McGee v. Poverello House

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 4, 2019
Docket1:18-cv-00768
StatusUnknown

This text of McGee v. Poverello House (McGee v. Poverello House) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGee v. Poverello House, (E.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 JILL MCGEE; et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00768-LJO-SAB

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE STIPULATION TO DISMISS 13 PLAINTIFFS’ SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION v. FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION,

14 CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND

POVERELLO HOUSE; et al., PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 ET SEQ. 15 16 Defendants. (ECF No. 43)

18 On October 2, 2019, stipulations were filed to dismiss certain Plaintiffs from this action and to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action. An order was filed on October 3, 2019, dismiss 19 Plaintiffs Noadiah Riaz, Christine Dambrosi and Lacey Hoxsie from this action without 20 prejudice. By this order, the Court addresses the parties’ stipulation to dismiss the sixth cause 21 of action. 22 The Ninth Circuit has held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) cannot be used 23 to dismiss individual claims against defendants, and that Rule 15 is the proper mechanism to do 24 so. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In 25 the specific context of Rule 41(a)(1), we have held that the Rule does not allow for piecemeal 26 27 dismissals. Instead, withdrawals of individual claims against a given defendant are governed by 28 [Rule 15].”); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding a 1 plaintiff cannot use Rule 41 “to dismiss, unilaterally, a single claim from a multi-claim 2 complaint.”); but see Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The 3 Plaintiff may dismiss some or all of the defendants, or some or all of his claims, through a Rule 4 41(a)(1) notice.”). The Court finds it proper to construe the parties’ stipulation to dismiss the 5 individual cause of action as consent to amend the complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules 6 of Civil Procedure. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council, 403 F.3d at 689 (“The fact that a voluntary 7 dismissal of a claim under Rule 41(a) is properly labeled an amendment under Rule 15 is a 8 technical, not a substantive distinction.”) (quoting Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784 9 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Therefore, the Court will give full effect to the parties’ stipulation through a 10 Rule 15 amendment. 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to the parties’ stipulation to 12 dismiss Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for unfair competition in violation of California 13 Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. without prejudice against Defendants 14 Poverello House and Naomi’s House, the Plaintiffs’ operative complaint (ECF No. 1 at 5-16) is 15 DEEMED AMENDED and the sixth cause of action is no longer alleged against Defendants 16 Poverello House and Naomi’s House. 17

18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: October 4, 2019 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 20 UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Related

Wilson v. City of San Jose
111 F.3d 688 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
McGee v. Poverello House, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgee-v-poverello-house-caed-2019.