McDonald v. United States

284 F. Supp. 978, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7228
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 27, 1967
DocketC.A. 4-697
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 284 F. Supp. 978 (McDonald v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McDonald v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 978, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7228 (N.D. Tex. 1967).

Opinion

OPINION

BREWSTER, District Judge.

E. L. McDonald, a floor sander, sustained serious bums over a large part of his body in a flash fire and explosion which occurred as he was starting to refinish the floors in a vacant apartment of a Wherry housing project, owned, operated and maintained by the government. He died twelve days later as a result of the burns. Natural gas had escaped into the apartment through an uncapped, unplugged flexible copper tube which had been disconnected from the gas dryer which it served. The gas was ignited by a spark emitted when the electrical sanding machine was started. Fumes from fresh paint on the interior walls and woodwork obscured the odor of the gas.

McDonald, though in his fifties, had never married. He made his home with his mother. He was her only source of support and she was his only dependent. This suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act is brought by her in her individual capacity for damages for loss of pecuniary benefits she reasonably expected to receive from her son, and in her capacity as temporary administratrix of his estate to recover his medical, hospital and funeral expenses and damages for conscious pain and suffering endured by him during the period he lived after the explosion.1

[980]*980The plaintiff claims that the flash fire and explosion were proximately caused by the government’s negligence in failing to install a separate shutoff valve on the gas dryer feeder line inside the house; in failing to cap the gas dryer feeder line inside the house when the dryer was disconnected from it; in failing to mark the outside main gas shutoff valve which controlled the supply of gas to the apartment in question so that it could be distinguished from an identical value which governed the flow of gas to the other apartment in the duplex; in turning on the gas when it was free to escape into the apartment; in failing to inspect the house to assure that it was safe from gas leaks; and in maintaining the gas dryer feeder line as it existed on the occasion in question in violation of Air Force Regulation 91-6.

The government denies that it was guilty of any negligence which proximately caused the explosion, and insists that the incident was caused by the contributory negligence of E. L. McDonald

The only substantial questions in the case are ones of fact raised by the respective claims above set out.

The building where the explosion occurred was a unit in a housing project originally constructed under the Wherry Act2 for rental to the enlisted military personnel at nearby Carswell Air Force Base. On the occasion in question and for some considerable time prior thereto, the project was owned by the government, and was operated and maintained by it through the Air Force. It was composed of a number of residential buildings. The unit where the explosion occurred was a single story, two family duplex, frame building, with two apartments divided by a common wall under the same roof structure. The apartments were designated by street addresses as 229 and 231 Dayless St., respectively. The explosion occurred in the apartment at 231.

The Air Force maintained the housing project through its civil engineer organization on the Base. The responsibilities of that organization in connection with gas operation and services are set out in Air Force Regulation 91-6 and its supplements, admitted in evidence as Plaintiff’s Ex. “P”. The following is quoted from that Regulation:

“1. Command Responsibility. In accordance with AFRs 85-5 and 20-42, command responsibilities carried out by the base civil engineer organization are:
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“b. The construction, operation, inspection, testing, repair, preservation, rehabilitation, alteration, and extension of gas generating plants and storage, transmission, and distribution systems.
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“6. Safety Considerations. (See AFM 32-3 for applicable safety requirements.)
“a. Each base civil engineer organization, through its operators, maintenance force, and fire prevention force, will remain constantly alert to detect and eliminate immediately safety and fire hazards arising from defective gas facilities or faulty operation of gas equipment. Operating instructions and precautions should be posted near gas-fired equipment.”

Each unit in the project was supplied with natural gas furnished by the public utility gas company which served Fort Worth. Each apartment had a separate meter. The two meters at the 229-231 Dayless duplex were located next to each other in the yard on the 229 side of the building. There was a cutoff valve located on the line to each apartment near the meter which served it. The meters [981]*981and valves were identical in all respects. There was no tag or visible indication of any kind identifying which of the two apartments was served by either meter or cutoff valve.3

The quarters at 231 Dayless were vacated on July 1, 1966, and those at 229 Dayless on the following July 5th. Shortly after the vacancies occurred, the maintenance authorities at the Base dedetermined that the apartment at 231 should have its interior walls and woodwork repainted and its floors refinished before being rented again. On July 5th, an Airman 2nd Class, acting under instructions from the proper authorities, shut off the gas in each of the apartments at the outside meters. He also disconnected the gas stove and gas clothes dryer in the 231 apartment so that the workmen could move them around while doing the painting and floor finishing. The conduit to the dryer from the main gas pipe in the house was a piece of flexible copper tubing. It went through a hole in the floor and connected with the rigid gas pipe underneath the house. There was no stopcock on or near the tubing, and it was so made that it could not be capped or plugged.4 When the dryer was disconnected, the only way the flow of gas through the tubing could be cut off was by turning the outside cutoff valve at the meter to “Off” position.

Air Force personnel, acting within the scope of their authority, inspected the apartments on July 6, 1966, and the outside gas shutoff valves and the petcocks at the gas stove and hot water heaters on the inside. All such valves were found to be in “Off” position. No attention was paid to the open end copper tubing.

Glenn Cone, General Contractor, Inc., had done most of the painting and floor refinishing in the housing project for several years, and it got the job at 231 Dayless on the occasion in question. It did the painting with its own employees, and subcontracted the floor finishing to McDonald. The workmen started the painting on July 7, 1966, and completed it around noon on Friday, July 8th. The windows and doors of the apartment were then closed to let the paint dry; and the place was locked and left in that condition until McDonald opened it on the following Monday morning to refinish the floors. The exact time he arrived there is not shown, but the explosion occurred shortly before 8:30 A.M. There was no living witness to the explosion, so the facts surrounding it and some of the events leading up to it must be determined from the circumstances and the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom.

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Bluebook (online)
284 F. Supp. 978, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcdonald-v-united-states-txnd-1967.