M.C.G. v. Houston County Department of Human Resources, M.T., C.W.T., and C.T.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

M.C.G. v. Houston County Department of Human Resources, M.T., C.W.T., and C.T.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama·Decided August 28, 2026·No. CL-2026-0124·Published

Opinion

Rel: August 28, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026

CL-2026-0123 and CL-2026-0124

M.C.G.

v.

Houston County Department of Human Resources, M.T., C.W.T., and C.T.

Appeal from Houston Juvenile Court (JU-24-446.01 and JU-24-447.01)

BOWDEN, Judge.

In July 2024, the Houston County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") filed dependency petitions in the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") seeking orders finding T.W.T. and N.S. ("the children")

dependent. DHR's petitions alleged that the children's mother, M.C.G. ("the mother"), had committed acts of domestic violence and abuse while intoxicated. The petitions resulted in a finding of dependency, and DHR required the mother to complete services that were tailored to reducing the risks posed by alcohol use and domestic violence, which she did. In January 2026, the juvenile court entered judgments finding that the children remained dependent and awarding legal custody of the children to T.W.T.'s paternal grandparents M.T. and C.W.T. ("the paternal grandparents"), i.e., the parents of C.T., T.W.T.'s father.1 The mother appeals.

On appeal, the mother argues that the evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the children were dependent because, she says, she completed the services DHR required and the initial conditions that precipitated DHR's intervention no longer exist. But a trial court can find a child to be a dependent child for reasons other than the initial reasons that caused the child to be found dependent. Here, the juvenile court reasonably could have found that there was clear and convincing

1C.T. was adjudicated T.W.T.'s legal father during the proceedings below.

evidence demonstrating that the children remained dependent because of the mother's limited financial means. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the juvenile court.

Procedural History

DHR filed dependency petitions in July 2024. In November 2024, the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing and entered orders ("the dependency orders") that found the children to be dependent children. The juvenile court then held a dispositional hearing over four days: August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January 12, 2026. On January 12, 2026, the juvenile court entered judgments ("the dependency judgments") that found the children to be dependent and transferred legal custody of the children to the paternal grandparents. The dependency judgments did not contain specific findings of fact, but the mother filed a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dependency judgments on January 20, 2026. The mother's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on February 3, 2026, and she timely filed notices of appeal on February 16, 2026.

Analysis

The mother presents two arguments. Her first argument is that DHR failed to present clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the children were dependent. Her second argument is that, because the children are not dependent children, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer custody of the children to the paternal grandparents. The mother's first argument is not persuasive, and we pretermit discussion of the mother's second argument, which is contingent on the success of her first argument.

I. Did DHR produce sufficient evidence to establish that the children were dependent?

A. Standard of review When a trial court presides over a bench trial, receives oral testimony, and issues a judgment, we decide if the evidence was sufficient to support that judgment using the ore tenus standard of review. W.S. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 426 So. 3d 838, 852 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). In this case, the ore tenus standard of review requires us to determine whether the juvenile court reasonably could have found that there was clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the children were dependent. See § 12-15-311, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring finding of dependency based on clear and convincing evidence); Ex parte Bodie, 377

So. 3d 1051, 1056 (Ala. 2022)(describing the quantum of evidence that is necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding when the standard for a factual decision by the trial court was clear and convincing evidence). Put simply, we must determine if the evidence could have produced in the juvenile court " ' "a firm conviction as to each element [of dependency] and a high probability of the correctness of the conclusion." ' " Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)(citations omitted).

"In passing on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence as to a finding of dependency, this court does not reweigh the evidence; instead, this court determines whether the juvenile court, acting in its fact-finding role, reasonably could have determined from its own weighing of the evidence that the dependency of the child was proven by clear and convincing evidence as that standard is defined above."

R.F.W. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 70 So. 3d 1270, 1272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). "We are not allowed to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, even when this court might have reached a different result, unless the trial court's resolution of the facts is plainly and palpably wrong." J.B. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 992 So. 2d 34, 39 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).

Thus, when determining if the evidence was sufficient to support the dependency judgments, we must examine the elements of dependency and the evidence that DHR produced in support of those elements. We must then determine if, based on that evidence, the juvenile court could have had a "firm conviction" that DHR had established each element of dependency and whether there is a "high probability" as to the correctness of the juvenile court's conclusion that the children were dependent, and we must do so without reweighing the evidence or substituting our judgment for that of the juvenile court.

B. The elements of dependency A child is dependent if he or she meets the statutory definition of a dependent child, Ex parte L.E.O., 61 So. 3d 1042, 1046 (Ala. 2010), which is set out in § 12-15-102, Ala. Code 1975. Under § 12-15-102, a dependent child is a child who is in need of care and supervision, has been adjudicated dependent, and who meets any of the circumstances described in § 12-15-102(8)1. - (8)8. Sections 12-15-301(8)1. - 7. are specific circumstances, and we have interpreted § 12-15-102(8).8. to mean that a trial court can find a child dependent based on the "totality of the circumstances." See Martin v. State ex rel. Dep't of Hum. Res., 502 So.

2d 769, 771 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)(interpreting former § 12-15-1(10)(m), Ala. Code 1975, which contained substantially similar language as § 12- 15-102(8)8., and stating that "this proposition gives the juvenile court the authority to determine a child to be dependent under the totality of the circumstances"). Thus, a child is dependent if (1) the child is in need of care and supervision, (2) the child has been adjudicated dependent, and (3) the child meets any of the specific circumstances set out in § 12-15- 102(8)1. - .7. or the totality of the circumstances indicates that the child is in need of the state's protection under § 12-15-102(8)8.

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Rel: August 28, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026

CL-2026-0123 and CL-2026-0124

M.C.G.

v.

Houston County Department of Human Resources, M.T., C.W.T., and C.T.

Appeal from Houston Juvenile Court (JU-24-446.01 and JU-24-447.01)

BOWDEN, Judge.

In July 2024, the Houston County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") filed dependency petitions in the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") seeking orders finding T.W.T. and N.S. ("the children")

dependent. DHR's petitions alleged that the children's mother, M.C.G. ("the mother"), had committed acts of domestic violence and abuse while intoxicated. The petitions resulted in a finding of dependency, and DHR required the mother to complete services that were tailored to reducing the risks posed by alcohol use and domestic violence, which she did. In January 2026, the juvenile court entered judgments finding that the children remained dependent and awarding legal custody of the children to T.W.T.'s paternal grandparents M.T. and C.W.T. ("the paternal grandparents"), i.e., the parents of C.T., T.W.T.'s father.1 The mother appeals.

On appeal, the mother argues that the evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the children were dependent because, she says, she completed the services DHR required and the initial conditions that precipitated DHR's intervention no longer exist. But a trial court can find a child to be a dependent child for reasons other than the initial reasons that caused the child to be found dependent. Here, the juvenile court reasonably could have found that there was clear and convincing

1C.T. was adjudicated T.W.T.'s legal father during the proceedings below.

evidence demonstrating that the children remained dependent because of the mother's limited financial means. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the juvenile court.

Procedural History

DHR filed dependency petitions in July 2024. In November 2024, the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing and entered orders ("the dependency orders") that found the children to be dependent children. The juvenile court then held a dispositional hearing over four days: August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January 12, 2026. On January 12, 2026, the juvenile court entered judgments ("the dependency judgments") that found the children to be dependent and transferred legal custody of the children to the paternal grandparents. The dependency judgments did not contain specific findings of fact, but the mother filed a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dependency judgments on January 20, 2026. The mother's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on February 3, 2026, and she timely filed notices of appeal on February 16, 2026.

Analysis

The mother presents two arguments. Her first argument is that DHR failed to present clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the children were dependent. Her second argument is that, because the children are not dependent children, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer custody of the children to the paternal grandparents. The mother's first argument is not persuasive, and we pretermit discussion of the mother's second argument, which is contingent on the success of her first argument.

I. Did DHR produce sufficient evidence to establish that the children were dependent?

A. Standard of review When a trial court presides over a bench trial, receives oral testimony, and issues a judgment, we decide if the evidence was sufficient to support that judgment using the ore tenus standard of review. W.S. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 426 So. 3d 838, 852 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). In this case, the ore tenus standard of review requires us to determine whether the juvenile court reasonably could have found that there was clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the children were dependent. See § 12-15-311, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring finding of dependency based on clear and convincing evidence); Ex parte Bodie, 377

So. 3d 1051, 1056 (Ala. 2022)(describing the quantum of evidence that is necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding when the standard for a factual decision by the trial court was clear and convincing evidence). Put simply, we must determine if the evidence could have produced in the juvenile court " ' "a firm conviction as to each element [of dependency] and a high probability of the correctness of the conclusion." ' " Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)(citations omitted).

"In passing on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence as to a finding of dependency, this court does not reweigh the evidence; instead, this court determines whether the juvenile court, acting in its fact-finding role, reasonably could have determined from its own weighing of the evidence that the dependency of the child was proven by clear and convincing evidence as that standard is defined above."

R.F.W. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 70 So. 3d 1270, 1272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). "We are not allowed to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, even when this court might have reached a different result, unless the trial court's resolution of the facts is plainly and palpably wrong." J.B. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 992 So. 2d 34, 39 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).

Thus, when determining if the evidence was sufficient to support the dependency judgments, we must examine the elements of dependency and the evidence that DHR produced in support of those elements. We must then determine if, based on that evidence, the juvenile court could have had a "firm conviction" that DHR had established each element of dependency and whether there is a "high probability" as to the correctness of the juvenile court's conclusion that the children were dependent, and we must do so without reweighing the evidence or substituting our judgment for that of the juvenile court.

B. The elements of dependency A child is dependent if he or she meets the statutory definition of a dependent child, Ex parte L.E.O., 61 So. 3d 1042, 1046 (Ala. 2010), which is set out in § 12-15-102, Ala. Code 1975. Under § 12-15-102, a dependent child is a child who is in need of care and supervision, has been adjudicated dependent, and who meets any of the circumstances described in § 12-15-102(8)1. - (8)8. Sections 12-15-301(8)1. - 7. are specific circumstances, and we have interpreted § 12-15-102(8).8. to mean that a trial court can find a child dependent based on the "totality of the circumstances." See Martin v. State ex rel. Dep't of Hum. Res., 502 So.

2d 769, 771 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)(interpreting former § 12-15-1(10)(m), Ala. Code 1975, which contained substantially similar language as § 12- 15-102(8)8., and stating that "this proposition gives the juvenile court the authority to determine a child to be dependent under the totality of the circumstances"). Thus, a child is dependent if (1) the child is in need of care and supervision, (2) the child has been adjudicated dependent, and (3) the child meets any of the specific circumstances set out in § 12-15- 102(8)1. - .7. or the totality of the circumstances indicates that the child is in need of the state's protection under § 12-15-102(8)8.

The juvenile court did not indicate in its dependency judgments what circumstance or circumstances of dependency listed under § 12-15- 102(8)1. – 8. apply. When a trial court does not make specific factual findings in support of its dependency finding, as in this case, this court must "presume that the juvenile court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, provided that those findings are supported by the evidence." J.C. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 313 So. 3d 1137, 1139 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (citing K.C. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 54 So. 3d 407, 413 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)). Thus, we presume that the juvenile court made the factual findings necessary to find that the

children are in need of care and supervision and that it found the existence of one of the circumstances listed in §12-15-102(8)1. - 8.

DHR argues that the circumstances described in § 12-15-102(8)2.

and § 12-15-102(8)6. are relevant to these appeals. Those circumstances describe a child "[w]ho is without a parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian willing and able to provide for the care, support, or education of the child," § 12-15-102(8)2., and a child "[w]hose parent, legal guardian, legal custodian, or other custodian is unable or unwilling to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child," § 12-15-102(8)6. Relying on those provisions, we have held that "a parent's inability to provide care for his or her child because of limited financial means can serve as a basis for a finding of dependency." B.O. v. C.T., 416 So. 3d 1101, 1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(citing K.D.S. v. M.P., 392 So. 3d 760 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), citing in turn § 12-15-102(8)2. and § 12-15-102(8)6.).

The time at which a trial court finds a child dependent is also relevant to appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a dependency adjudication. Dependency proceedings occur in two stages: an adjudicatory hearing, after which the trial court determines if the child is dependent, and a dispositional hearing, after which the trial court

determines what custody arrangement would serve the best interests of the child. See § 12-15-310, Ala. Code 1975 ("Conduct of Adjudicatory Hearings"); § 12-15-311 ("Dispositional Hearing"). The dispositional hearing can occur immediately after the adjudicatory hearing or at a later trial setting. Rule 25, Ala. R. Juv. P.; M.A. v. C.S., 382 So. 3d 1263, 1269 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023)("A juvenile court may either hold its adjudicatory and dispositional hearings on the same date or it may hold them on different dates.").

The evidence, however, must clearly and convincingly establish that the child is dependent at the time of the disposition of custody. A.N.F. v. D.F., [Ms. CL-2025-0736, May 1, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026); J.P. v. D.P., 260 So. 3d 862, 871 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). Thus, a trial court's initial finding of dependency, following an adjudicatory hearing, is not necessarily dispositive as to the question of dependency at the final disposition of the case. See M.D. v. S.C., 150 So. 3d 210, 213 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(holding that juvenile court's finding that child was dependent at time of initiation of dependency proceedings was insufficient to permit juvenile court to enter custody award or disposition of child at time of dispositional hearing three years after proceedings

were initiated). And we examine whether the evidence supports a finding that a child is dependent at the time of the disposition of custody.

As a corollary to the requirement that a child be dependent at the time of the trial court's custody disposition, a trial court must make its determination that a child is a dependent child based on a parent's "current circumstances," L.A.R. v. J.B.R., 401 So. 3d 1171, 1180 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). "There is no established formula for or time limitation on the determination of what constitutes 'current circumstances' in the context of a dependency action." Id.

With those principles in mind, we turn to the evidence before the juvenile court.

C. The relevant evidence before the juvenile court "The fundamental principle is that the decision of a court must be based on evidence produced in open court lest the guaranty of due process be infringed." Ex parte Berryhill, 410 So. 2d 416, 418 (Ala. 1982). The juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing in November 2024. Eleven months later, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing set over four days: August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January 12, 2026.

A court reporter's transcript of the November 2024 adjudicatory hearing is not in the record. It does not appear, however, that the juvenile court relied on evidence received at the November 2024 adjudicatory hearing when entering its dependency judgments. The dependency judgments do not reference evidence received or stipulations made at the November 2024 hearing, and it is apparent that the juvenile court was aware of its obligation to make a new dependency finding at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing because the juvenile-court judge stated, at the September 15, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing, that "[t]here must still be dependency, but it's disposition." Thus, transfer of these appeals because of a lack of a transcript from the November 2024 adjudicatory hearing, is not necessary. Cf. S.J. v. K.J., 206 So. 3d 641, 644-45 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)(transferring appeal because juvenile court's judgment indicated that juvenile court had considered witness testimony for which no transcript existed); C.J. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 76 So. 3d 268, 269 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(transferring appeal because juvenile court relied on factual stipulations at hearing for which there was no court reporter's transcript).

The court reporter's transcripts from the dispositional hearing held on August 7, 2025, September 15, 2025, October 27, 2025, and January 12, 2026, are in the record on appeal.2 The juvenile court did not take judicial notice of any prior proceedings, cf. Ex parte State Dep't of Hum. Res., 890 So. 2d 114, 118 (Ala. 2004) (listing evidence that can be appropriately admitted by judicial notice at an adjudicatory hearing), but it received two exhibits: an individualized-service plan dated June 27, 2025, and a "payment history," purporting to show support payments that the mother had -- and had not -- made to the paternal grandparents.

1. Evidence received at the August 7, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing

2Those transcripts indicate that the juvenile court admitted hearsay evidence over the mother's objection. The juvenile court reasoned, correctly, that hearsay evidence is admissible at a dispositional hearing. But a trial court cannot rely on hearsay evidence when making a finding of dependency, and we have held that a trial court must make a finding of dependency when it makes a custody disposition. The mother, however, does not argue that the juvenile court improperly relied on hearsay evidence when making its dependency finding at the time of the custody disposition, nor did she assert a due-process argument below, see Ala. R. Juv. P. 25A ("A dependency hearing shall be conducted consistent with legal and due-process requirements …."), and we cannot preserve or make those arguments for her.

The mother testified about her employment history spanning the period of July 2024 to August 7, 2025. She testified that she had been employed as a service advisor at two car dealerships, had done contracting work for Best Choice Roofing company, and had worked at an Olive Garden restaurant. The mother testified that she receives financial support from her family and that her grandmother has sent her money to assist her in paying rent. She testified, however, that she is not behind on her bills. She testified that she receives child-support payments from the father of N.S. and that she forwards those payments to the paternal grandparents.

With respect to her then-current employment status, the mother testified that she was not employed on August 7, 2025. She testified that she had an interview with Mercedes-Benz ("Mercedes") the next day.

2. Evidence received at the September 15, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing

The mother testified that she had worked for Mercedes for two weeks but that her employment had been terminated. She testified that her employment had been terminated because she had suffered a bleeding disorder, despite having provided a doctor's excuse to Mercedes. With respect to her employment status as of the September 15, 2025,

setting of the dispositional hearing, the mother testified that she was employed as an assistant general manager at a restaurant called "CB's." She testified, however, that she had not yet started working but would make $60,000 a year "plus bonuses."

The mother also provided testimony about her expenses. She testified that her vehicle is paid off and that she has a monthly car- insurance premium of $90. She testified that her monthly phone bill is $166 and that her electric bill usually runs between $200 and $250 per month. She testified that she pays rent in the amount of $1,425 per month and that she is required to pay rental insurance of $26 per month and that her expenses average $300 a month for gasoline and $500 a month for food. The mother testified that she would earn $4,800 per month as assistant general manager at C.B.'s. She testified that that income would meet the needs of her children. She testified that she had a letter of employment from C.B.'s.

Lillian Nelson, the DHR caseworker assigned to the children's cases, testified that her only concern regarding the mother's ability to resume custody of the children was her financial stability.

"[DHR's Counsel:] Do you have concerns at this time related to whether it would be in the children's best interest to be returned to [the mother]?

"[Nelson:] I am concerned about [the mother's] financial stability.

"[DHR's Counsel:] Any other concerns?

"[Nelson:] No sir.

"[DHR's Counsel:] Do you perceive [the mother's]

situation to be stable?

"[Nelson:] No sir. "

Nelson testified that she knew where the mother worked, "but [the mother] never gave [her] proof of employment."

3. Evidence received at the October 27, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing

The mother did not testify at the October 27, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing. Nelson testified that she had never seen a paystub or letter of employment from the mother. According to Nelson, the longest period of employment that the mother had reported to her was 90 days.

4. Evidence received at the January 12, 2026, setting of the dispositional hearing

The mother testified that she had never started work at C.B.'s, because, she testified, the schedule that she had been offered did not

accommodate her duties as a mother. The mother testified that she was not employed. She testified that she had "income, ways to make money." She testified that she offered cleaning services for people who have homes that have too many items. She testified that she has received around $400 from that service. She testified that she still receives financial support from family and that her family members has stepped in to assist her.

The mother also testified about her support obligations. She testified that she had received support from N.S.'s father every month, that she had been ordered to forward that support to the paternal grandparents, and that the last time she sent support to the paternal grandparents was on July 11, 2025. The mother testified that she had failed to send support since July 2025 because she had had the children during her visitation periods and that she provides for them during that time.

D. Whether the evidence supports a finding of dependency If the evidence sufficiently establishes that a parent lacks a source of income sufficient to provide for his or her expenses, this court will not reverse a judgment finding that child dependent. A.T. v. A.G., 81 So. 3d

385 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); K.D.S. v. M.P., 392 So. 3d 760 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). In A.T., the mother in that case, A.T., was not employed and occasionally earned $250 per month in income as a babysitter or a housecleaner. A.T. acknowledged that she relied on family members for much of her support and to pay her court fines. She also testified that she may have been eligible for Social Security disability benefits but that she had not explored that option and, therefore, that possible source of income was not yet available to her. The trial court found that A.T.'s financial circumstances could improve but that, at that time, she was unable to meet the children's needs. We affirmed the judgment finding A.T.'s children dependent, reasoning, in part, that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that A.T. was unable to meet the children's needs.

In K.D.S., the trial court received evidence regarding the income and expenses of K.D.S., the mother in that case. K.D.S. received income from her employment as a waitress, and her expenses included cost-of- living expenses as well as court costs and support obligations. The evidence demonstrated that K.D.S. was behind in making payments toward court costs and child support. The trial court's judgment found

the children dependent, and we affirmed that judgment. We reasoned that "[t]he [trial] court could properly have drawn the inference from [the] evidence that [K.D.S.'s] ability to earn income was insufficient to cover all of her existing expenses, much less to cover those plus provide support for teen and 'tween' children." K.D.S., 392 So. 3d at 764. We stated:

"Although the mother's brief cites S.K. v. Madison County Department of Human Resources, 990 So. 2d 887 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2008), which recites the proposition that poverty ' "should not be the criteria for taking away a wanted child from the parents," ' 990 So. 2d at 903 (quoting In re Hickman, 489 So. 2d 601, 602-03 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)), we would note that both S.K. and Hickman involved appellate review of final judgments terminating parental rights, whereas these appeals involve determinations of dependency. To the extent that the mother contends that the [trial] court could not properly find the children dependent based solely upon her inability to support them, this court held to the contrary in A.T. v. A.G., 81 So. 3d 385 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), affirming a judgment determining that two children were dependent because their mother was ' "unable to provide for the[ir] care, support, and education at this time" '; this court noted that the record in that case contained evidence indicating that the mother had earned no more than $250 per month from odd jobs and had relied on family members for her support and paying court fees. See A.T., 81 So. 3d at 388, 389. The [trial]

court thus did not err in finding the children dependent."

K.D.S., 392 So. 3d at 764 (emphasis added).

As in A.T. and K.D.S., the evidence in this case supports the juvenile court's implicit determination that the children are dependent based on the mother's limited financial circumstances. The mother was consistently unemployed throughout the dependency proceedings. When asked about her income at the most recent setting of the dispositional hearing -- the setting in January 2026 -- the mother testified that she was not employed but that she had other means to earn income. When asked about those other means, the mother testified that she had earned only $400 from cleaning houses. In contrast, the mother testified in detail about her monthly expenses at the September 15, 2025, setting of the dispositional hearing. She also acknowledged in January 2026 that she was behind on her support payments to the paternal grandparents.

In light of the mother's testimony, and our holdings in A.T. and K.D.S., we cannot say that the juvenile court could not have properly concluded that, at the time of the January 2026 setting of the dispositional hearing, the children were dependent "based solely on [the mother's] inability to support them." K.D.S., 392 So. 3d at 764.

The mother argues, capably, that other evidence established that that the children were not dependent due to her limited financial

resources. The mother points out that the evidence was undisputed that she had lived in the same three-bedroom rental home for over two years and was current on all her bills. She points out that, if she were to again receive custody of the children, she would retain the child-support payments that she is currently required to forward to the paternal grandparents. And she points out that not a single witness testified that the children ever lacked food, shelter, clothing, or other basic necessities while in the mother's care, even during the period when the mother had unsupervised custody of the children four days per week. We also note that Nelson testified that she had been in the mother's residence in June 2025 "to make sure that she had basic necessities for the boys," and Nelson had agreed that the residence had appeared safe at that time.

The mother's argument, however, asks this court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. R.F.W., 70 So. 3d at 1272. Nor can we substitute our judgment for the juvenile court's, even if we might have reached a different result. J.B., 992 So. 2d at 40.

Lastly, we acknowledge the mother's well-reasoned argument that the circumstances that led to the commencement of the dependency proceedings could not have served as a basis for the juvenile court's

subsequent dependency judgments. But, as the mother concedes in her reply brief, a juvenile court can find a child dependent based upon grounds not asserted in the initial dependency petition. M.M.S. v. D.W., 735 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).

Conclusion

Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the children are dependent because of the mother's limited financial circumstances. Therefore, the judgments are affirmed.

CL-2026-0123 -- AFFIRMED.

CL-2026-0124 -- AFFIRMED.

Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

M.C.G. v. Houston County Department of Human Resources, M.T., C.W.T., and C.T., (Ala. Ct. App. 2026).

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