McGann v. McGann

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

McGann v. McGann

88 A.D.2d 905, 450 N.Y.S.2d 773, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17237

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 1, 1982

StatusPublished

This text of 88 A.D.2d 905 (McGann v. McGann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McGann v. McGann, 88 A.D.2d 905, 450 N.Y.S.2d 773, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17237 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal by defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gowan, J.), dated December 31, 1981, which denied defendant’s motion to direct plaintiff to sell her interest in the former marital residence to him. Order reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and matter remitted to Special Term for a hearing consistent herewith. Special Term was asked to interpret a certain stipulation entered into by the parties as it pertains to the [906]*906buyout and/or sale of the former marital residence. The court found that the buyout period expired October 1,1981. As a result, Special Term did not reach the question of whether defendant had validly exercised his option under the stipulation, and if he had, whether plaintiff’s alleged acts and representations made between October 9 and October 13, 1981 prevented his good faith attempt to purchase the house. Such determination cannot be made on the basis of the record before this court. A hearing must be held to resolve this issue. Gulotta, J. P., O’Connor, Thompson and Brown, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gowan, J.), dated December 31, 1981, which denied defendant’s motion to direct plaintiff to sell her interest in the former marital residence to him. Order reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and matter remitted to Special Term for a hearing consistent herewith. Special Term was asked to interpret a certain stipulation entered into by the parties as it pertains to the [906]*906buyout and/or sale of the former marital residence. The court found that the buyout period expired October 1,1981. As a result, Special Term did not reach the question of whether defendant had validly exercised his option under the stipulation, and if he had, whether plaintiff’s alleged acts and representations made between October 9 and October 13, 1981 prevented his good faith attempt to purchase the house. Such determination cannot be made on the basis of the record before this court. A hearing must be held to resolve this issue. Gulotta, J. P., O’Connor, Thompson and Brown, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

88 A.D.2d 905, 450 N.Y.S.2d 773, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17237, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgann-v-mcgann-nyappdiv-1982.