McFall v. Smith

32 Ill. App. 463
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedFebruary 14, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 32 Ill. App. 463 (McFall v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McFall v. Smith, 32 Ill. App. 463 (Ill. Ct. App. 1890).

Opinion

Conger, J.

This was an action on the case brought by appellee against appellant, charging him with negligent and unskillful practice as a physician. Appellee recovered a verdict for $900 upon which judgment was entered.

The declaration consisted of eight counts, the substance of which appears as follows, as taken from the abstract:

First count avers that defendant was a practicing physician; that as such physician plaintiff employed him, she being about to be delivered of a child, which employment was accepted by defendant, and he so unskillfully and negligently conducted himself, that thereby the plaintiff underwent great and unnecessary pain and anguish, was greatly disordered, reduced, weakened and so remained hitherto, and has been obliged to pay divers other physicians divers sums of money, amounting to $100.

Second count same as first, except it avers the damages to plaintiff arising from defendant’s negligence to be the tearing and lacerating the lower portion of plaintiffs womb, rendering her a hopeless invalid for life, causing her great pain and anguish from thence hitherto.

. The third count avers that by reason of negligence of defendant, plaintiff’s perineeum was greatly torn and lacerated, causing great pain, etc.

The fourth count avers that through negligent and unskillful administration by defendant to plaintiff of anaesthetics the delivery of her child was delayed until her strength was so far exhausted and her sensibilities so far gone, and her nervous system so far stupified that she was, in consequence thereof, greatly torn and lacerated about the vaginal orifice and womb.

Fifth count avers that when plaintiff’s childbirth sickness began and she sent for defendant, he came and gave her morphine and went away, and when plaintiff sent l'or defendant at divers other times between the beginning of said sickness and the delivery of the child, the defendant would,come, and at each time simply direct the continued dosing of the plaintiff with anesthetics, leaving the plaintiff to suffer until her strength was exhausted, and causing her to be greatly torn and lacerated about the womb and perineum.

Sixth count avers that defendant carelessly and negligently went away and slept until plaintiff’s strength was exhausted, in consequence whereof she was greatly torn and lacerated about the womb and perineum.

Seventh count avers that defendant so unskillfully and negligently wrenched the child from the plaintiff that she was thereby torn, etc.

Eighth count avers that at the delivery of her child plaintiff was greatly torn, etc., and that defendant carelessly went away without stitching the lacerated parts, or doing anything else looking to the care of the parts, and left plaintiff in such condition to this date.

The jury returned with their general verdict the following ten special findings, viz.:

1. Did the giving of morphine by the defendant to the plaintiff cause any injury? A. Yes.

2. Did the absence of the defendant at any time after he was first called and before the birth of the child cause any injury to the plaintiff? A. Yes.

3. Did the defendant with his hands tear the perinæum of the plaintiff ? A. No.

4. Did the defendant after the child’s head was born, forcibly pull the child from its mother without waiting for any labor-pains to assist in its expulsion? A. No.

5. Was it through any fault or negligence of the defendant, that the perinænm of the plaintiff was torn? A. No.

6. Was there any such tear in the perinaenm as the ordinary practice of physicians in good practice required to be sewed up? A. Yes.

7. Was the plaintiff injured by anything the defendant did? A. Yes.

8. Was there anything in the treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant that the ordinary skill of the medical profession required defendant to do which he did not do? A. Yes.

9. Was there anything done by the defendant in his treatment of the plaintiff, that the ordinary skill of the medical profession would have required him not to do ? A. Yes.

10. Would it have been any to the advantage of the plaintiff, if the defendant had discovered the tear in plaintiff’s perinæum at the time of the birth of the child? A. Yes.

While the record is quite voluminous, the vital questions in the case, and the one upon which the right of recovery can be alone placed, is the charge contained in the eighth count. The physicians nearly all agree in their testimony, that if the rupture of the perinaenm was as extensive as claimed, by appellee reaching into and tearing the sphincter ani, that there should have been a more thorough examination made, and a majority of the medical experts testify in such case there should have been stitches taken to bring the edges of the rupture together, while some of them think, even under such circumstances, sewing would not be necessary.

But all substantially agree, that if the rupture was no more extensive than is claimed by appellant, and did not involve the sphincter ani, then the treatment given by appellant was proper; so that in our judgment the first and really the controlling question is, did the evidence warrant the jury in finding the rupture to have been as claimed by appellee, viz.: that is, involving the sphincter ani, and therefore requiring at the hands of appellant other and further attention than he gave it. There are seven witnesses, who testify upon this subject from personal examination, two of them appellant and appellee, before the rupture healed, and the other five from an examination of the scars left upon the person of appellee.

Appellee was blind, but testified that her sense of touch had been educated and developed, until she could with her fingers determine the direction, nature and length of the wound as accurately as one could by sight. She says, some three days after her child was born, she felt such a soreness and misery that she examined herself. Could tell with her finger that she was so very much swollen; that the laceration then seemed to be two or three times longer than it possibly could be. It seemed to be all of two inches. The scar (by which we understand she means the rupture) extended entirely back to the anus and seemed to be back to it—not through it, but into it. It seemed to extend into the muscle of the sphincter ani, but not through it. She also testified that the action of that muscle was positively destroyed for several days; hadn’t a particle of control of it for several days, perhaps two weeks.

Mary J. Mitchell, who had been a. nurse for several years, waiting upon women in childbirth, was the mother of ten children and had delivered a good many women without the assistance of a physician, testified upon this point that she had examined appellee’s private parts since they had healed up— how long after the birth of the child does not appear, except she says that it was the last term of the Circuit Court. She says: “ It (the scar) was about one-half inch and then it came around in a kind of a triangle like; both the triangle and the plain split would make it about one inch. It was healed up, but still it was open.

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Bluebook (online)
32 Ill. App. 463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcfall-v-smith-illappct-1890.