McEvilly v. Brownfield

101 N.E. 229, 258 Ill. 49
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 101 N.E. 229 (McEvilly v. Brownfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McEvilly v. Brownfield, 101 N.E. 229, 258 Ill. 49 (Ill. 1913).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Vickers

delivered the opinion of the court:

Pour of the children of Joseph P. Brownfield, deceased, filed a bill in the circuit court of Champaign county to set aside the last will of their father on the ground that he was of unsound mind at the tirpe the will was executed. Pour other children of the testator and certain grandchildren to whom legacies were given were made parties defendant. A summons was issued and served upon the resident defendants, and others who were non-residents were served by publication. Some of the non-resident defendants were minors and they answered by guardian ad litem. An issue of fact was made up as to the unsoundness of the testator’s mind, which was submitted to a jury. The verdict of the jury was for the- contestants upon the issue of mental capacity. The court overruled a motion for a new trial and entered a decree setting aside the will and the probate thereof, to reverse which the defendants below have brought the record to this court by appeal.

Some of the questions argued in the briefs have been eliminated by amendments and need not be considered. Appellants’ point as to the sufficiency of the return of service of the summons upon the resident defendants, and appellees’ contention that the bill of exceptions fails to show a motion for a new trial, have been obviated, the former by an amendment of the sheriff’s return to the summons showing due and proper service, and the latter by a supplemental transcript filed by leave of this court which contains an amendment to the bill of exceptions showing that a motion for a new trial was made by the defendants below and overruled.

Appellants contend that the affidavit of non-residence was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction of suchmf the adult non-resident defendants as did not answer and of the infant non-resident defendants who answered by their guardian ad litem. The affidavit of non-residence states unequivocally that certain defendants (naming them) are non-residents of the State of Illinois and states their places of residence on information and belief. The contention is that the place of residence should be stated positively, upon personal knowledge. This contention cannot be sustained. Where a defendant in chancery is a non-resident the statute makes it the duty of complainant to make due and diligent inquiry to ascertain his place of residence, and in case he is able upon such inquiry to ascertain the place of residence, to state it in the affidavit, so that notice may be mailed to such non-resident defendant. The knowledge of the place of residence of a non-resident defendant would ordinarily be obtained as a result of that due and diligent inquiry which is required, and when so obtained it is necessarily based on information and belief. The statute does not require the complainant to make a tour of foreign States to verify information as to the residence of defendants, in order that he may be able to state in his affidavit, on personal knowledge, the residence of such defendants. The affidavit upon which publication was had is sufficient. Rowand v. Carroll, 81 Ill. 224; Fitch v. Gray, 162 id. 337.

Appellants’ most serious contention is that the court erred in not granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the clear weight and preponderance of the evidence. To determine this question it will be necessary to examine the evidence.

Joseph F. Brownfield, the testator, was eighty-three years of age when, on the 19th day of November, 1904, the will in question was executed. He came to Champaign county in 1833, then a boy about twelve years of age. He resided in said county until the time of his death, which occurred June 11, 1911. He had no education and was unable to read and write. There is some testimony that in his earlier life he could read a little plain print. He was a pioneer ■ farmer of Champaign county. He was married and raised a family of eight- children,—four sons and four daughters,-—all of whom, survived him. The four daughters had married and left home more than forty years before the will in question was made. John, one of the sons, lived on a farm near his father but had had no intercourse with him for more than forty years. Elias, another son, had been away from home for about the same length of time. The two youngest sons, Alfred and Joseph, lived with or near their father all of their lives until about the time of the making of the will. The testator and his wife lived in the old homestead on the farm until her death, which occurred in January, 1904. The testator had acquired title to about 222 acres of valuable farm lands. This was in two farms,—one of 120 acres and the other of 102 and a fraction. Eor some time prior to -the making of the will his son Alfred had occupied the 102-acre farm in section 2, while Joseph lived near his father and cultivated the home farm, each of the sons paying their father one-half of the grain grown, as rent. A short time before the death of the mother Joseph invested in property at Greeley, Colorado, and removed to that State. After Joseph went to Colorado it was arranged for Alfred to occupy the home farm, and a written agreement was prepared between Alfred and his father and mother fixing the terms upon which the home farm should be cultivated by Alfred. This contract does not appear to have been signed, although all the parties to it accepted its terms and carried out its provisions. For several years prior to her death the testator’s wife was afflicted with rheumatism and was under the care of Dr. J. W. Fuqua, who had been the family physician of the testator for a number of years, and continued to be until he removed to Greeley, Colorado, in the early part of 1904. The evidence shows that during the six or seven years prior to 1904 Dr. Fuqua visited the testator’s wife professionally more than one hundred times; that he was thus brought into very intimate relations with the testator; that during all of these years he was. never called upon to treat the testator for any disease whatever, and that he never was called upon to examine the testator professionally with one exception, when, at the request oi his wife, he made an examination to see whether the testator was suffering from pneumonia; that on this occasion the physician made a careful examination of the testator’s lungs and heart. Dr. Fuqua did not see the testator after he (the doctor) removed to Colorado until after the will had been executed. His testimony will be referred to more particularly hereinafter.

The evidence shows, that some years prior to- the death of the testator’s wife he had executed a will. The provisions of the first will are not important. It also appears from the evidence that the testator had frequently consulted William B. Webber, an attorney at law, who resides in Urbana. Mr. Webber had been the attorney and adviser of the testator for a number of years. He had drawn the first will and attended to other legal matters for the testator. On the day that the will in question was executed the testator went to the office of Mr. Webber, in Urbana, and informed him that his wife was dead and that he wanted Mr. Webber to draw another will. The first will had been left in possession of Mr. Webber. Mr. Webber testified that he was seventy-five years of age and a lawyer by profession, and had been practicing in Champaign county since 1864, and that he was still practicing in that county; that he had no interest whatever in the result of the litigation and had not been employed by either party or consulted since the present suit was started; that he had known Joseph F.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
101 N.E. 229, 258 Ill. 49, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcevilly-v-brownfield-ill-1913.