McDonald v. State Highway Department

192 S.E.2d 919, 127 Ga. App. 171, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 823
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 27, 1972
Docket47323
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 192 S.E.2d 919 (McDonald v. State Highway Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McDonald v. State Highway Department, 192 S.E.2d 919, 127 Ga. App. 171, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

Stolz, Judge.

1. "The words 'in the course of the employment’ relate to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place, and an accident arises in the course of the employment when it occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.” (Emphasis supplied.) New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 688 (118 SE 786). In the case of General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bellflower, 123 Ga. App. 864, 867 (182 SE2d 678), this court held that "the status of a bus driver who is required to be away from home overnight is substantially analogous to that of a traveling salesman required to remain away from home.” The claimant’s decedent, who was required to be away from home five days out of each week, certainly had this same status.

"By the very nature of his work, a traveling salesman is not usually restricted to working on a schedule of hours. His employment is broader in scope than that of ordinary employees; his hours are more irregular, and usually longer, than those of general employees working in a fixed location; his conduct of his duties is of necessity left largely to his discretion; and his acts of ministration to himself, such as eating a meal, because of the nature of his work, are not usually limited to a certain period, or periods, of time daily. Consequently, we think, in a case involving an injury to a traveling salesman while going to or from, or while eating, a meal, such a strict interpretation of the phrase, 'arising out of and In the course of the employment,’ as is sometimes made in cases involving employees injured during a regular noon hour, or similar periods, is too limited. In the latter class of cases the injuries are received during a definite period set apart as belonging exclusively to the employees, during which they may go where they wish and do what they please, subject to no orders from their employers and freed from all duty or responsibility with reference *174 to their employment; and their employers do not usually pay the expenses of their meals.

"A traveling salesman is taken away from his home or headquarters by his employment; and, because of the nature of his work, he usually can not return home each night. He must of necessity eat and sleep in various places in order to further the business of his employer; and the employer recognizes these necessities and usually pays the expenses of his lodging and meáis, as was done in this case. While lodging in a hotel or preparing to eat, or while going to or returning from a meal, he is performing an act incident to his employment, unless he steps aside from his employment for personal reasons. Such an employee is in continuous employment, day and night. This does not mean that he can not step aside from his employment for personal reasons, or reasons in no way connected with his employment, just as might an ordinary employee working on a schedule of hours at a fixed location. He might rob a bank; he might attend a dance; or he might engage in other activities equally conceivable for his own pleasure and gratification, and ordinarily none of these acts would be beneficial or incidental to his employment and would constitute a stepping aside from the employment. The eating of meals, while a pleasure indulged in by a traveling salesman and all mankind, is as necessary to the continuance of his duties as the breath of life; and where his duties take him away from his home, his acts of ministration to himself should not — and we believe do not — take him outside the scope of his employment, so long as he performs these acts in a normal and prudent manner. Such activities, the performance of which are necessary to his health and comfort, while in a sense personal to himself, are nevertheless incidents of his employment and acts of service therein within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act, although only remotely and indirectly conducive to the object of the employment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thornton v. Hartford Acc. &c. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 789 (32 SE2d 816). The Thornton case quoted with approval, on page 788, the following lan *175 guage in Employers Liability Assur. Corp. v. Pruitt, 63 Ga. App. 149, 151 (10 SE2d 275): "The scope of employment of a traveling man is wider than that of an ordinary employee. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 691 (118 SE 786). It can not be said that the employment is broken by mere intervals of leisure such as those taken for a meal. If an accident happened at such a time, there would be no break in the employment . . . unless the workman is doing something wholly foreign to his employment. Acts of ministration by a servant to himself, such as quenching his thirst, relieving his hunger . . . are incidents to his employment and acts of service therein within the workmen’s compensation acts though they are only indirectly conducive to the purpose of the employment. Consequently, no break in the employment is caused by the mere fact that the workman is ministering to his personal comforts or necessities ... to procure drink, refreshments, food.’ 1 Honnold’s Workmen’s Compensation, 379-384, § 111.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Under a line of cases exemplified by the Thornton case, supra, McDonald was "in continuous employment, day and night” while lodging in the motel authorized and paid for by his employer, hence was "continuously performing an act incident to his employment,” unless he stepped aside from his employment for "personal reasons.” Under the Pruitt case, supra, cited approvingly by the Thornton case, supra, McDonald’s mere interval of leisure — during which he ministered to his personal comforts by procuring drink, refreshments, food, and relaxation by card playing and conversation, all after his normal working hours and on the premises of the motel authorized and paid for by his employer for his and his subordinate fellow employees’ use— caused no break in the employment. Although his activities were "only indirectly conducive to the purpose of the employment,” nevertheless, they were not "wholly foreign to his employment.” Furthermore, under the reasoning of the cases above cited, the employee is not even restricted to the confines of his lodging place if the activity is not pro *176 scribed. In our view, the fact that McDonald consumed alcoholic beverages during his interval of leisure is irrelevant in the case. Certainly, they constitute "drink,” "refreshments,” and/or "food.” Although the employer did not pay him an allowance for alcoholic beverages, this does not demand a finding that he was forbidden to purchase them with his own funds. The mere consumption of alcoholic beverages was not illegal and there was no finding that it was a causative factor in McDonald’s fall, that his acts of ministration to himself were not performed "in a normal and prudent manner,” or that his fall was in any way caused by his own misconduct.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
192 S.E.2d 919, 127 Ga. App. 171, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 823, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcdonald-v-state-highway-department-gactapp-1972.