McCray v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 43, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

THOMAS MCCRAY, § § Defendant Below, § No. 43, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1702010418 (N) § Appellee. §

Submitted: May 8, 2025 Decided: June 26, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Thomas McCray, filed this appeal from a Superior Court

order denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State of Delaware

has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the grounds that it is manifest

on the face of McCray’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree

and affirm.

(2) In 2018, McCray resolved multiple criminal cases by pleading guilty to

possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (“PDWDCF”),

strangulation, and breach of bond conditions. The parties agreed, among other things, to recommend a non-suspended sentence of twelve years and six months of

Level V incarceration for the PDWDCF conviction and suspended Level V time for

the other convictions. The Superior Court sentenced McCray as follows: (i) for

PDWDCF, twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, suspended after twelve years

and six months for decreasing levels of supervision; (ii) for strangulation, five years

of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III GPS probation; and

(iii) for breach of bond conditions, five years of Level V incarceration, suspended

for one year of Level III GPS probation. McCray unsuccessfully moved for sentence

modification and sentence correction in 2019, 2022, and 2024.

(3) In November 2024, McCray filed another motion for correction of

illegal sentence. He argued that his PDWDCF sentence was illegal because it

exceeded the Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission Guidelines

(“SENTAC Guidelines”) and was based on an aggravating factor not found by a jury

as required by the United States Supreme Court. The Superior Court denied the

motion. This appeal followed.

(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for

abuse of discretion.1 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the

claim de novo.2 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double

1 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 2 Id. 2 Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to

be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute,

is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did

not authorize.3

(5) In his opening brief, McCray argues that the Superior Court ignored the

binding nature of the SENTAC Guidelines and United States Supreme Court

precedent in denying his motion for sentence correction. He is mistaken. This Court

has repeatedly stated that the SENTAC Guidelines are voluntary and non-binding.4

We have also rejected the argument that a sentence exceeding the SENTAC

Guidelines is illegal.5 McCray’s twenty-five year sentence—suspended after twelve

years and six months—for PDWDCF falls within the statutory range.6 The United

States Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey7 and Blakely v.

3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 4 See, e.g., White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 410 (Del. 2020) (describing the “voluntary and non- binding” nature of the SENTAC Guidelines); Counts v. State, 2016 WL 556633, at *2 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“It is well-settled that SENTAC guidelines are voluntary and nonbinding.”); Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Del. 2008) (referring to the “voluntary and nonbinding character” of the SENTAC Guidelines). 5 See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 2023 WL 4103984, at *2 (Del. June 20, 2023) (“A sentence is not illegal because it exceeds the sentence recommended by the prosecutor or SENTAC Guidelines.”); Whittle v. State, 2022 WL 3348988, at *2 (Del. Aug. 12, 2022) (rejecting argument that sentence was illegal because it exceeded the SENTAC Guidelines); Wynn v. State, 23 A.3d 145, 151 (Del. 2011) (holding that sentences exceeding SENTAC Guidelines were not illegal). 6 11 Del. C. § 1447 (defining PDWCF as a class B felony); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (providing that the sentence for a class B felony is between two and twenty-five years of Level V incarceration). 7 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 3 Washington8 do not apply to McCray’s PDWDCF sentence because it does not

exceed the proscribed statutory maximum for PWDCF.9 The Superior Court

properly denied McCray’s for correction of illegal sentence.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

8 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”). 9 See, e.g., Cropper v. State, 2007 WL 1672437, at *1 (Del. June 12, 2007) (finding Apprendi and Blakely did not apply to sentence that the defendant conceded fell “within the statutory range of authorized sentences for that crime”); Shabazz v. State, 2005 WL 1413234, at *1 (Del. June 14, 2005) (holding that the imposition of a sentence within the statutory range did not implicate Apprendi or Blakley).