McGee-Weiss v. Parker, II

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedAugust 29, 2025
Docket25-01232
StatusUnknown

This text of McGee-Weiss v. Parker, II (McGee-Weiss v. Parker, II) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGee-Weiss v. Parker, II, (Fla. 2025).

Opinion

Poe Oy, Vx * OS aR’ if * A iL Ss eA □□□ a Ways 6 Ye, AIK gp □□ AR □□□ ‘Disrmict OF OE ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on August 28, 2025.

Scott M. Grossman, Judge United States Bankruptcy Court

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION In re: Charles William Parker, IJ, Case No. 24-17138-SMG Debtor. Chapter 7 ee Lauren McGee-Weiss, Plaintiff, V. Adv. No. 25-1232-SMG Charles William Parker, IJ, Defendant. ee ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT Defendant Charles William Parker, II filed for bankruptcy on July 17, 2024.1! He voluntarily converted his case from chapter 13 to chapter 7 on August 2, 2024.2

1 Case No. 24-17138-SMG (Main Case) (ECF No. 1). 2 Main Case, ECF No. 20.

On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff Lauren McGee-Weiss filed a complaint3 objecting to Mr. Parker’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(3) and (a)(6)(A). Ms. McGee-Weiss based her complaint on this Court’s findings in its January 10, 2025 order holding

Mr. Parker in contempt of court.4 Specifically, the Court found that Mr. Parker failed to obey court orders and without justification failed to keep or preserve recorded information from which his financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained.5 Although Mr. Parker appealed the contempt order,6 he later voluntarily dismissed that appeal.7 Ms. McGee-Weiss served8 the summons,9 the complaint,10 and the order

setting scheduling conference11 on Mr. Parker on July 2, 2025, at 2242 SE 10th St. Pompano Beach, FL 33062. This is the address listed on Mr. Parker’s bankruptcy petition as both his home address and his mailing address.12 Mr. Parker has never filed a notice of change of address in either his bankruptcy case or this adversary proceeding. Mr. Parker did not respond to the complaint. As a result, on July 28, 2025, Ms. McGee-Weiss filed a verified motion for clerk’s default,13 and on July 29, 2025, a

3 ECF No. 1. 4 Main Case, ECF No. 98. 5 Id. 6 Main Case, ECF No. 104. 7 Main Case, ECF No. 130. 8 ECF Nos. 4, 5. 9 ECF No. 2. 10 ECF No. 1. 11 ECF No. 3. 12 Main Case, ECF No. 1, at p. 2, § 5. 13 ECF No. 6. default was entered14 against Mr. Parker. Ms. McGee-Weiss then moved for entry of default judgment,15 which the Court granted.16 On August 1, 2025, the Court then entered a final default judgment17 against Mr. Parker denying his discharge under

11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(3) and (a)(6)(A). On August 11, 2025, Mr. Parker filed a motion to set aside the default judgment,18 along with a motion to dismiss the complaint.19 He argues that the default and default judgment should be vacated because he did not receive service of the complaint until August 7, 2025, and thus was not afforded due process or an opportunity to defend himself. In his motion, he lists his current address as 6141 Old

Bagdad Highway, Milton, FL 32583. Attached to his motion, however, is a photocopy of the service envelope, which shows that the envelope was forwarded on August 2, 2025 to him at yet another address – 751 E. McNab Rd., Apt. 2, Pompano Beach, FL 33060-9441. Notwithstanding the new address listed in his motion, or the other address shown on the copy of the forwarded service envelope, Mr. Parker never filed a notice of change of address with the Court. In fact, his address is still listed in his bankruptcy case as 2242 SE 10th St. Pompano Beach, FL 33062.

Debtors in bankruptcy have certain responsibilities. One of them is filing a statement of any change in the debtor’s address.20 This obligation is significant

14 ECF No. 7. 15 ECF No. 8. 16 ECF No. 9. 17 ECF No. 12. 18 ECF No. 17. 19 ECF No. 18. 20 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4002(a)(5). A debtor’s obligation to update his address only ends when the case is closed or dismissed. See In re Cantrell, 2019 WL 2323772, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019). because Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004 permits service by mail on a debtor at the address shown on the debtor’s petition or the address the debtor specifies in a filed writing. Specifically, Rule 7004(b)(9) provides in relevant part that:

a copy of a summons and complaint may be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, within the United States on . . . the debtor, after a petition has been filed by or served upon a debtor, and until the case is dismissed or closed – by mailing the copy to the address shown on the debtor’s petition or the address the debtor specifies in a filed writing.21 “Generally, where notice is sent to the address listed by the debtor in his or her bankruptcy petition, due process is satisfied.”22 Proof of actual receipt of the notice is not required, and “courts have held that service is effective on a debtor even if mailed to the wrong address, if the address to which it is mailed is the last listed by the debtor in a filed writing.”23 Thus, “[t]he debtor who fails to keep the court apprised of his proper mailing address has only himself to blame.”24 Here, Ms. McGee-Weiss served Mr. Parker with the summons, the complaint, the motion for default, and the motion for default judgment, all at his last known address, which at that time was the address shown on his petition. Absent Mr. Parker filing a notice of change of address, Ms. McGee-Weiss satisfied the requirements of

21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7004(b)(9). 22 Cantrell, 2019 WL 2323772, at *3; see also In re DeVore, 223 B.R. 193, 196 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“Mailing a notice by first class mail to a party’s last known address is sufficient to satisfy due process.”). 23 Id. (citing In re Coggin, 30 F.3d 1443, 1450 (11th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004)). 24 In re Davis, 275 B.R. 864, 867 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 55 F. App’x 789 (8th Cir. 2003). Rule 7004(b)(9), and Mr. Parker received appropriate due process. Accordingly, there is no basis to vacate the final default judgment. It is therefore ORDERED that:

1. Mr. Parker’s motion25 to set aside the default and the default judgment is DENIED. 2. Mr. Parker’s motion to dismiss26 is DENIED AS MOOT. # # #

Copies furnished to: Mark S. Roher, Esq.

Charles William Parker, II 2242 SE 10 St Pompano Beach, FL 33062

Charles William Parker, II 6141 Old Bagdad Highway Milton, FL 32583

25 ECF No. 17. 26 ECF No. 18.

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Related

Kontrick v. Ryan
540 U.S. 443 (Supreme Court, 2004)
DeVore v. Marshack (In Re DeVore)
223 B.R. 193 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Davis v. Case (In Re Davis)
275 B.R. 864 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Lawrence Davis v. E. Rebecca Case
55 F. App'x 789 (Eighth Circuit, 2003)

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