McDaniel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedMarch 16, 2020
Docket7:18-cv-02091
StatusUnknown

This text of McDaniel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner (McDaniel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McDaniel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, (N.D. Ala. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

DEBRA KAY MCDANIEL, ) ) Claimant, ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. v. ) 7:18-CV-02091-KOB ) ANDREW SAUL, ) ACTING COMMISSIONER OF ) SOCIAL SECURITY, ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION On January 13, 2016, the claimant, Debra Kay McDaniel, protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. In both applications, the claimant alleged disability commencing on December 18, 2015, because of diabetes, depression, migraines, generalized anxiety disorder, back pain, slipped disc in neck, iron anemia, neuropathy, peripheral neuropathy, vitamin D deficiency, and fibromyalgia. (R. 96–97). On February 25, 2016, the Commissioner denied the claims. Approximately two weeks later, the claimant filed a written request for a hearing, and on November 17, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge held a video hearing, with the ALJ presiding over the hearing from Birmingham, Alabama, and the claimant appearing via video from Tuscaloosa, Alabama. (R.11). In a decision dated May 1, 2018, the ALJ found that the claimant was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and was, therefore, ineligible for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (R. 8). On November 7, 2018, the Appeals Council denied the claimant’s request for review. (R. 1). Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. The claimant has exhausted her administrative remedies, and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). As explained below, because substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s

findings regarding the claimant’s fibromyalgia, this court reverses and remands the decision of the Commissioner to the ALJ for reconsideration. II. ISSUE PRESENTED Whether the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s fibromyalgia was not a medically determinable impairment lacks substantial evidence in the record. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s decision is limited. This court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if he applied the correct legal standards and substantial evidence supports his factual conclusions. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Brown, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

“No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] legal conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating claims.” Walker, 826 F.2d at 999. This court does not review the Commissioner’s factual determinations de novo. The court will affirm those factual determinations that are supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The court must keep in mind that opinions regarding whether a claimant is disabled, the nature and extent of a claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Whether the claimant meets a listing and is qualified for Social Security disability benefits is a

question reserved for the ALJ, and the court “may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the court were to disagree with the ALJ about the significance of certain facts, it cannot reverse that finding as long as substantial evidence in the record supports it. The court must “scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the [Commissioner]’s factual findings.” Walker, 826 F.2d at 999. A reviewing court must not only look to those parts of the record that support the decision of the ALJ, but also must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence that detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986).

IV. LEGAL STANDARD The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “fibromyalgia, a chronic pain illness, is usually diagnosed based on an individual’s described symptoms because the ‘hallmark’ of the disease is a lack of objective evidence.” Brown-Gaudet-Evans v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 673 F. App’x 902, 906 (11th Cir. 2016). The ALJ must “find that a person has a [medically determinable impairment] of [fibromyalgia] if the physician diagnosed [fibromyalgia] and provides the evidence described in II.A or section II.B, and the physician’s diagnosis is not inconsistent with the other evidence in the [claimant’s] case record.” SSR 12-2p. Sections II.A and II.B provide two sets of criteria for diagnosing fibromyalgia: the 1990 American College of Rheumatology (ACR) Criteria for the Classification of Fibromyalgia or the 2010 ACR Preliminary Diagnostic Criteria. SSR 12-2p §§ II.A & II.B. The 1990 ACR Criteria require that the claimant show (1) a history of widespread pain; (2) at least 11 positive tender

points on physical examination, found bilaterally, on the left and right sides of the body and both above and below the waist; and (3) evidence that other disorders that could cause the symptoms or signs were excluded. SSR 12-2p § II.A. The 2010 ACR Criteria require that the claimant demonstrate (1) a history of widespread pain; (2) repeated manifestations of six or more fibromyalgia symptoms, signs, or co-concurring conditions; and (3) evidence that other disorders that could cause the symptoms, signs, or co- concurring conditions were excluded. SSR 12-2p § II.B. Symptoms and signs of fibromyalgia include muscle pain, fatigue or tiredness, muscle weakness, headache, numbness or tingling, dizziness, insomnia, depression, nausea, chest pain, shortness of breath, and hair loss. See SSR 12-2p § II.B n. 9 (citing 20 C.F.R. 404.1528(b) and 416.928(b) and Table No. 4, “Fibromyalgia

diagnostic criteria,” 2010 ACR Preliminary Diagnostic Criteria). Some co-concurring conditions include depression, chronic fatigue syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux disorder, and migraines. SSR 12-2p § II.B n. 10. Further, the law obligates the ALJ to develop a full and fair record. Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.3d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985).

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McDaniel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcdaniel-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-alnd-2020.