McGee v. City of Palo Alto

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJuly 27, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-02113
StatusUnknown

This text of McGee v. City of Palo Alto (McGee v. City of Palo Alto) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGee v. City of Palo Alto, (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANTHONY MCGEE, Case No. 23-cv-02113-JD

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE IFP APPLICATION AND 9 v. DISMISSAL

10 CITY OF PALO ALTO, et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 Pro se plaintiff Anthony McGee filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) 14 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and a complaint alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment and the 15 California Government Code against defendants the City of Palo Alto, the Palo Alto District 16 Attorney’s Office, and the Palo Alto Police Department. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. 17 IFP requests are evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The first question is whether the 18 plaintiff’s financial status excuses payment of the court’s filing fees. The answer is yes. McGee 19 states that he is unemployed with no sources of income, and pays monthly expenses of 20 approximately $1,475. Dkt. No. 4. McGee meets the financial qualifications for IFP status. 21 The next question is whether the complaint is sufficient to stand, and the answer is no. The 22 Court may “at any time” dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief may 23 be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The standard is the same as under Federal Rule of 24 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court has 25 afforded McGee and his complaint a liberal construction, as is appropriate for pro se litigants, but 26 he must still allege facts plausibly demonstrating a claim for relief for the complaint to go forward. 27 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Nordin v. Scott, No. 21-cv-04717- 1 The complaint as it currently stands does not meet these standards. The sole federal claim 2 is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an allegedly false arrest that occurred on April 20, 2023, 3 and subsequent detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 17-32. The main 4 problem is that the complaint does not allege that McGee has obtained a favorable termination of 5 the criminal charges against him, which is required to recover damages for an allegedly 6 unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment under Section 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 7 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1994); see also Davis v. Suhr, No. 16-cv-04487-JD, 2017 WL 475289, at *1 8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017). If anything, the complaint indicates that the criminal charges against 9 McGee were unresolved when he filed suit. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 11 (alleging that the District 10 Attorney “did not dismiss the charges alleged in a criminal complaint against the Plaintiff”); id. ¶ 11 14 (alleging that a further court appearance “for the allegations of failing to register as a sex 12 offender” was set for June 7, 2023). 13 If a plaintiff files “a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other 14 claim related to rulings that likely will be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial),” the 15 district court may “stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case 16 is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). If the plaintiff is then convicted, and if 17 the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck requires dismissal; otherwise, the case 18 may proceed. Id. at 394; see also Davis, 2017 WL 475289, at *2. 19 Because it is unclear from the pleadings if McGee has been convicted of any crime, if 20 charges are currently pending, or if charges have been dismissed, the complaint is dismissed with 21 leave to amend to provide more information about the current status of criminal charges against 22 McGee. In addition, McGee must present more information on how his arrest was unlawful and 23 violated the constitution. Simply providing a few conclusory allegations is insufficient. He must 24 also describe the actions of specific defendants. That resolves the only federal claim in the complaint. Until a plausible federal claim is 25 alleged, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1376(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Arizona, Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013); 27 1 see also Doe v. City of Concord, No. 20-cv-02432-JD, 2021 WL 3140782, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2 || 26, 2021). 3 McGee may file an amended complaint by August 17, 2023. McGee may not add any new 4 || defendants or claims, or make any additional filings in this case without the Court’s prior 5 approval. A failure to meet this deadline will result in a dismissal of the case under Federal Rule 6 of Civil Procedure 41(b). The motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 19, is terminated without prejudice, 7 and the case management conference set for August 3, 2023, is vacated pending further order. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: July 27, 2023 10 11 JAMES ATO %L United Yates District Judge

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Related

Maley v. Shattuck
7 U.S. 458 (Supreme Court, 1806)
Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Raymond Watison v. Mary Carter
668 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Guillermina Parra v. Pacificare of Arizona, Inc.
715 F.3d 1146 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
McGee v. City of Palo Alto, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgee-v-city-of-palo-alto-cand-2023.