McCrea v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 18, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2016-0808
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NICOLE RENA MCCREA,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 16-cv-808 (TSC)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff is a former firefighter who alleges she was sexually assaulted by two of her

coworkers while on duty. Mem. Op., ECF No. 113 at 1. Throughout the last eight years of

litigation, this court has dismissed most Defendants and claims, such that only Americans with

Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claim against the District of Columbia remains. Order,

ECF No. 127. Plaintiff moved pro se for certification of an interlocutory appeal of the court’s

orders dismissing most of the other Defendants and claims as well as an order resolving a motion

for reconsideration. See Pl.’s Mot. to Certify an Interlocutory Appeal, ECF No. 135 at 1

(“Mot.”).

The courts of appeals generally have jurisdiction over only “final decisions of the district

courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. One exception to this general rule is if the district court certifies an

interlocutory order for appeal. Id. § 1292(b). Certification is proper if the “order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and

that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation.” Id. “The movant bears the burden of not only establishing the three certification

elements but also of demonstrating exceptional circumstances that warrant a departure from the

Page 1 of 3 general rule that appellate review must await final judgment.” Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Iowa

Values, 710 F. Supp. 3d 35, 46 (D.D.C. 2024) (citation omitted). Interlocutory appeals are thus

“rarely allowed.” Mahoney v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 566 F. Supp. 3d 22, 32 (D.D.C. 2022)

(citation omitted).

The court will deny Plaintiff’s motion. At the outset, the record casts serious doubt on

Plaintiff’s position that she has identified a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial disagreement. Even assuming she met that burden, however, certification would be

improper because immediate appeal would not materially advance the litigation. Appeal may

materially advance the litigation if “reversal would hasten or at least simplify the litigation in

some material way, such as by significantly narrowing the issues, conserving judicial resources,

or by saving the parties from needless expense.” Doe 1 v. George Washington Univ., 573

F. Supp. 3d 88, 102 (D.D.C. 2021) (citation omitted). For example, interlocutory appeal of an

order finding subject matter jurisdiction may materially advance the litigation because reversal

would end the litigation altogether. APCC Servs, Inc. v. Sprint Comm’cs Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d

90, 100 (D.D.C. 2003).

Rather than “simplify the litigation in some material way,” Doe 1, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 102

(citation omitted), reversal here would reintroduce up to 20 Defendants regarding up to 25

federal and state claims, see Mem. Op., ECF No. 126 at 2; see also Am. Order, ECF No. 114

(dismissing Council of the District of Columbia, Hochhauser, Police and Fire Clinic Associates,

LLC, Dr. Maloma, Dr. Gordon, and Dr. Cottrell); Order, ECF No. 116 (dismissing D.C. Police

and Firefighters’ Retirement and Relief Board, Bowser, Cardwell, Chase (in part), Dean, Donlon,

Ellerbe, Gardner, Gretz, Henline, Jones, Noznesky, Sarvis, and Stewart-Ponder); Order, ECF

No. 127 (dismissing remaining claim against Chase). With the risk of adding these additional

Page 2 of 3 Defendants and claims on remand, the breadth of issues in litigation, judicial resources, and

expense stand to only increase from immediate appeal. See Doe 1, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 102.

Consequently, certification is unwarranted.

Plaintiff’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. First, she argues that an immediate

appeal could narrow the issues by “eliminating the threat of issue preclusion.” Mot. at 34–36.

Issue preclusion, however, conserves judicial resources by preventing courts from relitigating

issues that have already been decided. See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d

245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The objective of the doctrine of issue preclusion . . . is judicial

finality.”). Thus, eliminating issue preclusion would expand, rather than simplify, the litigation.

Second, Plaintiff contends that interlocutory appeal would save resources by streamlining the

discovery process. Mot. at 35. To the contrary, the discovery process would be vastly expanded

to include additional parties and claims if this court is reversed. Finally, Plaintiff invokes the

purported significance of her controlling question of law, id., but that is not relevant to whether

immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Certification of

Interlocutory Appeal, ECF No. 135. An Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion. The

Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to Plaintiff at her address of

record.

Date: September 18, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 3 of 3