McGee v. New York City Housing Authority

122 A.D.3d 695, 995 N.Y.S.2d 724
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedNovember 12, 2014
Docket2013-09148
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 122 A.D.3d 695 (McGee v. New York City Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGee v. New York City Housing Authority, 122 A.D.3d 695, 995 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), dated July 18, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on an accumulation of water in one of the stairwells of the defendant’s building, where she resided in an apartment on the top floor. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it did not create the alleged dangerous condition, *696 and did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion. We affirm.

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall action is required to demonstrate, prima facie, that it maintained the subject property in a reasonably safe condition and that it neither created the alleged dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice thereof (see Rodriguez v Shoprite Supermarkets, Inc., 119 AD3d 923, 923 [2014]). The defendant here established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that its employees had inspected the subject stairwell on the day prior to the accident, and did not observe any water condition at that time. The defendant further demonstrated, prima facie, that it had not received any complaints regarding the condition prior to the accident. In opposition, however, the plaintiff asserted in her affidavit that there had been a recent rainfall during which the water had already accumulated shortly before the inspection of the area by the defendant’s employees, thus raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the existence of the condition. Moreover, the plaintiff submitted evidence that residents of the building had previously complained to the defendant about a specific ongoing and recurring dangerous condition, consisting of a leak in the roof area above the stairwell, which allowed water to accumulate on the stairway whenever it rained, thus raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had constructive notice of the dangerous condition (see Nikolakopoulos v New York City Tr., 115 AD3d 716 [2014]; Santiago v JP Morgan Chase & Co., 96 AD3d 642 [2012]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Balkin, J.E, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Asprou v. Hellenic Orthodox Community of Astoria
2020 NY Slip Op 3758 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2020)
Rivera v. Waterview Towers, Inc.
2020 NY Slip Op 1946 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2020)
Sperling v. Wyckoff Heights Hospital
129 A.D.3d 826 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
122 A.D.3d 695, 995 N.Y.S.2d 724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgee-v-new-york-city-housing-authority-nyappdiv-2014.