McGee v. Vandeventer

166 N.E. 151, 334 Ill. 305
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 1929
DocketNo. 19300. Decree affirmed.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 166 N.E. 151 (McGee v. Vandeventer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGee v. Vandeventer, 166 N.E. 151, 334 Ill. 305 (Ill. 1929).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

At the June term, 1927, this court reversed a decree of the circuit court of McDonough county which overruled a demurrer to a third amended and supplemental bill filed by the heirs of Thomas J. Caldwell, who died testate on February 7, 1906, for the partition of certain real estate which he had owned in his lifetime but which it was alleged he had not disposed of by his will, and ordered partition of the real estate. Some of the defendants to the bill who had demurred elected to stand by their demurrers, while others, among whom was the present appellant, Don P. Pennywitt, filed answers, and the decree was entered against those defendants, only, who had declined to answer,, and expressly provided that the commissioners should not make partition until after the final determination of the case as to the parties who had not stood by their demurrers, and that the decree should not be binding upon or affect the rights of any of the defendants except those who had stood by their demurrers and against whom the bill had been taken as confessed for refusal to answer. McGee v. Vandeventer, 326 Ill. 425.

The will of Thomas J. Caldwell, executed on April 22, 1903, after providing for the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, some minor bequests and certain provision for his wife, continued as follows:

“Eighthr- — A part of the income of my estate over and above the bequests hereinbefore named, including the annual allowance set apart to my wife, I direct to be used for charitable purposes, the McDonough County Holiness Association to receive a portion of said bequest, the amount and purposes for which said bequests is to be used, I leave to the discretion of my wife, Elsie Caldwell.

“Ninth — After the death of my wife, Elsie Caldwell, all the rest and residue of my estate I desire shall be used for charitable and religious purposes, my said wife to direct in her lifetime in what amount and for what specific purposes said estate shall be used.

“Tenth — I hereby authorize my executor hereinafter named to make and deliver all deeds or leases necessary for the carrying out of the provisions of this will and for the carrying into effect any of the contracts for deeds that may be incompleted at the time of my death.”

The testator’s widow, Elsie Caldwell, was nominated as executrix. Letters testamentary were issued to her upon probate of the will, and within a year she renounced the benefit of the provision made for her by the will and elected to take her statutory rights in the estate, which consisted of 378 acres of land, a residence occupied as a homestead in the city of Macomb, and personal property exceeding $40,000 in value.

The heirs of the testator soon after his death began a suit in the circuit court of McDonough county to declare paragraphs 8 and 9 of the will void and all of the estate of the testator, except the special bequests in the will, intestate. The court sustained a demurrer by the executrix and beneficiaries of the will to that bill, the decree dismissing the bill for want of equity was affirmed, and it was held that the will created charitable trusts capable of enforcement of which Elsie Caldwell was the trustee, with power as such to appoint the beneficiaries of the trusts and the amounts and purposes for which the estate should be used. It was also held that the ninth paragraph of the will was a gift of the rest and residue of the estate, at the death of the widow, to charitable and religious purposes generally, without specifying the particular objects but with power given to the widow to select .such objects; that such power was valid, and if exercised the estate would be disposed of according to the testator’s will. Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill. 488.

Elsie Caldwell died on January 17, 1924, leaving a will, which purported to exercise the power of appointment created by the will of Thomas J. Caldwell, and the question for determination in the case of McGee v. Vandeventer, supra, was whether her will was a valid execution of the power. The appellants in that case were the executor of Mrs. Caldwell’s will and the claimants, as benefici- ’ aries of the will of Caldwell, under the appointment of Mrs. Caldwell’s will, and the decision was that Mrs. Caldwell’s will, dated July 19, 1921, was a valid exercise of the power and a direction in her lifetime in what amount and for what specific purposes the estate of Caldwell should be used, as authorized by the ninth paragraph of his will. Don P. Pennywitt was not a party to that adjudication or in any way affected by it, since he had not abided by his demurrer to the third amended bill but had filed an answer to it and had been expressly excluded from the decree.

Upon the remandment of the cause the original complainants, the heirs of Thomas J. Caldwell, filed a fourth amended and supplemental bill and Pennywitt filed his answer to it, which was substantially the same as the answer which he had previously filed to the third amended bill. Pennywitt, who had also filed a cross-bill alleging that Elsie Caldwell, long before the execution of her will, executed an instrument in writing under seal whereby she appointed Pennywitt, together with Albert Eads and Stephen E. Blackstone, both of whom had since died, trustee to carry out the trusts created by the will of Caldwell, and that Pennywitt, Eads and Blackstone, by a written declaration of acceptance signed by them on said instrument of writing, accepted the trust and appointment, and praying for the establishment and confirmation of the trust so created in the cross-complainant as the surviving trustee, filed by leave of court a second amended cross-bill, which was practically the same as the first amended cross-bill except that it contained additional allegations in opposition to the claim of the heirs of Caldwell that the judgment of the Supreme Court on the appeal had been an adjudication against Pennywitt’s claim. The complainants in the fourth amended original bill, the heirs of Caldwell, then filed a disclaimer of any interest in the suit or right in the subject matter, stating that the court might dismiss the bill as far as the complainants were concerned. This action eliminated the heirs of Caldwell from- the litigation, leaving the only question pending that between Pennywitt, claiming as trustee under the alleged earlier appointment of Mrs. Caldwell, and the beneficiaries under the appointment in her will. Demurrers were filed to the amended cross-bill and were sustained by the court, which dismissed the cross-bill for want of equity. The complainant in the amended cross-bill has appealed.

The question is whether the second amended cross-bill shows a valid exercise by Mrs. Caldwell of the power of appointment under her husband’s will, and if it does, whether such appointment is revocable and has been revoked.

The will of Thomas J. Caldwell created two separate trusts — one by the eighth paragraph, which was held in Welch v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Illinois State Trust Co. v. Southern Illinois National Bank
329 N.E.2d 805 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1975)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 N.E. 151, 334 Ill. 305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgee-v-vandeventer-ill-1929.