McGhee v. Broomfield

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedFebruary 7, 2023
Docket4:20-cv-05135
StatusUnknown

This text of McGhee v. Broomfield (McGhee v. Broomfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGhee v. Broomfield, (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TIJUE ADOLPHUS MCGHEE, Case No. 20-cv-05135-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO REOPEN 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 24 10 R. JAIME-DAUMY, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Plaintiff filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against San Quentin State 14 Prison (“SQSP”) officers Jaime-Daumy and Wren. On March 22, 2021, the Court dismissed this 15 case for failure to prosecute. Dkt. No. 16. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s request to 16 reopen this action. Dkt. No. 24. For the reasons set forth below, this request is DENIED. 17 DISCUSSION 18 I. Procedural History 19 On or about July 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Dkt. No. 1. On September 28, 2020, the Court found that the complaint’s allegation that SQSP 21 officer Jaime-Daumy read Plaintiff’s legal mail that was addressed to his appellate counsel, and 22 that SQSP officer Wren allowed it, stated cognizable First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 23 claims. Dkt. Nos. 1, 8. On March 22, 2021, the Court dismissed this action and entered judgment 24 in favor of Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute and for failure to 25 respond to the Court’s January 7, 2021 Order ordering Plaintiff to provide the Court with an 26 updated address where he could be reached. Dkt. Nos. 16, 17.1 The Court dismissed the action 27 1 without prejudice to reopening if Plaintiff could demonstrate good cause for the failure to 2 prosecute. Dkt. No. 16 at 3. On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a request for judgment in his 3 favor, which the Court denied as moot on September 14, 2022, noting that judgment had already 4 been entered in favor of Defendants. Dkt. No. 21. The Court also informed Plaintiff that to the 5 extent that he was seeking to reopen this case, he was required to demonstrate good cause for 6 failing to prosecute this action from August 11, 2020 to September 6, 2022. Dkt. No. 21. 7 II. Motion to Reopen 8 Plaintiff has filed a pleading titled “Reply to the Court for Reopening of Dismissed Action 9 without Prejudice Good Cause to be Determined by Hon. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam Jr.,” which 10 the Court construes as a request to set aside the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and 11 reopen this action.2 Dkt. No. 24. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES this request. 12 A. Legal Standard 13 “[Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)] has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 14 manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 15 from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” United States v. 16 Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, to reopen a 17 case under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must establish “both injury and circumstances beyond his control 18 that prevented him from proceeding in a proper fashion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see, 19 e.g., id. at 1160-61 (finding plaintiffs entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because tribal non- 20 recognition was extraordinary circumstance beyond their control which prevented them from 21 proceeding in proper fashion). In considering whether to grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the 22 following factors may be relevant to the analysis: (1) whether the plaintiff has made a showing of 23 extraordinary circumstances, such as a change in intervening law; (2) whether the petitioner 24 exercised diligence in pursuing the issues; (3) interest in finality; (4) delay between the finality of 25

26 2 Plaintiff has attached to his motion a habeas corpus petition that he wishes to file, which names the Oakland Police Department as a respondent, and seeks to challenge a 1993 conviction which 27 resulted in a 9-month sentence. See Dkt. No. 24 at 14-30. This action is a Section 1983 civil 1 the judgment and the motion for Rule 60(b)(6) relief; and (5) degree of connection between the 2 extraordinary circumstance and the decision for which reconsideration is sought.3 See Henson v. 3 Fidelity Nat’l Financial, Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 2019) (factors set forth in Phelps v. 4 Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009), which considered Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) relief in 5 the context of habeas proceedings, are also relevant in civil rights context). The Court must 6 consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the specific Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Id. 7 B. Analysis 8 Plaintiff argues that the following facts constitute good cause for failure to prosecute this 9 action from August 11, 2020 to September 6, 2022. During this time period, Plaintiff deliberately 10 engaged off and on in heavy drug use, causing him to be become unhoused and cycle in and out of 11 temporary housing and correctional facilities; Plaintiff suffered health issues from unknowingly 12 using crack cocaine that was laced with fentanyl and contracting a bacterial infection from 13 scraping his knee on San Francisco’s bacteria-infested streets; Plaintiff’s property, including his 14 legal documents, was stolen, confiscated, or otherwise made unavailable to him; and Plaintiff 15 engaged in petty crime (“boosting” from stores) to get money. See generally Dkt. No. 24. 16 Applying the Phelps factors listed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown the 17 required “extraordinary circumstances” or “manifest injustice” necessary to set aside a judgment 18 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 19 The first and second factors – showing of extraordinary circumstances and diligence in 20 pursing this action – weigh against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not made a showing of either 21 extraordinary circumstances or diligence. His failure to prosecute this case was due to his 22 deliberate decisions to engage in drug use and in actions that resulted in incarceration. See, e.g., 23 Dkt. No. 24 at 2-3 (reporting that he received the Court’s January 7, 2021, told himself he had to 24 get it done, placed the document in his backpack, and then “went on with [his] day using drugs 25 ‘crack’ and trying to figure out a way to gain money with[out] committing any felonys (sic)”). 26 The third and fourth factors – interest in finality and delay between the finality of the 27 1 || judgment and this motion — also weigh against Plaintiff. Nearly two years have passed since this 2 || case was closed. 3 The fifth factor — degree of connection between the extraordinary circumstance and the 4 || decision for which reconsideration is sought — is neutral. The alleged extraordinary circumstances 5 || — using drugs, being incarcerated, and lacking access to his legal documents — are the reasons that 6 || Plaintiff seeks to reopen this action. But because these alleged extraordinary circumstances were 7 || the product of Plaintiff's voluntary choices, i.e.

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Related

United States v. Washington
394 F.3d 1152 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Phelps v. Alameida
569 F.3d 1120 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Melissia Henson v. Fidelity National Financial
943 F.3d 434 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
McGhee v. Broomfield, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcghee-v-broomfield-cand-2023.