McCulloch v. Standish

167 A.D.2d 723, 563 N.Y.S.2d 294, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13976
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedNovember 21, 1990
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 167 A.D.2d 723 (McCulloch v. Standish) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCulloch v. Standish, 167 A.D.2d 723, 563 N.Y.S.2d 294, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13976 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

Kane, J. P.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Smyk, J.), entered September 19, 1989 in Broome County, which, inter alia, partially granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Lisa McCulloch (hereinafter plaintiff) was severely injured when, in an intoxicated condition, she lost control of a vehicle she was operating on State Route 221W in Cortland County. Plaintiff and her mother have commenced this action against defendants, four different establishments where plaintiff, who was 19 years old at the time, was allegedly sold the alcoholic beverages that led to her intoxication. The complaint contained nine causes of action, the first four brought by plaintiff alleging common-law negligence on the part of each defendant, respectively. The fifth cause of action was by plaintiff against all four defendants based on violations of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law §65. Plaintiff’s mother alleged common-law negligence by all four defendants in the sixth cause of action. The seventh cause of action sought punitive damages and was by both plaintiff and her mother for "willful, wanton, reckless and intentional” conduct of defendants in violation of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65. The eighth and ninth causes of action set forth statutory dram shop actions by plaintiff’s mother. Defendants thereafter all moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court, treating the motions as for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3211 [c]), dismissed the first through seventh causes of action but allowed plaintiff’s mother to replead the seventh cause of action "if sufficient facts arise”. Plaintiffs now appeal those dismissals.

"Rejecting any argument that a duty exists to protect a consumer of alcohol from the results of his or her own voluntary conduct, the courts of this State have consistently refused to recognize a common-law cause of action against providers of alcoholic beverages in favor of persons injured as a result of their own voluntary intoxication” (Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day, 73 NY2d 629, 636).

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Related

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298 A.D.2d 369 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2002)
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178 A.D.2d 835 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
167 A.D.2d 723, 563 N.Y.S.2d 294, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13976, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcculloch-v-standish-nyappdiv-1990.