24CA1391 McCullough v Grand Junction 05-29-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1391 Mesa County District Court No. 22CV30352 Honorable Valerie J. Robinson, Judge
Claire McCullough, Sara Woods, and Daniel Woods,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
Richard McCreanor,
Plaintiff,
v.
The City of Grand Junction, The City of Grand Junction City Council, and Kettle Capital, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025
Drew Moore, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
No Appearance for Plaintiff
John P. Shaver, City Attorney, Jamie B. Beard, Assistant City Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees The City of Grand Junction and The City of Grand Junction City Council Dufford Waldek, Shelly S. Dackonish, Scott D. Goebel, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Kettle Capital, LLC ¶1 Claire McCullough, Sara Woods, and Daniel Woods
(collectively, the neighbors)1 appeal the district court’s judgment
affirming a City of Grand Junction (the City) resolution, passed by a
vote of the City of Grand Junction City Council (council), approving
a rezoning application filed by Kettle Capital, LLC (developer)
(collectively, the Defendants). We affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
¶2 This dispute centers around the rezoning of an approximately
fifteen-acre parcel of property located in the Redlands area of Grand
Junction. The Redlands are bordered by the Colorado River, the
Colorado Monument, and the Lower Red Canyon, which serves as a
wildlife corridor.
¶3 The subject property is currently improved with a single-family
residence. It is bordered by Broadway on the south, and an
elementary school to the north. The eastern border of the property
is a designated floodplain known as the Red Canyon Wash, and
further east are single-family residences zoned Rural Residential,
which permits one dwelling unit per five acres. The parcel is
1 Richard McCreanor was identified as a plaintiff in the district
court, but is not a party to the appeal.
1 bordered on the west by single-family residences, as is the area
south of Broadway.
¶4 In March 2022, the developer submitted a rezoning application
proposing to convert the property from the existing R-2 zone
district, which allows for two dwelling units per acre, to an R-5 zone
district, which allows multifamily housing units.
¶5 In Grand Junction, when a rezoning is sought, the City’s
planning director is required to review the application and make a
recommendation to the planning commission whether the request
should be approved. Grand Junction Mun. Code §§ 21.02.080,
21.02.140(b) (repealed effective Dec. 20, 2023) (hereinafter
G.J.M.C.).2 The planning commission receives input at a public
hearing. The planning commission then makes a recommendation
to the council. Id.
¶6 The council ultimately decides whether to approve the
rezoning application. Id. If the planning commission recommends
2 We note that since the hearings in this case, section 21.02.140
has been repealed or relocated in the G.J.M.C. The record does not contain copies of the pertinent sections of the Code as it existed in 2022. But the parties’ briefs agree on the substance of the applicable provisions, so we draw our citations to the 2022 Code from their briefs.
2 denial of a rezoning application, the applicant must secure the
votes of at least five of the six councilmembers in order to prevail on
the application. Id. § 21.02.120(e).
¶7 In May 2022, the developer held a virtual meeting to introduce
the rezoning request to the community and answer questions. The
meeting lasted about thirty minutes and was attended by ten
residents. After the meeting, Scott Peterson — a senior planner for
the City — prepared a staff report evaluating the application. The
report recommended approving the rezoning application, concluding
that it was consistent with the vision, goals, and policies of the One
Grand Junction Comprehensive Plan (Plan), and met four out of the
five criteria contained in G.J.M.C. section 21.02.140(a)(1) to (5).
¶8 A number of interested parties provided written comments
prior to the hearing, and members of the public also made
statements at the planning commission meeting. Numerous people
who lived close to the property spoke against the requested
rezoning. Among other concerns, they stated that the housing
density enabled by the proposed rezoning was inconsistent with the
surrounding neighborhoods and would be detrimental to wildlife in
the area, improperly burden the Red Canyon Wash and related
3 wetlands, and compromise the pastoral setting of some of the
surrounding properties. After the hearing, a quorum of the
planning commission voted 4-0 in favor of recommending that the
council deny the application.
¶9 In July, the council scheduled a public meeting to consider the
application. After learning that only five of six councilmembers
were present, the developer requested a continuance of the hearing,
which the council granted.
¶ 10 The hearing took place in August. Over the course of
approximately forty-five minutes, the developer’s engineer, City
staff, and community members addressed the propriety of the
application. Five community members, including one of the
neighbors, requested that the council deny the application. The
neighbors assert that at the hearing the developer and Peterson
used about twice as much time as that used by members of the
public.
¶ 11 Before voting on the application, the mayor made the following
statement and findings:
I just want to remind us exactly what it is we’re deciding here tonight. . . . [T]here are processes in place . . . such as the [Plan] that
4 have gone through the process of making sure that nothing inappropriate is . . . being put next to things. . . . [W]hat we’re here to decide tonight specifically is whether or not the request by the [developer] meets the criteria and the ordinances that are in place and that have been decided and voted on by City Council. And that essentially [is] the law of our city, the law of the land here. And what we’re essentially determining is whether or not the boxes have been checked. . . . We are not here to make an emotional decision. We are here to make a very objective decision, which is pretty black and white. And that’s whether or not [the application] meets the criteria of the Zoning and Development Code and whether or not this meets the [Plan]. And what I heard this evening is that four of the five zoning and development criteria were met or are met by this, and only one has to be met in order for this to move forward. So, the number of criteria does not matter, but I think it’s important to point out that four of five are met here and also four of the [Plan’s] principles are addressed here. To me, this is a pretty cut and dry decision.
I find the boxes are checked and that is . . . that’s our role here. . . . What we’re being asked to determine is whether or not this meets the [Plan] principles and the criteria of Designing and Development Code. And I find that it has been.
The council voted 5-1 to approve the application.
¶ 12 The neighbors sought district court review of the council’s
decision under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). They argued that the council
5 violated their due process rights by failing to give them a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and did not meaningfully
consider their concerns. The neighbors also argued that the council
misinterpreted and misapplied the controlling ordinance by
concluding that it lacked any discretion to reject the application
and by failing to adequately consider whether the rezone was
consistent with the Redlands Area Plan (RAP).3
¶ 13 In response, the City argued that (1) the council approved the
rezoning application in accordance with the Plan and controlling
ordinances; (2) the neighbors’ due process claim fails because they
were properly provided with adequate notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard; and (3) the council properly construed and
considered the RAP as an advisory document rather than a binding
standard that controlled the rezoning decision.
¶ 14 In a thorough and well-reasoned order, the district court
denied the neighbors’ claim. The court concluded that the
neighbors had notice of the hearing and were provided ample and
3 The RAP is a 2002 advisory document adopted by the Mesa
County Planning Commission and the City of Grand Junction Planning Commission that addresses future development in the Redlands area.
6 meaningful opportunities to be heard and thus suffered no violation
of their due process rights. The court also concluded that the
council properly treated the Plan and ordinances as the controlling
legal authority and the RAP as an advisory document. Thus, the
district court determined that the council did not abuse its
discretion by finding that the application met the Plan’s rezoning
requirements. The neighbors timely appealed the district court’s
order.
¶ 15 In August 2024, the City repealed the RAP. The repeal became
effective the following month.
II. Due Process Claim
¶ 16 The neighbors contend the district court erred by concluding
that the City provided them with a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. We are not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 17 We review a district court’s interpretation of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. Brown v. Walker Com., Inc., 2022
CO 57, ¶ 14. When construing the rules, we apply “settled
principles of statutory construction” and interpret the rules
“according to their commonly understood and accepted meanings.”
7 Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, we review de novo the construction
and application of municipal ordinances. City of Golden v. Sodexo
Am., LLC, 2019 CO 38, ¶ 22.
1. Judicial Review Under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)
¶ 18 In a Rule 106(a)(4) action, a district court may grant relief only
if the governing body has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion, and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
otherwise provided by law. Martin v. Arapahoe Cnty. Ct., 2016 COA
154, ¶ 10; C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(I).
¶ 19 “Review of a governmental body’s decision pursuant to Rule
106(a)(4) requires an appellate court to review the decision of the
governmental body itself rather than the district court’s
determination regarding the governmental body’s decision.” Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. O’Dell, 920 P.2d 48, 50 (Colo. 1996). In doing so,
we apply the same legal standard as the district court. Alpenhof,
LLC v. City of Ouray, 2013 COA 9, ¶ 9. A governmental body
abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law or if no
competent record evidence supports its decision. Id. Rule 106(a)(4)
does not permit judicial review of legislative acts such as the
passage of a code or ordinance; rather the reviewing court’s analysis
8 focuses on the application of an ordinance to a particular set of
facts. Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer, 2020 CO 30, ¶ 16.
¶ 20 A reviewing court “is not[,] and should not” sit as, a “zoning
board of appeals.” O’Dell, 920 P.2d at 50 (citation omitted). Rather,
the governing body’s decision must be upheld unless it is contrary
to law or there is no competent evidence to support it. See
Whitelaw v. Denver City Council, 2017 COA 47, ¶ 8 (the no
competent evidence standard requires a conclusion that there is
such an absence of evidentiary support that the decision can be
explained only as an arbitrary exercise of authority).
2. The Right to Due Process
¶ 21 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee the
right to due process in matters where a person may be deprived of
their life, liberty, or property. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;Colo.
Const. art. II, § 25. Thus, before making a quasi-judicial decision, a
governmental body must provide “notice and an opportunity to be
heard as a matter of ‘fundamental fairness to those persons whose
protected interests are likely to be affected by the governmental
decision.’” Whitelaw, ¶ 8 (quoting Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v.
City of Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d 622, 626 (Colo. 1988)).
9 ¶ 22 “The due process requirement of neutrality in adjudicative
proceedings entitles a person to an impartial decision-maker.” No
Laporte Gravel Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2022 COA 6M, ¶ 41.
“An impartial adjudication requires ‘the absence of a personal,
financial, or official stake in the decision evidencing a conflict of
interest on the part of a decision-maker.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“This concept encompasses both the absence of actual bias and the
risk of actual bias.” Id. The obligations of neutrality extend to
governmental actors acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Id.
¶ 23 “Acting as quasi-judicial decision-makers, city council
members are entitled to a ‘presumption of integrity, honesty, and
impartiality.’” Whitelaw, ¶ 11 (quoting Soon Yee Scott v. City of
Englewood, 672 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. App. 1983)). To overcome this
presumption and invalidate the council’s action, the neighbors
must demonstrate that the conflict, if any, had an impact “on the
outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
B. Application
¶ 24 The neighbors concede that they received adequate notice of
the hearing, but they contend that the district court erred by
finding that the City provided them a meaningful opportunity to be
10 heard. They also assert that the hearing was fundamentally unfair
due to the City’s alleged bias.4
¶ 25 The neighbors argued before the district court, and again on
appeal, that they were denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard
because, among other reasons, (1) the council failed to engage in
meaningful deliberation or discussion; (2) the councilmember who
voted against approval of the application provided no explanation
for that vote; (3) the mayor pro tem discussed personal experiences
living near multifamily housing; (4) a councilmember stated that he
felt like he did not have discretion to deny the application; (5) the
mayor stated that she was checking the boxes for the application
and that the decision was pretty black and white; (6) she also
referred to avoiding “emotional” decisions; (7) staff members were
biased against the neighbors and spent too much time advocating
for approval of the rezoning application; and (8) there were ex parte
4 Both parties rely on California case law to bolster their due
process arguments. Although we are permitted to consider authority from other jurisdictions in the absence of controlling Colorado case law, because there is Colorado law on point, we need not rely on the cited California cases. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, 2016 COA 72, ¶ 17 (“[W]e, of course, are not bound by the decisions of the courts of other states.”).
11 communications between City staff, developer representatives, and
councilmembers.
¶ 26 The Defendants counter that the City afforded the neighbors
meaningful opportunities to be heard both before the planning
commission and council, and by written comments. The
Defendants also argue that councilmembers listened to and
considered the public’s comments and the evidence presented by
the developers and City staff, and they properly concluded that the
available information demonstrated that the requested rezoning was
consistent with the Plan and applicable zoning ordinances. Thus,
the Defendants conclude, the City did not deny the neighbors a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
¶ 27 We discern no error in the district court’s finding that the City
provided the neighbors a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The
neighbors were permitted to provide written comments between May
and August. There were no limits on the number or length of those
comments. Furthermore, the City provided the neighbors an
opportunity to speak at the planning commission and council
meetings. Indeed, numerous community members, including one of
the neighbors, expressed concerns at those meetings.
12 ¶ 28 Nor did the mayor pro tem’s references to his personal
experience living next to multifamily housing create error. Nothing
in Rule 106 or the Federal and Colorado Due Process Clauses
prohibits a fact finder from drawing on their lived experience.
¶ 29 The neighbors’ arguments about “checking the boxes,” “lack of
discretion,” and dismissing “emotional comments” are similarly
unavailing. When read in context, these councilmembers simply
acknowledged that they were required to evaluate whether the
proposed rezoning was consistent with the Plan and met one or
more of the five criteria set forth in G.J.M.C. section 21.02.140(a)(1)
to (5). In doing so, a number of councilmembers expressed that
they heard and empathized with the neighbors’ concerns, but they
were obligated to view the evidence and code dispassionately. We
discern no error in these statements.
¶ 30 Nor do we find any of the other specific allegations persuasive.
As to the asserted absence of factual findings to support the
majority and dissenting votes, we begin by noting that “[g]enerally,
express factual findings are not a prerequisite to a valid decision by
an administrative board if the necessary findings may be implied
from the action taken.” Canyon Area Residents for the Env’t v. Bd.
13 of Cnty. Comm’rs, 172 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2006) (citing
Sundance Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 534
P.2d 1212 (Colo. 1975)). Thus, the councilmembers were not
required to provide specific factual findings to support their votes.
But we also note that a number of those who voted in favor of the
application provided both the factual and legal context for their
decision.
¶ 31 Nor do we discern any error with how the council managed the
evidentiary presentations. In the first instance, the structure and
process for conducting a public hearing is left to the sound
discretion of the presiding board. See Carpenter v. Civ. Serv.
Comm’n, 813 P.2d 773, 776 (Colo. App. 1990) (“A hearing is nothing
more than an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”); People v. Dist. Ct., 767 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo.
1989) (a trial court has broad discretion and is the final arbiter of
that admissibility of evidence). During the hearing, a
councilmember asked the developer’s engineer and the city planner
multiple questions and consulted with the city attorney when there
was any confusion about council’s quasi-judicial function.
Councilmembers acknowledged and consistently referred to their
14 obligation to objectively apply the Plan and controlling ordinances.
And though not required, multiple councilmembers articulated
general facts and Plan standards that informed their decision.
These actions contradict the neighbors’ assertion that the council
merely rubber-stamped the planning staff’s recommendations.
¶ 32 The neighbors’ expressions of concern regarding the time given
to the participants at the hearing and the allegedly ex parte
communications between staff members and the developer or
among councilmembers are also unavailing.
¶ 33 As it relates to the allocation of time between the developer
and the neighbors, there is no indication that any neighbors were
unable to meaningfully convey their concerns at the hearing.
Moreover, there is no indication that the allotted time was
inadequate or that interested neighbors were deprived of their
ability to be heard. And even though oral comments were limited to
three minutes per person at the May and August hearings, the
neighbors were also permitted to submit written comments online
prior to those hearings. Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude
that the district court did not err by rejecting the neighbors’
15 contention that they were denied the opportunity to be meaningfully
heard during this process.
¶ 34 We also reject the neighbors’ argument that the City’s
communications with the participants reflected a bias in favor of
the developer. The application process requires communications
between the planning department and the developer, and the
neighbors point to nothing untoward about those communications.
Similarly, we do not perceive anything improper about alleged
communications between two councilmembers who apparently
shared some initial perspectives concerning the Plan and applicable
ordinances as they related to the application.5
¶ 35 Because the record indicates that the neighbors had a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, we discern no error in the
5 In their reply brief, the neighbors argue for the first time on appeal
that the City failed to provide a full record of all communications between the staff and the developer, or among councilmembers. But we do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2023 COA 107, ¶ 25. Nor will we speculate about the supposed content of communications that are not documented in the record. See In re Marriage of Tessmer, 903 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Colo. App. 1995) (The court of appeals is bound by the record presented and may not consider “arguments and assertions not supported by evidence in the record.”).
16 district court’s conclusion that the City did not violate their due
process rights.
III. Misapplication of the Law
¶ 36 The neighbors also claim that the district court erred when it
found that the council properly applied the Plan and controlling
ordinances. Again, we are not persuaded.
¶ 37 A governing body abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or
misapplies the law. No Laporte Gravel, ¶ 23. We review a district
court’s interpretation of statutes and municipal ordinances de novo.
Asphalt Specialties, Co. v. City of Commerce City, 218 P.3d 741, 745
(Colo. App. 2009). Although we are not bound by a governing
body’s interpretation of its local ordinances, we extend deference to
those interpretations. See Roundup Found., Inc. v. Bd. of
Adjustment, 626 P.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Colo. App. 1980) (granting
deference to a board of adjustment’s interpretation of a municipal
ordinance).
¶ 38 The neighbors contend that the City misapplied the law by
treating the RAP as merely an advisory document. The neighbors
17 argue that the approval of the rezoning application was inconsistent
with the RAP’s stated objectives, including protecting the floodplain
and related wetlands, protecting wildlife corridors, and maintaining
the pastoral setting of neighboring properties by preserving gradual
transitions to more densely populated areas. The neighbors reason
that these failures contradicted the Plan’s incorporation of
neighborhood plans and the substantive provisions of the RAP.
¶ 39 The Defendants first contend that the issue is moot because
the City repealed the RAP after this appeal was filed. In the
alternative, they argue that regardless of its repeal, the RAP was
merely advisory, and therefore, the council was not bound by its
provisions when deciding the rezoning issue.
1. Mootness
¶ 40 Approximately a week after the neighbors filed their notice of
appeal, the council adopted a resolution repealing the RAP (along
with three other neighborhood plans). Because the RAP no longer
exists, the Defendants argue that even if the rezoning failed to
appropriately apply the RAP, it doesn’t matter. In other words, even
if we were to reverse the City’s decision based on the failure to
properly apply the RAP, it would not affect the outcome of the
18 dispute because on remand the City could again approve the
rezoning application for the same reasons without consideration of
the repealed RAP. See Gresh v. Balink, 148 P.3d 419, 421 (Colo.
App. 2006) (“A case is moot when the relief sought, if granted,
would have no practical legal effect on the controversy.”).
¶ 41 Based on the mootness doctrine, a court generally will not
decide an issue that will not affect the outcome of the case. Giuliani
v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2012 COA 190, ¶ 15
(“Where a claim is moot on appeal, we decline to address its merits,
and instead dismiss the claim.” (citing USAA v. Parker, 200 P.3d
350, 356 (Colo. 2009)); Campbell v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo.
App. 1994). The neighbors argue that mootness principles should
not be applied in this case because they were not provided notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the repeal of the
RAP. They also argue that the Plan continues to reference and
incorporate the RAP even after its repeal.
¶ 42 We need not weigh in on the mootness issue because
regardless of the current status of the RAP, the City did not err by
not giving it controlling import.
19 2. The RAP’s Advisory Nature
¶ 43 The RAP was originally passed in 1986. It was last updated in
2002. Its self-described purpose is “to identify and articulate
detailed needs of the area as they have changed over the last
several years. The [RAP] will help achieve community goals by
providing specific policies and implementation strategies.” It does
not purport to set forth the controlling criteria for the City’s decision
whether to approve a rezoning request.
¶ 44 The Plan was originally adopted in 2010 and last updated in
2020. The Plan designates neighborhood plans, such as the RAP,
as “guiding documents to the City.” Specifically, the Plan provides:
Previously adopted plans, studies, and reports completed by or for the City of Grand Junction are important to the current comprehensive planning process. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan is first among these as it contains many guiding principles and information that have remained relevant to the City’s vision a decade later. In addition, many of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan policies and recommendations remain consistent with the . . . Plan. Where this consistency occurs, policies and recommendations from the previous plan have been incorporated into the . . . Plan. Relationship to [other plans, including the RAP] also remain important for City long-term planning and provide for a more granular assessment and recommendations for
20 specific areas . . . or specific services. . . . These plans remain guiding documents to the City and should be reviewed for consistency with [the] Plan and updated periodically.
¶ 45 These provisions indicate that the RAP is an advisory
document that sets forth recommendations and guidelines for the
City to consider when addressing zoning and land use issues in the
Redlands region. But these policies are subservient to the Plan.
And most importantly, the RAP does not change or supersede the
requirements of the G.J.M.C., which controls the approval of a
rezoning request.
3. The Municipal Code Requirements
¶ 46 Section 21.02.140(a) articulates five criteria for the City to
evaluate when determining whether an area should be rezoned:
In order to maintain internal consistency between the [G.J.M.C.] and the zoning maps, map amendment must only occur if:
(1) Subsequent events have invalidated the original premises findings and/or;
(2) The character and/or condition of the area has changed such that the amendment is consistent with the Plan; and/or
(3) Public and community facilities are adequate to serve the type and scope of the proposed land use; and/or
21 (4) An inadequate supply of suitably designated land is available within the community as defined by the presiding body to accommodate the proposed land use; and/or
(5) The community or area, as defined by the presiding body, will derive benefits from the proposed amendment.
¶ 47 The neighbors concede that a rezoning application need not
satisfy all five of these criteria. But they contend that the
councilmembers improperly concluded that they had no discretion
to deny the application if any one of the five criteria was satisfied.
We disagree.
¶ 48 Read in context, the councilmembers’ statements that their
decision was controlled primarily by whether the application met
one of the criteria set forth in section 21.02.140(a)(1) to (5) and was
consistent with the vision and objectives of the Plan. We
acknowledge that a couple of the councilmembers expressed
reluctance to reject the application if it met the approval conditions,
but we do not interpret these statements as an abandonment of
their discretion to deny the application.
¶ 49 For example, one councilmember said, “Our job is to apply the
rules that have been adopted to the facts of the case. We don’t have
22 a lot of discretion. And I, I have a lot of commiseration with the
residents who have come and talked.” The mayor stated, “We are
not here to make an emotional decision. We are here to make a
very objective decision, which is pretty black and white. And that’s
whether or not [the rezoning application] meets the criteria of the
[G.J.M.C.] and whether or not this meets the [Plan].”
¶ 50 We interpret these statements as an expression of the
councilmembers’ recognition that they sat in a quasi-judicial
capacity, and that they were obligated to apply the approval criteria
objectively. We reject the notion that these statements reflect their
understanding that they were compelled to accept the application
simply because one or more of the criteria was established. Indeed,
a councilmember listening to the same presentation and discussion
exercised just such discretion by voting against the application.
¶ 51 In sum, we reject the contention that the council
misinterpreted or misapplied the controlling law, including section
21.02.140(a)(1) to (5) and the Plan.
23 IV. Disposition
¶ 52 Because the City did not violate the neighbors’ due process
rights, misapply the law, or otherwise abuse its discretion, the
district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE KUHN concur.