McDonald's Admx. v. Louisville Car Wheel & Railway Supply Co.

149 S.W. 1142, 149 Ky. 801, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 730
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 11, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 149 S.W. 1142 (McDonald's Admx. v. Louisville Car Wheel & Railway Supply Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McDonald's Admx. v. Louisville Car Wheel & Railway Supply Co., 149 S.W. 1142, 149 Ky. 801, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 730 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Settle

Affirming.

Henry McDonald, an employe in appellee’s manufacturing plant, lost his life there by coming in contact with a wire charged with electricity, and' this action was brought by the administratrix of his estate to recover of appellee damages for his death; it being alleged in the petition, as amended, that it was caused by appellee’s negligence in failing to provide him a reasonably safe place and machinery for the performance of his work, and that of J. L. Boss, an incompetent servant of appellee, in turning on the wire, without notice to him, the current of electricity by which he was killed.

The answer of appellee traversed the averments of the petition as amended, and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the intestate; and its affirmative matter was traversed by appellant’s reply.

On the trial, appellee, both at the conclusion of appellant’s evidence and after the introduction of all the evidence, asked for a peremptory instruction directing a verdict in its behalf; hut it was refused, to which appellee excepted. Thereupon the case was submitted to the jury, under certain instructions given by the trial [802]*802judge, over the objections of both parties, and they' re-’ turned a verdict in favor of appellant whereby she was awarded damages in the sum of $4,500.

Following the return of the verdict appellee filed a motion and grounds for a new trial, which was granted by the court, upon the ground it had erred in refusing the peremptory instruction asked by appellee. To this ruling appellant excepted.

When the case was called for trial at the succeeding term of the court, the parties, after the jury had been empaneled and sworn entered into an agreement of record, providing that the evidence introduced on the first trial might be considered as offered and heard on the second trial; thereupon the court peremptorily instructed the jury to find for appellee, which was accordingly done. .Appellant then filed a motion and grounds for a new trial, which motion was overruled. She complains of that ruling, the judgment entered upon the last verdict, and' of the action of the court in granting appellee a new trial at the previous term; hence this appeal.

It appears from the evidence that appellant’s intestate had been engaged for about two years and four months as operator of a crane in appellee’s plant; that he had for several years theretofore been a motorman in the employ of the Louisville Railway Company and, while his experience derived from these employments may not have made of him an expert electrician, it gave him more knowledge of electricity and the danger attending its use in the' operation of machinery, than was possessed by the average laborer employed in appellee’s plant, and enabled him to repair'and keep in proper condition for its work the traveling crane operated by him. His duties as operator of the crane were somewhat similar to those which had been performed by Mm as a motorman on the street ears.

The crane was attached to a wheeled traveler propelled by electricity upon an elevated track; the electricity being supplied from wires suspended above the track, connection with which was furnished by a trolley pole extending over the traveler. The crane was used for lifting and carrying from place to place, in appellee’s plant, heavy materials used in manufacturing its products and for moving the products as well. The electrical currents for the trolly wires were controlled by a [803]*803switch in a corner of the building by which it was turned on and off the wires.

One William Harbold, a one-armed man, was the. electrician of appellee’s plant. J. L. Eoss, known among the men of the plant as “Happy” Eoss, was also an employe of appellee; though neither an electrician nor a skilled machinist, Eoss was useful about the premises as a utility man. He gave frequent assistance to Harbold when required and also to appellant’s intestate and other employes of appellee when requested to do so. It appears from the evidence that when any trouble occurred with the crane as to which intestate required assistance, he called on Harbold if the trouble affected its electricial features, and if the assistance needed was with respect to work that any common laborer could do he called on “Happy” Eoss. It does not appear from the evidence that Eoss ever undertook to do any electrical work other than to occasionally start the air compressor of the electrical works in the morning by simply turning a switch when commanded, and to “oil up” generally. Nor does it appear from the evidence that he was in any sense a superior of the intestate.

According to the evidence, on the morning of the day the intestate was killed, the crane refused to work, probably, because of the burning out of a fuse or fuses. Harbold was absent that day and intestate undertook to ascertain what interferred with the operation of the crane and to remove the difficulty himself. Shortly thereafter he and Eoss were seen standing together near the switch board at a corner of the building about 75 feet from the crane, but before going to the switch board he had been to the engine room and gotten one or more fuses which he took with him to the switch board. After a minute or two spent in doing something at the switch board he again returned to the crane which still refused to perform its work. He then left the crane a second time and went in the direction of the switch board, but it does not appear from the evidence whether he went to the switch board or somewhere else in the building.

At any rate, he returned to the crane in a few minutes, got upon it for some purpose, and came in contact with one of the wires which caused his death.

It is appellant’s contention that while the intestate was upon top of the crane “Happy” Eoss turned on the [804]*804current of electricity which caused Ms death. This contention, it is insisted, is sustained by the testimony of R. D. Ross, who saw “Happy” Ross standing within three feet of the switch board while the intestate was upon the top of the crane; and by that of George Selgraph that he at that time felt a slight electrical shock through a tool with which he was working, and immediately saw a flash of light and heard intestate groan.

If the testimony of R. D. Ross and Selgraph referred to, embraced all that was said by them, it might be claimed that it gives some support to appellant’s theory that the electricity was turned on the wire by “Happy” Ross; but in addition to what has been said of their statements, R. D. Ross testified that after he saw “Happy” Ross standing within three feet of the switch box and intestate on the crane, he left the building and after walking a distance of one hundred feet therefrom returned to the building and upon re-entering it, discovered that “Happy” Ross was not at or near the switch box; that he then saw the intestate still upon the crane and that he was not killed until five minutes after his (R. D. Ross’) return to the building.

. Selgraph also testified that when he felt the shock through the tool, saw the flash of light and heard the intestate groan, he called for some one to shut off the electricity and then saw “Happy” Ross about forty feet from him going in a direction that would not have taken him either to or from the switch box, or to the crane.

“Happy” Ross testified he was not at the switch box when or before intestate was killed, and that he did not turn on the electric current.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vincennes Bridge Company v. Poulos
27 S.W.2d 952 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1930)
Davis v. Burns' Administratrix
269 S.W. 763 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1924)
Louisville & Interurban Railway Co. v. Jones
250 S.W. 822 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1923)
Gregory's Administratrix v. Director General of Railroads
242 S.W. 373 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1922)
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Rogers
237 S.W. 18 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1922)
John R. Coppin Co. v. Richards
231 S.W. 229 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1921)
Jarboe's Administrator v. Coleman
182 S.W. 922 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1916)
Wood v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co.
151 S.W. 29 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1912)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 S.W. 1142, 149 Ky. 801, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 730, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcdonalds-admx-v-louisville-car-wheel-railway-supply-co-kyctapp-1912.