McDaniel v. The City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 20, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-08348·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CURTIS McDANIEL, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-8348 (LLS) THE CITY OF NEW YORK; JOHN DOE ORDER TO AMEND SUPERINTENDENT; JOHN DOE HEAD OF MEDICAL UNIT, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Bare Hill Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights when he was held in the Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC) on Rikers Island. By order dated November 12, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s claims arise from events that occurred when he was held in the Dorm Unit of AMKC between March 11, 2019 and January 24, 2020. The following allegations are taken from the complaint. During Plaintiff’s time at AMKC, he was required to sleep on an “emergency floor matteress [sic] placed on a foundation, which [the] manufacturer clear[ly] state[s] that it shouldn’t be.” (ECF No. 1, at 4.) Plaintiff had “a few injuries get worst [sic] and a few NEW injuries after repeated use” of the mattress. (Id.) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff repeatedly went to sick call “for known neck, shoulder blade, upper midlevel and lower back pains.” (Id. at 5.) He was prescribed medication “2 or 3 times 3 or 4 month[s] apart,”

as well as medication for depression and to help him sleep. (Id.) The sleep medication aggravated his injuries because it made him “sleep sedated through the pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that “[n]one of the medical treatment or procedures” were appropriate or adequate. (Id.) At one point, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “olecranon swelling on [his] elbow, para thoracic and lumbar sprains with tenderness at level of L10 – L3.” (Id. at 5-6.) He also had tenderness in his neck and shoulder blade. Plaintiff saw an orthopedist who told him to “do a seri[es] of bends,” but that he did not need physical therapy. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was “then sent back with no medication, new bedding, double mattress, and [he] had to go to sick call again for ointment.”2 (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that while being transported back and forth to court, he was

required to wait in the C-95 inmate intake area, which had an “asbestos abatement notic[e]” on the wall and which Plaintiff maintains was “filled” with asbestos. (Id. at 4-5.) He alleges that the asbestos worsened his asthma and gave him “a cough producing a white spectrum [sic].” (Id. at 5.) The clinic “diagnosed [him] with show[ing] light sign[s] of asbestos but never did an asbestos test or gave [him] any medicat[ion], but more asthma pumps.” (Id. at 6.)

2 Plaintiff appears to be stating that he was not provided with medication, new bedding, or a double mattress. Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries to his “neck, shoulder, entire back, [and] elbow,” as well as depression, emotional distress, asthma, coughing, dizziness, headaches, mental anguish, and “inconvenience.” (Id. at 8.) He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting § 1983 claims that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement that posed a serious threat to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Because Plaintiff was likely a pretrial detainee during the events that are the basis for his claims, his claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 If he was a convicted prisoner, his claims arise under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979), Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).

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McDaniel v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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