McDaniel v. Skillsoft Corp.

2005 DNH 159
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedNovember 18, 2005
DocketCV-04-311-PB
StatusPublished

This text of 2005 DNH 159 (McDaniel v. Skillsoft Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McDaniel v. Skillsoft Corp., 2005 DNH 159 (D.N.H. 2005).

Opinion

McDaniel v. Skillsoft Corp. CV-04-311-PB 11/18/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SCOTT MCDANIEL

v. Case No. 04-cv-0311-PB Opinion No. 2005 DNH 159 SKILLSOFT CORPORATION

O R D E R

Scott McDaniel charges that he was sexually harassed by hi

supervisor, Rob Brown, while both men worked at SkillSoft

Corporation's office in Nashua, New Hampshire. McDaniel seeks

damages for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 and the New Hampshire Civil Rights Act, as well as

for the common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional

distress and constructive discharge.

The guestion I answer in this Order is whether McDaniel ha

standing to sue given his failure to list his claims against

Skillsoft as assets in his intervening bankruptcy proceeding.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

McDaniel started working at SkillSoft in July 2000. Compl

5 11. SkillSoft hired Rob Brown in November 2000. Id. 5 15.

According to McDaniel, Brown sexually harassed him by making suggestive comments, sending him emails laden with sexual

content, and touching him inappropriately. See id. generally.

In March 2001, McDaniel sought mental health counseling. Compl.

5 47. On September 21, 2001, at the suggestion of his doctor,

McDaniel stopped working and started collecting disability

benefits. McDonald Aff. 5 7; McDaniel Dep. Vol. I at 213 in. 23;

214 in. 1-2. Although he has not returned to work, McDaniel

never resigned his position at SkillSoft. Id. at 212 in. 21-23.

Nor did SkillSoft terminate McDaniel's employment, id. at 218 in.

14-16, although his disability coverage expired after 18 months.

Id. at 219 in. 6-12. McDaniel first told SkillSoft's human

resources department about Brown's conduct on October 1, 2001.

Id. Vol. II at 47 in. 20-23; 48 in. 5-6. SkillSoft promptly

investigated McDaniel's allegations and terminated Brown by

giving him the opportunity to resign on October 29, 2001.

McDonald Aff. 5 5-6.

McDaniel filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on

December 21, 2001; he did not list his claims against SkillSoft

in the statement of financial affairs and schedules that

accompanied the petition. McDaniel received a discharge on April

5, 2002. See Filings in McDaniel Bankruptcy Case, No. 01-13815

- 2 - (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002).

The present litigation commenced in December 2003.

B. STANDING

Legal claims existing when an individual files a Chapter 7

petition become part of the bankruptcy estate. See Howe v.

Richardson, 193 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing 11 U.S.C. §

541(a)(1)); see also Harrisv. St. Louis University, 114 B.R.

647, 648 (E.D. Mo. 1990) ("It is well established that [the

bankruptcy estate] includes causes of action existing at the time

of the commencement of the bankruptcy case.").

The trustee in bankruptcy "is the real party in interest

with exclusive standing to assert claims which are property of

the bankruptcy estate." Vidal v. Doral Bank Corp., 363 F. Supp.

2d 19, 22 (D.P.R. 2005) (emphasis added). This is true even if

the cause of action is not scheduled as an asset in the

bankruptcy proceeding. Brooks v. Beatty, No. 93-1891, 1994 U.S.

A p p . LEXIS 12425 at *9 (1st Cir. 1994) (unpublished).

McDaniel's claims against SkillSoft arose from events that

occurred before his last day of work in September 2001, which was

prior to the filing of his bankruptcy petition in December 2001.

Thus, the claims became part of the bankruptcy estate and the

- 3 - trustee in bankruptcy is the real party in interest to this

lawsuit. Because the trustee's standing is exclusive, McDaniel

lacks standing to pursue his claims against SkillSoft at this

time.

These proceedings shall be stayed for 90 days so that

McDaniel may reopen his bankruptcy proceeding and amend his

schedule of assets to include his claims against SkillSoft. If

McDaniel does not reopen his bankruptcy case within 90 days, the

action will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Skillsoft's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 19) is

denied without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro__________ Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

November 18, 2 005

cc: Mary Notaris, Esg. Elizabeth A. Bailey, Esg. Christopher Cole, Esg.

- 4 -

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Related

Howe v. Richardson
193 F.3d 60 (First Circuit, 1999)
Harris v. St. Louis University
114 B.R. 647 (E.D. Missouri, 1990)
Vidal v. Doral Bank Corp.
363 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Puerto Rico, 2005)

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