McFaddin v. Anderson Motor Co.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

McFaddin v. Anderson Motor Co.

108 S.E. 919, 118 S.C. 309, 1921 S.C. LEXIS 180

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedOctober 10, 1921

Docket10734

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 108 S.E. 919 (McFaddin v. Anderson Motor Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McFaddin v. Anderson Motor Co., 108 S.E. 919, 118 S.C. 309, 1921 S.C. LEXIS 180 (S.C. 1921).

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Opinions

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Cothran.

Action for $20,000.00 damages on account of personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in being struck by an automobile of the defendant at Rock Hill, S. C., February 18, 1919. The case was tried at York, S. C., at December term, T920, before Judge Mclver and a jury. At the close of the testimony for the plaintiff the Circuit Judge ordered a nonsuit, and'from the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff, a school girl, was on her way to school, and while upon the street near the school was run over by an automobile of the defendant, 'operated by one Frank Hall. The circumstances of the collision are very meagerly detailed in the testimony, but there was sufficient evidence of the negligent operation of the car to require the submission of the issue to the. jury, and the order of non-suit was erroneous.

The witness, Pressly, testified that he was walking on the north side of East Main Street, and was in the act of crossing Reid Street, which intersects East Main; that he was *312 with a young man, Sam Fant; that Sam Fant exclaimed, “There goes Frank’s car,” and immediately thereafter, “Watch out there; he is going to hit that little girl.” Pressly looked around, the car was out of sight, and the little girl was lying on the ground. If Fant could see the danger, why could Hall have not seen it? If the car was out of sight when Pressly looked around, its speed was a question of fact for the jury. The fact that Hall did not stop means either that he did not see the little girl (upon the presumption of his humane feelings), or that he was going at such a speed on a wet pavement that he could not stop in time to avoid the collision, all of which were questions for the jury to decide. It was also for them to decide whether, under the circumstances, within the danger zone which should surround the approach to a public school, the driver exercised that degree of care which was required of him. The wet street, the presence of school children, the unobstructed view, were elements which the jury had the right to consider in determining the presence or absence of negligence.

The judgment of this Court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and that the case be remanded to that Court for a new trial.

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Fraser concur.

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The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Cothran.

Action for $20,000.00 damages on account of personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in being struck by an automobile of the defendant at Rock Hill, S. C., February 18, 1919. The case was tried at York, S. C., at December term, T920, before Judge Mclver and a jury. At the close of the testimony for the plaintiff the Circuit Judge ordered a nonsuit, and'from the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff, a school girl, was on her way to school, and while upon the street near the school was run over by an automobile of the defendant, 'operated by one Frank Hall. The circumstances of the collision are very meagerly detailed in the testimony, but there was sufficient evidence of the negligent operation of the car to require the submission of the issue to the. jury, and the order of non-suit was erroneous.

The witness, Pressly, testified that he was walking on the north side of East Main Street, and was in the act of crossing Reid Street, which intersects East Main; that he was *312 with a young man, Sam Fant; that Sam Fant exclaimed, “There goes Frank’s car,” and immediately thereafter, “Watch out there; he is going to hit that little girl.” Pressly looked around, the car was out of sight, and the little girl was lying on the ground. If Fant could see the danger, why could Hall have not seen it? If the car was out of sight when Pressly looked around, its speed was a question of fact for the jury. The fact that Hall did not stop means either that he did not see the little girl (upon the presumption of his humane feelings), or that he was going at such a speed on a wet pavement that he could not stop in time to avoid the collision, all of which were questions for the jury to decide. It was also for them to decide whether, under the circumstances, within the danger zone which should surround the approach to a public school, the driver exercised that degree of care which was required of him. The wet street, the presence of school children, the unobstructed view, were elements which the jury had the right to consider in determining the presence or absence of negligence.

The judgment of this Court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and that the case be remanded to that Court for a new trial.

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Fraser concur.

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Bluebook (online)

108 S.E. 919, 118 S.C. 309, 1921 S.C. LEXIS 180, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcfaddin-v-anderson-motor-co-sc-1921.

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