McCready v. Lindenborn

37 A.D. 425, 56 N.Y.S. 54
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedFebruary 15, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 37 A.D. 425 (McCready v. Lindenborn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCready v. Lindenborn, 37 A.D. 425, 56 N.Y.S. 54 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1899).

Opinion

O’Brien, J.:

Upon the issues presented by the pleadings, involving questions-of fact rather than of law, there was a protracted trial extending over many days, on which the voluminous record on this appeal shows that, upon every material question, there was an irreconcilable conflict of testimony, which finally was resolved by the jury in. the-plaintiff’s favor.

[427]*427In saying that the principal questions are those of fact and not of law, we have not overlooked the numberless exceptions taken to rulings upon evidence, or the many requests to charge proposed by the defendant, some of which were refused and some charged in a modified form. It would not only be impracticable to. discuss these exceptions at length, hut it is, also, unnecessary ; for although there may be a few instances of rulings to which, technically, an exception would lie, they are not such as would justify our reversing a judgment which was rendered after the material and substantial questions were properly presented to the jury. By way of illustration, much stress is placed upon an exception to the refusal of the court to grant an adjournment on the ground of the sickness of the defendant’s attorney. Counsel stated that he was ill, and had been without sleep the night before and desired an adjournment with a view to obtaining needed rest. There was present assisting him upon the trial another lawyer who, though not as familiar with the pleadings or the facts, having been brought in for the first time ujion the trial, was able to and did assist; and the record shows that both counsel not only represented the defendant with ability, but stubbornly and closely contested every position taken by the plaintiff. The refusal to grant the adjournment was apparently due to the objection of the jurors, whose convenience was consulted by the judge, and who w'ere opposed to the granting of such adjournment. It was not reversible error to consult the jurors, the judge having finally to assume the responsibility of deciding the motion, which he did. The question presented for our determination is, was the ruling wrongful ? This in turn is to be determined by a consideration whether or not the defendant suffered or was prejudiced. Considering the zeal and ability which at every stage of the trial was exhibited by both counsel represen ting him, it cannot be concluded that he was prejudiced by not having his case fully argued and presented to the jury.

We come back, therefore, in deciding the merits of this appeal, to a consideration of the questions of fact; and this involves a determination whether the burden placed upon the plaintiff was sustained at the time the motion was made to dismiss the complaint at the end of the plaintiff’s testimony, or whether, upon all the proof, including that thereafter submitted by the defendant, the ver[428]*428■diet rendered in fay-or of the plaintiff was against the weight of •evidence.

Considering the obligations assumed by the plaintiff under the lease, it was incumbent upon her to prove, before a recovery could be had, a substantial performance of the covenants of the lease, particularly those relating to the alterations of the building, and the time when the building w-as ready for occupancy. This necessarily requires a review of the evidence, and without attempting to give a detailed presentation we must content ourselves with noting the leading facts and the manner in which the learned trial judge ■submitted them to the jury.

After the lease was made the jirivilege was given to and exercised by the defendant of selecting an architect, and the builder was a man of whom he approved. The plans and specifications were drawn up and accepted by both parties, and the architect then discovered that the alterations as arranged could not be made within the stipulated $15,000, the builder’s estimates being about $20,000. After notice and opportunity for the parties to examine the specifications and plans a meeting was held in the architect’s office on the afternoon of June 27, 189Í, which was attended by all the parties interested, for the purpose of modifying them so that the alterations to be made by the plaintiff should come within the sum of $15,000. At this meeting the parties had the plans and specifications, excepting the specifications for the plumbing work — although it was testified that there was present a memorandum of the plumbing work — and went over them in detail, and, as appears from the erasures made in the specifications, each item was examined.

According to the plaintiff’s version the plans and specifications were thus modified with the defendant’s assent and the matter left with the architect to obtain estimates and make contracts with the builder. The plaintiff’s witnesses testified that among the things left out were the elevator and the extension of the vault under the sidewalk; and that it was understood that if the defendant desired these things he was to pay for them himself. The architect’s assistant particularly testified that Hr. Lindenborn said “to get them done, as far as we thought we had to, and if there was anything he wanted in addition he would pay for it * * * Hr. Lindenborn agreed, on the 27th of June, that the work should be cut down so [429]*429as not to exceed §15,000. * * * On the 27th of June it was, determined that to build the building with elevator the cost would far exceed $15,000; therefore, it was agreed that an elevator shaft would be built so that an elevator could be added at any future time, as eventually was, and also that Mr. Lindenborn would be satisfied with a hoist.” The defendant, although admitting being present and taking part in the modification and discussion of the proposed changes, insists that he did not give his full assent, or any assent, to such revised plans and specifications for the reason that he did not have ample opportunity to examine them for the purpose of determining whether he would or would not approve them. The defendant testified that at the meeting of June twenty-seventh he particularly objected to omitting the elevator; that he never made any suggestion as to a “ hoist,” and that he insisted upon having a vault under the sidewalk. In other words, he directly contradicts the plaintiff’s witnesses, not only in regard to the changes proposed, but also with regard to the plans and specifications, which he insists he was to-examine further before approval. The defendant also stated that, he never intended to put in his own heating apparatus, and denied that he had, since June, made any requests as to the alterations or approved the work as done.

What took place at the meeting of June twenty-seventh is of importance, for from that date followed an acrimonious dispute, not. only between the defendant and the plaintiff represented by her attorney, but also between the defendant and the architect, commencing. on the next day after the meeting, when the defendant returned to the office of the architect, charged him with having treated him unfairly, and, both verbally then and by letters sent, one on that day and the others on days immediately following, demanded that the plans and specifications be again submitted to him as matter of right, with a view to further examination to determine whether or not he would approve them as modified.

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Related

People v. Curtiss
118 A.D. 259 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1907)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
37 A.D. 425, 56 N.Y.S. 54, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccready-v-lindenborn-nyappdiv-1899.