McCurley v. Royal Seas Cruises, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided December 3, 2020·No. 3:17-cv-00986·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 JOHN MCCURLEY and DAN Case No. 17-cv-00986-BAS-AGS 10 DEFOREST, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 11 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, SANCTIONS 12 v. (ECF No. 192) 13 ROYAL SEA CRUISES, INC., 14 Defendant. 15 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 On July 31, 2020, this Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Witness 18 Declarations, for Restraining Order, for Monetary Sanctions and for Disqualification of 19 Counsel. (ECF No. 129 (“Motion for Sanctions I”); ECF No. 190.) In the Order, the Court 20 expressed grave concern about Defendant’s conduct in contacting class members without 21 notifying them that a class action existed, that they were potentially a member of that class, 22 and that they could be represented by class counsel. The Court held that “[d]efense counsel 23 violated an ethical rule when they encouraged their client to contact an individual the 24 lawyer knew to be represented by counsel, regarding the subject of the representation, 25 without counsel’s consent.” (Id. at 8.) The Court found the communications with class 26 members were misleading and coercive, and, thus, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for 27 monetary sanctions. (Id.) 28 1 At the time Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Sanctions I on March 4, 2020, they stated 2 they had incurred $18,037.50 in attorneys’ fees and $2,323.72 in costs in bringing the 3 motion and conducting sanctions discovery. (Mot. for Sanctions I at 15.) However, since 4 they claimed they had incurred additional costs in replying and appearing in Court after the 5 initial Motion was filed, the Court allowed them to supplement their request for Monetary 6 Sanctions. This Motion for Sanctions ensued. (ECF No. 192 (“Motion for Sanctions II”)). 7 Plaintiffs now request $73,509.50 in attorneys’ fees and $3,764.01 in costs.1 They also 8 request an additional $9,450.00 for preparation of a Reply to the Motions for Sanctions II. 9 (ECF No. 194.) Curiously, the statements they submit supporting their requests for 10 attorneys’ fees now detail $37,165 in attorneys’ fees allegedly incurred before the Motion 11 was filed on March 4, 2020, well over the initial request for $18,037.50. 12 Ultimately, although the Court finds monetary sanctions are warranted, it finds 13 Plaintiffs’ request to be excessive and awards a total of $46,298.50 in attorneys’ fees and 14 $2323.72 in costs. 15 II. ANALYSIS 16 “Federal courts have inherent powers to manage their own proceedings and to 17 control the conduct of those who appear before them.” Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 18 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). “By 19 invoking the inherent power to punish bad faith conduct which abuses the judicial process, 20 a court must exercise discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction.” Id. “It is crucial . 21 . . that a sanctions award be quantifiable with some precision and properly itemized in 22 terms of the perceived misconduct and the sanctioning authority.” Matter of Yagman, 796 23 F.2d 1165, 1183–1184 (9th Cir. 1986). 24 “When the sanctions award is based upon attorney's fees and related expenses, an 25 essential part of determining the reasonableness of the award is inquiring into the 26 reasonableness of the claimed fees. Recovery should never exceed those expenses and fees 27 1 Although the Plaintiffs initially requested $73,509.50 in attorneys’ fees at the beginning of their motion, 28 1 that were reasonably necessary to resist the offending action.” Id. at 1184–85. “The 2 measure to be used is not actual expenses and fees but those the court determines to be 3 reasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted). 4 Calculating a “lodestar” amount by determining the reasonable number of hours 5 spent and the appropriate billing rate per hour is the starting point for determining a 6 reasonable fee. Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1994). It is only “in rare 7 instances” that the lodestar figure should “be adjusted on the basis of other considerations.” 8 Id. 9 A. Attorneys’ Fees—Calculation of Lodestar 10 1. Hourly billable rate 11 Plaintiffs’ fee request details hourly rates of $425/hour for fourth year associate Mr. 12 Wheeler and $625–725/hour for the three partners working on the case. (Decl. of Adrian 13 R. Bacon in supp. of Mot. for Sanctions II (“Bacon Decl.”) ¶ 18, ECF No. 192-1.) Counsel 14 provides documentation that these are rates “prevailing in the community for similar work 15 performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” See Camacho v. 16 Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Specifically, counsel 17 provide documentation that their rates have been approved by other courts in Southern 18 California. (See id. ¶¶ 21. 23. 26 (showing $425/hour approved for Mr. Wheeler, $625 19 approved for Mr. Bacon and $725 approved for Mr. Friedman); Decl. of Abbas 20 Kazerounian in supp. of Mot. for Sanctions II (“Kazerounian Decl.”) ¶¶ 13–14, ECF No. 21 192-2 (detailing Mr. Kazerounian has been approved for an hourly rate of $695 and $705 22 in 2019, $675 in 2018, and maintaining that his rate has increased $5 in 2020 to the 23 requested rate of $710.) 24 The rates submitted by the Defendant in its 2017–2018 U.S. Consumer Law 25 Attorney Fee Survey Report (Ex. 1 to Opp’n, ECF No. 193-1) add support to Plaintiffs’ 26 requests. First, this survey was conducted in the 2017–2018 year. Presumably attorney 27 rates have increased since then. Additionally, the survey shows that the 25% median for 28 all attorneys practicing class action litigation in California was $350/hour and the 95% 1 median of all attorneys practicing in this area of law in California was $700/hour. (Id.) 2 Both Mr. Friedman and Mr. Kazerounian are skilled, experienced class action litigators 3 very familiar to this Court. All four of the attorneys have quite a bit of experience in the 4 area of class action litigation. The rates requested are similar to rates requested by other 5 attorneys in other class action cases. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ requested 6 billable hour rates are reasonable. 7 2. Number of hours billed 8 As a preliminary matter, the Court takes notice of the fact that Plaintiffs’ original 9 Motion for Sanctions I asked for $18,037.50 in attorney’s fees covering the time billed up 10 until the date the Motion was filed on March 4, 2020. (Mot. for Sanctions I at 15.) 11 Specifically, at that time Plaintiffs sought 39.5 hours for Mr. Wheeler to investigate, take 12 the deposition of, and draft the sanctions motion and two hours for Mr. Bacon to supervise 13 and revise the motion. (Id.) Plaintiffs indicated at the time that they would “forego other 14 hours worked leading up to this motion including multiple calls between [the lawyers.]” 15 (Mot. for Sanctions I at 20 n. 12.) 16 Plaintiffs now apparently no longer “forego other hours worked” and request an 17 additional $19,127.5 consisting of an additional 3.9 hours billed by Mr. Friedman, 10.4 18 hours billed by Ms. Bacon, 3.6 hours billed by Mr. Wheeler, and 7.1 hours billed by Mr. 19 Kazerounian. (See generally, Bacon Decl. and Kazerounian Decl.) After reviewing these 20 additional charges, the Court finds that they largely consist of attorney conversations 21 necessary because there are so many attorneys involved in the case.

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McCurley v. Royal Seas Cruises, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2020).

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Harris v. Marhoefer
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