McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia

234 F. Supp. 3d 637, 102 Fed. R. Serv. 850, 2017 WL 590271, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 13, 2017
DocketCIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2803
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 234 F. Supp. 3d 637 (McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia, 234 F. Supp. 3d 637, 102 Fed. R. Serv. 850, 2017 WL 590271, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

Opinion

Memorandum Opinión

RUFE, J.

Before the Court is Defendant City of Philadelphia’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied, as there are factual disputes regarding nearly every element of Plaintiffs claim, and Defendant has failed to put forward any compelling evidence or argument that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I. BACKGROUND

This ease concerns the shooting death of Aaron Lamar McDaniels by Jermias Olivo, a Philadelphia Police Officer with a checkered past.1 The parties have stipulated to some of the following facts, although others remain in dispute.2

A. The August 20 Shooting of Mr. McDaniels

The parties agree that on the evening of August 20,2013, Officer Olivo and his partner, Officer Camarote, were in uniform and driving a marked patrol car when they attempted to stop a Buick for disregarding a stop sign.3 Mr. McDaniels was riding in the front passenger seat and Kareem Gordon was driving.4 The Buick initially stopped, but sped off when the officers exited their patrol car.5 The. officers returned to their vehicle and a brief chase ensued, which ended when the Buick struck a minivan at the intersection of 22nd Street and Glenwood Avenue and came to rest on a nearby sidewalk.6 Mr. Gordon fled the scene on foot while Mr. McDaniels remained in the car.7 Officer Camarote split off to chase after Mr. Gordon while Officer Olivo approached the passenger side of the Buick.8

The parties dispute what happened next. Plaintiff alleges based on independent eyewitness testimony that Officer Olivo approached the Buick with his gun drawn, opened the door, and yelled “get out, get out.”9 Mr. McDaniels, who was unarmed, remained seated and turned toward Officer Olivo.10 Officer Olivo “then just started shooting,” paused briefly when Mr. McDaniels appeared to lean over, and re[641]*641sumed firing.11 Plaintiff offers the opinions of two experts that Mr. McDaniels was unarmed at the time of the shooting, although a gun was later recovered from the car.12

Officer Olivo provided a different account of the shooting, and testified that as he approached the Buick, Mr. McDaniels opened the door and pointed a gun at him.13 Officer Olivo claims that he instructed Mr. McDaniels to drop the weapon and then fired two shots when Mr. McDaniels failed to do so.14 In response, Mr. McDan-iels raised his weapon again, and Officer Olivo fired several more round's until the gun fell from his hands,15

B. The Philadelphia Police Department’s (“PPD’s”) Use-of-Force Policies and Training Practices

Mr. McDaniels’.s death came during a rise in shootings by PPD officers between 2007 and 2014 despite an overall downward trend in violent crime during the same period.16 In August 2013, then-Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey asked the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to provide technical assistance to the PPD, including an evaluation of its use-of-force policies.17 The resulting report, An Assessment of Deadly Force in the Philadelphia Police Department, was issued in 2015 and identified numerous deficiencies in PPD’s use-of-force policies, training programs, and investigative procedures.

The DOJ Report found that PPD officers did not “receive regular, consistent training on the department’s deádly force policy,” and were not .provided sufficient alternatives to.,the use' of deadly force.18 For example, officers lacked de-escalation training, which, can reduce the likelihood that officers will resort to deadly force.19 PPD also did not provide officers with comprehensive training -covering a wide variety of scenarios, including foot pursuits in high-crime areas.20 This lack -of training contributed to threat perception failures by officers in the field, such -as mistakenly believing that an unarmed person was carrying a weapon.21

The DOJ also found PPD’s use-of-force policies fragmented and confusing.22 In particular, • PPD Directive 10, which governed the use of deadly force at the time of Mr. McDaniels’s shooting, was poorly worded and incorrectly led officers to believe they could employ deadly force whenever they feared for their life.23 However, this was inconsistent with the Directive’s [642]*642intent and controlling Supreme Court precedent, both of which limit the use of deadly force to situations in which it is objectively reasonable.24 As a result, PPD officers were sent into the field without a clear understanding of when the use of deadly force was permissible under PPD policy or federal law.

The DOJ’s conclusions were consistent with those reached by Plaintiffs proffered expert on police practices, Dr. R. Paul McCauley. Dr. McCauley undertook a review of PPD deadly force incidents over a 15-year period, and found that PPD officers received inadequate training and lacked clear guidance regarding when the use of deadly force was appropriate.25 Dr. McCauley determined that due to a lack of training, PPD officers engaged in dangerous tactics such as “partner splitting”—in which two partners split up to pursue different suspects—which can heighten the risk that an officer will fear for his or her life and resort to deadly force unnecessarily.26 Dr. McCauley concluded that PPD’s “longstanding practice and custom” of failing to train officers caused Officer Olivo to resort unnecessarily to the use of deadly force against Mr. McDaniels.27

C. PPD’s Disciplinary System

Plaintiff has put forward evidence that the problems at PPD extended to its disciplinary system as well. A 2003 report by PPD’s Integrity and Accountability Office (“IAO”) found that investigations by PPD’s Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) suffered from excessive and chronic delays, a haphazard penalty system, inadequate followup efforts, and a pervasive failure to discipline officers who had violated PPD policies or engaged in severe misconduct.28 The IAO Report also found that “the conditions necessary for meaningful and lasting reforms” did not exist because PPD leadership generally tolerated misconduct and an “inherent fraternity” existed between officers and the IAD personnel charged with disciplining them.29

Dr. McCauley conducted an audit of IAD investigations and concluded that similar problems still plagued PPD’s disciplinary system at the time of Mr. McDaniels’s death. Specifically, Dr. McCauley found that IAD investigations frequently were untimely and incomplete, and often failed to account for flawed threat perception or poor tactical decisions when investigating a shooting by an officer.30

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
234 F. Supp. 3d 637, 102 Fed. R. Serv. 850, 2017 WL 590271, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcdaniels-v-city-of-philadelphia-paed-2017.