the Court is the Parties’ “Joint Motion to Dismiss” this action, filed on October 5, 2022 [Doc. 14]. In that motion, joined and signed by all Parties who have appeared in this action, the Parties ask the Court to dismiss this action in its entirety, dismissing the named Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and any claims of yet-unnamed and undefined potential class members without prejudice [Id. at 1]. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide two distinct procedures for dismissal that are relevant here. First, under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). “Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) orders, generally speaking are ‘self-executing’ and do ‘not require judicial approval.’” Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. DeMoisey, 718 F.3d 535, 540 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1301 (6th Cir. 1997)). Second, under Rule 41(a)(2), “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Here, the Parties, through their “Joint Motion to Dismiss” [Doc. 14], have satisfied the requirements for dismissal as a matter of right under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). As such, the Parties’ stipulation of dismissal was effective upon filing on October 5, 2022, and no order from this Court is required. See Exact Software N. Am., Inc., 718 F.3d at 540; see also Dillon-Barber v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,

51 F. App’x 946, 951 (6th Cir. 2002). Because there are no issues remaining in this case, an appropriate judgment shall enter. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Katherine A. Crytzer KATHERINE A. CRYTZER United States District Judge

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McGhee v. Grainger County, Tennessee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcghee-v-grainger-county-tennessee-tned-2022.

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