1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Frank Dale McCray, No. CV-17-01658-PHX-DJH
10 Petitioner, ORDER
11 v. DEATH-PENALTY CASE
12 David Shinn, et al.,
13 Respondents. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Frank Dale McCray’s motion to stay his 16 federal proceedings and hold them in abeyance so he may return to state court to exhaust 17 two competency-related claims in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant 18 to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. McCray also moves the Court to authorize his attorneys to represent 19 him in state court postconviction proceedings. (Doc. 59.) The motion is fully briefed. 20 (Docs. 65, 69.) The Court denies both requests for the reasons stated below. 21 I. Factual and Procedural Background 22 In 1991, in proceedings unrelated to the offense at issue here, McCray underwent 23 competency proceedings following his arrest on charges of aggravated assault, robbery, 24 and burglary of a residence. (See IOR 366 at 247, 257.)1 Though McCray was subsequently 25 26 1 The Court uses the same citation formats used by Petitioner in his Motion and in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (See Doc. 14 at 1 n.3.) The Maricopa County 27 Superior Court prepared an Index of Record for the petition for review proceedings, which includes documents from both the trial and postconviction proceedings and is numbered 28 1–468. Indexed documents from the record on appeal and from the state postconviction proceedings are designated “IOR” followed by the docket number. 1 found competent by the two doctors who had evaluated him, they both diagnosed McCray 2 with paranoid schizophrenia and felt McCray required psychiatric help including 3 medication. (Id. at 257.) 4 In May 1987, McCray forced his way into the apartment of Chestene Cummins, 5 physically assaulted her, raped her, and strangled her to death with a cord. State v. McCray, 6 218 Ariz. 252, 259 (2008). The crime remained unsolved for more than a decade. Id. at 7 255. 8 In June 1992 McCray underwent competency proceedings after being charged for a 9 separate incident of kidnapping and sexual assault. (Doc. 41, Ex. 3 at 2; IOR 366 at 277.)2 10 He was evaluated by a psychiatrist who diagnosed him with chronic paranoid 11 schizophrenia, severe—with sociopathy, and determined he was incompetent with only a 12 remote chance of restoration. (Doc. 41, Ex. 3 at 3.) After eventually being found competent 13 by the court (see Doc. 14 at 28), McCray pleaded guilty to sexual assault and was sentenced 14 to 18 years in the Arizona Department of Corrections. (“ADOC”). (Doc. 21 at 915–16.) 15 In 1997, McCray’s blood was drawn and stored pursuant to a recently enacted 16 Arizona law and, in 2000, his DNA profile was entered into the Arizona Department of 17 Public Safety’s database. McCray, 218 Ariz. at 255. In 2001, police matched a DNA profile 18 obtained from semen in Cummins’ body to McCray’s profile and McCray was 19 subsequently indicted for Cummins’ murder. Id. at 255. 20 McCray’s trial counsel filed a motion for a competency evaluation after a defense 21 expert opined that McCray was “likely suffering from a serious mental disorder” and “his 22 capacity to properly assist in his defense [was] very questionable.” (IOR 80 at 3.) On 23 November 6, 2003, the Maricopa County competency court found McCray criminally 24 incompetent and ordered that he be sent to the Arizona State Hospital to receive treatment. 25 (IOR 102 at 1–2.) Later, for security reasons, the court ordered that McCray instead
26 2 McCray attached to his habeas petition and request for evidentiary development a 27 number of items that are not included in the state-court record. Respondents address this extra-record evidence in responding to the motion to stay. The Court considers the extra- 28 record evidence solely for purposes of resolving McCray’s motion to stay. - 2 - 1 undergo the Restoration to Competency (“RTC”) program at the Maricopa County Jail 2 through Correctional Health Services (“CHS”). (IOR 104; IOR 105.) 3 On March 2, 2004, an RTC psychologist, Bruce Kushner, opined that McCray had 4 been restored to competency. (IOR 111.) Trial counsel stipulated that the court could 5 determine McCray’s competency based on Kushner’s final report, which recommended 6 that McCray “should be maintained on medication.” (IOR 109; IOR 111 at 5; Tr. Mar. 11, 7 2004 at 3.) Upon review of Kushner’s report, the competency court concluded that McCray 8 “understands the proceedings and is able to assist counsel and defend its defense so long 9 as he remains compliant with medication.” (Tr. Mar. 11, 2004 at 3.) The competency court 10 directed McCray to continue to take all prescribed medications” and the CHS to continue 11 to provide the medications. (Id.) Consequently, the court ordered that “the current 12 medication regimen is necessary to ensure Defendant’s ongoing competency,” that “the 13 Defendant shall take any and all medication as prescribed,” that “[CHS] shall provide any 14 and all prescribed medications to the Defendant as directed,” and “that any change in the 15 medications recommended by the [CHS RTC] Program shall take place only after 16 consultation with the Director of Psychiatry at [CHS] and the Director of Psychiatry at the 17 [CHS RTC] Program.” (IOR 113 at 2.) 18 In 2005, a jury convicted McCray of first-degree felony murder. In the penalty phase 19 of the trial, the jury found two aggravating factors: McCray had been previously convicted 20 of a felony involving violence, see A.R.S. § 13–703(F)(2) (1978 & Supp.1987), and the 21 murder was especially cruel, id. § 13–703(F)(6). McCray, 218 Ariz. at 257. The jury 22 determined McCray should receive a death sentence and the trial court entered a sentence 23 of death by lethal injection. Id. 24 After the Arizona courts denied relief on both direct and collateral review, McCray 25 filed a habeas petition in this Court presenting 55 claims for relief. (Doc. 14.) At issue in 26 this motion to stay are two competency-related claims in the petition: Claim Eight, alleging 27 that McCray’s due process rights were violated when he was tried and sentenced to death 28 while legally incompetent (id. at 239–247), and Claim Five(A), alleging that his trial - 3 - 1 counsel rendered constitutionally deficient performance by failing to object to the 2 unconstitutional procedures used or the unreasonable competency determinations made 3 during his competency proceedings (id. at 199–206). McCray alleges that for the fifteen 4 months leading up to his trial, and up through the day he was sentenced to death, he was 5 not provided with any anti-psychotic medication, and both his counsel and the trial court 6 had reason to question McCray’s understanding of the proceedings and his ability to assist 7 in his defense, but no new competency evaluation was requested or ordered. McCray 8 asserts that, because of his state postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, no court has ever 9 heard evidence that McCray was tried and sentenced to death while incompetent and that 10 his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to ensure his competency. McCray now 11 requests a stay in order to allow him to seek relief in state court on Claims Five(A) and 12 Eight. 13 II. Applicable Law 14 A. Rhines Stay and Abeyance 15 A federal court may not “adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is, 16 petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 17 269, 273 (2005) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–519 (1982)). The Supreme Court 18 has held that “a federal district court has discretion to stay [a] mixed petition to allow the 19 petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, and then 20 to return to federal court for review of his perfected petition.” Rhines, 544 at 271–72. This 21 discretion is to be exercised under “limited circumstances,” id. at 277, because “routinely 22 granting stays would undermine the AEDPA’s[3] goals of encouraging finality and 23 streamlining federal habeas proceedings.” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 981–82 (9th Cir. 24 2014). 25 The stay-and-abeyance procedure is appropriate only where the habeas petitioner 26 has shown: (1) “good cause” for the failure to exhaust, (2) the unexhausted claim is 27 28 3 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. - 4 - 1 “potentially meritorious,” and (3) the petitioner did not “engage[] in intentionally dilatory 2 litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78. “[G]ood cause turns on whether the 3 petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to justify” 4 the failure to exhaust the claim in state court. Blake, 745 F.3d at 982. However, “even if a 5 petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it 6 were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 7 U.S. at 277–78. 8 B. Exhaustion 9 Because the Rhines procedure for staying a petition applies only to “mixed 10 petitions,” see King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the 11 Rhines exception to the total exhaustion rule carved out an exception allowing mixed 12 petitions to remain pending in federal court under limited circumstances), the Court must 13 first analyze the procedural status of Claims Five(A) and Eight in McCray’s petition to 14 determine if they are unexhausted. 15 A petitioner’s claims are exhausted if (1) the petitioner has fairly presented the 16 federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it or (2) no state remedy 17 remains available for the claim. Johnson v. Zenon, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). This latter form of 18 exhaustion, where a petitioner has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirement for 19 presenting a claim in state court, is described as “technical exhaustion” through procedural 20 default. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (“[I]f state-court remedies are no 21 longer available because the prisoner failed to comply with the deadline for seeking state- 22 court review or taking an appeal, those remedies are technically exhausted . . . .”); Coleman 23 v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal 24 claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state 25 remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 26 2007) (observing that if the state court would find the claims procedurally barred, petitioner 27 has technically exhausted the claims through procedural default). 28 A Rhines stay would be inappropriate in a federal habeas case if the claims for which - 5 - 1 a petitioner seeks a stay are technically exhausted through procedural default. See e.g., 2 Armstrong v. Ryan, 2017 WL 1152820 (D. Ariz. March 28, 2017); White v. Ryan, 2010 3 WL 1416054, *12 (D. Ariz. March 16, 2010) (“Because the Petition in this case contains 4 claims that are either actually or technically exhausted, it is not a mixed Petition and Rhines 5 does not apply.”). 6 In Arizona, Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure4 (“Rule 32”) 7 governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner is procedurally barred from relief 8 on any claim alleging that the defendant was convicted or sentenced in violation of the 9 United States constitution that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR petition. 10 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a); 32.2(a)(3). Under Arizona law, a petitioner generally may not 11 return to state court to exhaust claims unless the claims fall within the category of claims 12 for which a successive PCR petition is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (b)–(h), 32.2(a) 13 & (b)). 14 Additionally, Arizona’s time bar under Rule 32.4 is an additional bar that may make 15 a return to state court fruitless. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) 16 (holding that if an Arizona habeas petitioner “has any exhausted claims” they are 17 “procedurally defaulted ... because he is now time-barred under Arizona law from going 18 back to state court”); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing 19 timeliness under former Rule 32.4(a) as grounds for dismissal of a PCR petition, distinct 20 from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). A defendant must file the notice for a claim under
21 4 After the petition and the present motion in this case were fully briefed, the Arizona 22 Supreme Court abrogated Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and adopted a new Rule 32 and Rule 33, amending substantively and reorganizing the rules concerning 23 postconviction relief, effective January 1, 2020. The new rules apply to all actions filed on or after January 1, 2020 and in all other actions pending on January 1, 2020, except to the 24 extent the court determines that applying the rule or amendment would be infeasible or work an injustice, in which event the former rule or procedure applies. See Ariz. R. Crim. 25 P. 32, cmt. Although the Court has considered and cites throughout this Order to the current version of Rule 32 in making its determination that McCray has no presently available state 26 remedy, see Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (approving of district court’s evaluation of then current Rule 32.2 to determine if Ortiz had a presently available 27 state remedy), whether the Court evaluates McCray’s claims under the former rules in effect at the time the motion was filed or the current rules makes no difference to the 28 Court’s ultimate determination. - 6 - 1 Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days 2 after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.” Ariz. R. Crim. 3 P. 32.4(b)(3)(A). Claims under Rule 32.1(b) through (h) must be brought “within a 4 reasonable time after discovering the basis of the claim.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(C). 5 III. Discussion 6 As an initial matter, the Court rejects Respondents’ argument that Claim Eight was 7 adjudicated on the merits by the trial court by way of competency proceedings pursuant to 8 Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the subsequent finding by the trial 9 court that McCray was restored to competency. (Doc. 65 at 7.) McCray argues in Claim 10 Eight that he was not, in fact, restored to competency and that the perfunctory review by 11 the parties and the court following his commitment for purposes of restoration resulted in 12 his conviction and sentence being “rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to due 13 process, to a fair and reliable determination of penalty, to present a defense, and to the 14 effective assistance of counsel because he was suffering from psychiatric and neurological 15 impairments as a result of his FASD and schizoaffective disorder at the time of his trial 16 that rendered him legally incompetent.” (Doc. 14 at 241.) The legal theory and operative 17 facts of this claim were never presented to or adjudicated on the merits by any state court. 18 A. No Available State Court Remedy 19 Because Claims Five and Eight have never been presented to any state court, the 20 Court must determine if McCray has an available remedy in state court for these claims or 21 if he would be procedurally barred from raising them in a successive PCR petition. 22 Respondents argue that the claims would be precluded as a successive PCR petition under 23 Rule 32.2(a)(3), and as time barred under former Rule 32.4(a). McCray asserts that his 24 claims are not procedurally defaulted because they meet the procedural requirements of 25 exceptions to Arizona’s procedural bars for successive petitions under Rules 32.2(b) and 26 that Claim Eight was not personally waived by defendant, as required under Rule 27 32.2(a)(3). For the reasons stated below, the Court disagrees; there is no state court remedy 28 available to McCray because he waived these claims. - 7 - 1 If McCray were to return to state court and file a PCR notice alleging his conviction 2 and sentence were rendered in violation of the United States Constitution, the state courts 3 would find it untimely. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a); 32.4(b)(3)(a); Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; 4 Moreno, 116 P.3d at 410. Newly adopted Rule 32.4(b)(3)(D), however, provides that 5 untimely notices requesting postconviction relief filed for claims brought pursuant to Rule 6 32.1(a) must be excused if the defendant adequately explains why the failure to timely file 7 a notice was not the defendant’s fault. Because this provision was not in effect when the 8 parties filed their motion, the Court makes no finding that either claim would be 9 procedurally barred as untimely under this new rule and none is necessary; as explained 10 below, both claims are waived because McCray failed to raise them on direct review or in 11 his first PCR petition, and no exception to preclusion applies to these claims. 12 Claim Eight, to the extent it alleges trial court error based on the record, is waived 13 and precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because McCray failed to present it to the Arizona 14 Supreme Court on direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also State v. Moody, 15 94 P.3d 1119, 1137 (Ariz. 2004). 16 McCray also failed to raise either Claim Five(A) or Eight in his first PCR petition. 17 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arise under Rule 32.1(a). See State v. Robbins, 166 18 Ariz. 531, 533 (App. 1991) (acknowledging claims of ineffectiveness of counsel fall under 19 Rule 32.1(a)); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a) cmt. (“[Rule 32.1(a)] encompasses most 20 traditional post-conviction claims, such as . . . incompetent or ineffective counsel . . ..”) 21 Because Claim Eight alleges a constitutional violation, to the extent it relies on extra-record 22 evidence, it also arises under Rule 32.1(a). See Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203– 23 05 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that in Arizona claims requiring factual development must 24 ordinarily be raised in PCR proceedings rather than on direct appeal). Both claims were 25 waived because McCray failed to present them in his first PCR proceeding and would now 26 be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) if presented in a successive PCR petition. 27 Thus, in the absence of an exception to Arizona’s preclusionary rules that would 28 make a state court remedy available, See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b), Claims Five(A) and - 8 - 1 Eight are technically exhausted through procedural default. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). 2 B. Exceptions to Arizona’s Procedural Bars 3 At the outset, the Court rejects McCray’s broad assertion that “[t]he ultimate 4 determination of whether McCray has met the requirements of an exception to Rule 32’s 5 procedural bars, a question of state law, must be answered by the state court.” (Doc. 69 at 6 2; see also Doc. 59 at 16 (“[C]ontrolling Circuit authority holds that a stay is appropriate 7 as applied to the filing of a second state petition in Arizona because it is not clear that such 8 a petition would be procedurally barred.”).) While there may be instances in which it is not 9 clear that the Arizona courts would find a claim barred, see e.g., Cassett v. Stewart, 406 10 F.3d 614 (2005), it is the role of the district court to determine if a petitioner presently has 11 a remedy available in state court. Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931. In making that decision, the court 12 is required to “assess the likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner a 13 hearing on the merits of his claim.” Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) 14 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). The question 15 is whether “there is some reasonable probability that (state) relief . . . will actually be 16 available.” Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Powell v. Wyrick, 17 657 F.2d 222, 224 (8th Cir. 1981)). 18 McCray asserts his claim that he was tried and sentenced while legally incompetent 19 is cognizable under Rule 32.1(h), an exception to Arizona’s preclusionary rules. See Ariz. 20 R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). McCray supports this assertion with a citation to an unpublished 21 appellate court decision, State v. Sanchez, No. 1-CA-CR-15-0431-PRPC, 2018 WL 22 359810, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018), upholding the trial court’s summary dismissal of a 23 claim of incompetency raised under Rule 32.1(h). In Sanchez, the appellate court upheld 24 the PCR court’s ruling in State v. Sanchez, CR 2010-006121-001 DT; CR 2009-007906- 25 004 DT, Maricopa County Superior Court Ruling (March 2, 2015).5 The PCR court had 26 specifically rejected Sanchez’s argument that, because he was incompetent, a fact finder
27 5 The Court takes Judicial Notice of the PCR court’s ruling. See Fed. R. Evid. 28 201(c)(1). - 9 - 1 could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the criminal trial of an 2 incompetent defendant violates due process. Id. The PCR court explained Sanchez’s 3 reasoning was flawed, because “[t]o prevail on a claim pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h) 4 a defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no fact finder could 5 find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the facts underlying the charges,” whereas 6 “[c]competence is a legal determination to be made by the court.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 7 The PCR court continued, stating that, “[e]ven if Sanchez’s claim of incompetency at the 8 time of the plea properly fit within the legal framework of Rule 32.1(h), it would still not 9 prevail.” On review, the appellate court rejected Sanchez’s argument that the court applied 10 the wrong burden of proof in reviewing his claim of incompetency raised under Rule 11 32.1(h), explaining: 12 This rule specifically states that a petitioner seeking relief on the basis that “no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty” has the 13 burden of establishing the facts underlying the claim by “clear and 14 convincing evidence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h). Thus, the trial court did not err by referring to this burden of proof in addressing Sanchez’s claim. 15 Sanchez, 2018 WL 359810 at *2. 16 McCray asserts that Respondents’ argument—that the unpublished Sanchez case 17 does not “address the issue of whether Rule 32.1(h) is a proper avenue for relief for a 18 petitioner’s claim of incompetence at the time of trial” (see Doc. 65 at 11)—misses the 19 point, that Sanchez demonstrates that Arizona courts do analyze competency claims under 20 Rule 32.1(h) and thus it is not clear that the state courts would hold an incompetency claim 21 raised in a successive petition under Rule 32.1(h) barred. The Court disagrees. Read in 22 context, Sanchez strongly suggests that constitutional based due process competency 23 claims do not fall within the purview of Rule 32.1(h) because they do not challenge the 24 facts “underlying the charges.” Moreover, Sanchez’s competency claim was presented in 25 a timely, and presumably first, proceeding for postconviction relief. The state courts had 26 no reason to perform an analysis of whether Sanchez’s claim would be precluded under 27 Rule 32.2(a) or whether it met an exception under Rule 32.2(b). McCray cites no authority, 28 - 10 - 1 and this Court is not aware of any, in which an Arizona court has recognized that a 2 competency related due process claim raised under Rule 32.1(h) is not subject to preclusion 3 under Rule 32.2(b). 4 Next, McCray asserts that Claim Eight is also cognizable under Rule 32.1(e). That 5 exception dictates that Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not apply if “newly discovered material facts 6 probably exist and those facts probably would have changed the judgment or sentence.” 7 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e); 32.2(b). McCray bases his argument on the newly alleged fact 8 that “ADOC violated the competency court’s order to maintain McCray on antipsychotic 9 medication in order to ensure his competence, and instead, ceased all mental-health 10 medication” and he was therefore incompetent at the time of his trial and sentencing. (Doc. 11 59 at 17.) McCray states that, had the trial court been alerted that McCray was no longer 12 being medicated, in violation of the competency court’s order, he would have been 13 reevaluated and deemed incompetent to stand trial and thus would not have been convicted 14 or sentenced to death, satisfying the requirements of Rule 32.1(e). 15 Under Rule 32.1(e), however, McCray is required to demonstrate that he “exercised 16 due diligence in discovering” the new evidence. McCray’s medical and mental health 17 records while he was incarcerated at ADOC were available at the time of his trial, and 18 therefore McCray did not diligently discover these records and develop the factual basis 19 for his claim. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e); see also State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 219 20 (2016); State v. Bilke, 162 Ariz. 51, 52–53. McCray offers no persuasive reason why his 21 attorneys could not have reviewed these records prior to his trial. Conversely, McCray 22 asserts that both trial counsel and postconviction counsel had reason to suspect McCray 23 was incompetent at the time of trial and should have obtained all of the records and 24 information demonstrating McCray had lapsed into incompetency, including: 25 [T]he 1981 and 1992 Rule 11 reports from McCray’s prior cases, which include multiple diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia, and a psychiatrist’s 26 finding that McCray was incompetent to stand trial; CHS records reflecting 27 the medication he was taking at the time Kushner determined McCray had been restored to competency and documenting his self-harming behavior; the 28 - 11 - 1 competency court’s order that he must remain on his medication regimen to maintain competency; ADOC Medical and Offender Records showing that 2 McCray was removed from his anti-psychotic medication in violation of that 3 order; and the trial transcripts showing his bizarre behavior at trial. 4 (Doc. 59 at 5–6.) 5 Citing State v. Avington, 2017 WL 83340, *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan 10, 2017), for 6 support, McCray argues that Arizona courts have recognized that where ineffective 7 assistance resulted in prior counsel failing to exercise due diligence to discover material 8 facts related to a petitioner’s mental illness, that claim may be cognizable under Rule 9 32.1(e)(2). Avington, however, does not support McCray’s argument. In Avington, an 10 unpublished memorandum decision by an intermediary appellate court, the defendant 11 asserted that he did not learn he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder until after he 12 filed his first PCR petition. The court held that under Rule 32.1(e), “Avington was required 13 to show the evidence existed at the time of trial but could not have been discovered through 14 the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id. at *1. Avington blamed the failure to discover 15 this evidence on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, who failed to exercise reasonable 16 diligence in making that discovery. Id. at *2. The court found such a claim could not be 17 raised in a successive petition, because it was essentially an ineffective assistance of 18 counsel claim made pursuant to Rule 32.1(a) and was thus untimely under Rule 32.4(a). 19 Id. The court then assumed, without deciding, that Avington’s argument—“that he recently 20 discovered evidence his counsel should have discovered before trial”—was cognizable 21 under Rule 32.1(e), and held that absent a showing of meritorious reasons why he could 22 not have raised it in his earlier petition for postconviction relief, it was also subject to 23 preclusion under Rule 32.2(b). Thus, Avington does not, as McCray asserts, support a 24 finding that ineffective assistance of counsel excuses the due diligence requirement of Rule 25 32.1(e). “Evidence is not newly discovered unless it was unknown to the trial court, the 26 defendant, or counsel at the time of trial and neither the defendant nor counsel could have 27 known about its existence by the exercise of due diligence.” State v. Saenz, 197 Ariz. 487, 28 - 12 - 1 490 (App. 2000). McCray has not alleged facts from which the state court could conclude 2 he had been diligent in discovering that he was no longer being medicated in violation of 3 the competency court’s order and thus cannot establish a claim of newly discovered 4 evidence under Rule 32.1(e). 5 C. Personal Waiver 6 Next, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s recognition in Stewart v. Smith, 7 that, under Arizona’s Rule 32.2(a)(3), the waiver of a claim of “sufficient constitutional 8 magnitude,” must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and “not merely omitted from 9 previous petitions” Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 858 (2002) (per curiam), McCray 10 argues that he could not waive his competency claim as contemplated by Rule 32.2(a)(3). 11 McCray asserts that the right to be competent when tried, convicted, and sentenced is of 12 “sufficient constitutional magnitude” that any waiver thereof must be knowing, voluntary, 13 and intelligent for purposes of applying Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Doc. 30 at 133.) 14 McCray first asserts that although the Arizona Supreme Court has not identified the 15 right to competency as a specific right requiring a knowing waiver before its omission in 16 prior proceedings may give rise to a procedural bar pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), the court 17 has cited approvingly to Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973), in which 18 the United States Supreme Court observed that the requirement of a knowing and 19 intelligent waiver applies to those rights guaranteed “to preserve a fair trial.” Stewart v. 20 Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449 (2002). McCray argues that the right to be competent during trial 21 is such a right. (Doc. 59 at 18) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)) 22 (“[F]ailure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or 23 convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair 24 trial.”). 25 This argument fails for two reasons. First, McCray presumes that competency is a 26 right that can only be personally waived while at the same time inexplicably 27 acknowledging that the Supreme Court has stated that “it is contradictory to argue that a 28 defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have - 13 - 1 the court determine his capacity to stand trial.” Pate v Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); 2 see also State v. Davis, 106 Ariz. 598, 480 P.2d 354 (1971) (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 384); 3 State v. Ferguson, 26 Ariz. App. 285, 287 (1976) (“The right to a determination of 4 competency to stand trial cannot be waived for the obvious reason that until he is found 5 competent, a defendant cannot make a knowing waiver.”). 6 It does not necessarily follow, however, that because a defendant cannot personally 7 waive their right to competency during trial that defendant’s counsel cannot waive a 8 competency claim on appeal or in postconviction proceedings. McCray mistakenly 9 presumes that all rights necessary to preserve a fair trial are “personal rights” that cannot 10 be waived by defendant’s counsel. But Arizona law does not support this assertion. See 11 State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399 (App. 2007) (“The mere assertion by a defendant that 12 his or her right to a fair trial has been violated is not a claim of sufficient constitutional 13 magnitude for purposes of Rule 32.2. … An alleged violation of the general due process 14 right of every defendant to a fair trial, without more, does not save that belated claim from 15 preclusion.”) 16 The personal-waiver rule applies only to a small category of “inherently personal 17 right[s] of fundamental importance,” such as the right to counsel and the right to a jury 18 trial. State v. Espinoza, 200 Ariz. 503, 505 (App. 2001). McCray points to no legal 19 authority holding that competency is the type of paramount right that requires a personal 20 waiver. In fact, Arizona courts do find claims relating to competency to stand trial subject 21 to preclusion under Rule 32.2(a) when counsel has failed to raise the issue on appeal. See 22 e.g., State v. Weeks, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0032-PR, 2013 WL 4511315, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 23 Aug. 22, 2013) (“. . . Week’s claims of trial error, relating to his competency to stand trial 24 and the court’s duty to order a competency evaluation sua sponte, are precluded because 25 he did not raise them on appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) . . . .”)6; State v. Pryor,
26 6 In federal court, the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the District Court’s 27 conclusion in Weeks that a competency claim may be procedurally defaulted, citing its holding in Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1996), that an 28 Arizona court’s application of its waiver rule, Rule 32.2(a), to an incompetency claim was - 14 - 1 No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0247-PR, 2012 WL 4859158, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012) 2 (noting the trial court found Pryor’s competency claim precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) 3 despite Pryor’s arguments that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 4 competency required personal waivers and therefore were not subject to preclusion); State 5 v. Tucci, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0294-PR, 2011 WL 315429, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 6 2011) (finding Tucci failed to demonstrate trial court error in finding Tucci’s competency 7 claim brought in a successive petition precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because he did not 8 explain why his mental-health claims could not be raised on appeal and therefore should 9 not be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(1)). 10 Finally, though McCray did not specifically argue that his IAC claim also requires 11 personal waiver, the Court addresses this issue on its own in considering whether there is 12 an available state remedy for Claim Five(A). Ineffective-assistance claims do not generally 13 require personal waivers. Rather, they are precluded in successive postconviction 14 proceedings by a defendant’s failure to raise them in his first. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 15 213 Ariz. 562, 566 (2006). A court need only examine the underlying nature of the right 16 allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance if a petitioner asserts ineffective 17 assistance of counsel for the first time in a successive PCR petition. Stewart v. Smith, 202 18 Ariz. at 450. If there has been no personal waiver of a right of sufficient constitutional 19 magnitude, then the IAC claim is not precluded. Id. If it is not of such magnitude, the claim 20 is precluded. Id. Because a successive petition would not be McCray’s first petition raising 21 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court need not address the nature of the 22 right affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. See id. But even if it did address the 23 nature of the right, McCray’s right to competency cannot be personally waived, as 24 explained above, but can be waived by counsel’s failure to raise the claim. 25 Thus, McCray’s failure to “personally waive” his right to competency does not 26 excuse either claim from preclusion.
27 an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Weeks v. Ryan, 2017 WL 4662251 (D. Ariz. Oct 17, 2017), 28 aff’d 741 Fed.Appx. 500 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem). - 15 - 1 D. McCray’s Alleged Incompetence during PCR Proceedings does not Establish Cause to Excuse Procedurally Barred Claims 2 McCray contends, relying on Fitzgerald v. Myers, 43 Ariz. 84 (2017), that a 3 defendant’s incompetence during state PCR proceedings may constitute cause to excuse an 4 otherwise procedurally barred claim. (Doc. 57 at 19.) Fitzgerald, however, does not support 5 this contention. In Fitzgerald, the Arizona Supreme Court held that there is no right to 6 competency in PCR proceedings under Arizona Statute or Rule. Id. The Arizona Supreme 7 Court did not address the question of whether a petitioner has a due process right to 8 competency in PCR proceedings because the issue was not properly raised. The court also 9 did not address whether a petitioner’s incompetency may provide cause to excuse the 10 failure by postconviction counsel to raise a competency claim in petitioner’s initial PCR 11 proceedings. The court did recognize that sometimes “a capital defendant’s input and 12 participation regarding a particular Rule 32 claim are needed and perhaps imperative,” id. 13 at 92, and that therefore a trial court has discretion to order a competency evaluation, 14 “particularly in the initial capital case PCR proceeding,” depending on all the 15 circumstances, including the “importance of or need for the petitioner’s direct input on 16 those claims,” id. at 92–93. The court contemplated that when a petitioner raises the issue 17 of incompetency during a first PCR proceeding it might be appropriate for the PCR court 18 to order a competency determination because it would serve as a “marker” for a successive 19 PCR petition raising the issue of petitioner’s incompetency in the first PCR to excuse the 20 failure to raise a claim during the initial PCR proceedings due to the petitioner’s 21 incompetency and inability to competently consult with counsel, not, as McCray alleges 22 occurred in this case, ineffective counsel’s failure to raise the issue. 23 IV. Conclusion 24 McCray is not entitled to a stay. Because he has no available state remedy to raise 25 his constitutional claims, they are technically exhausted through procedural default. See 26 Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d at 1139; Phillips, 267 F.3d at 974; Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 27 at 829. Because Petitioner does not present a so-called “mixed petition,” a stay under 28 - 16 - 1 | Rhines is inappropriate. See e.g., White v. Ryan, 2010 WL 1416054, *12. Having determined that Petitioner is not entitled to a Rhines stay, the Court finds it is not appropriate to authorize the Federal Public Defender’s Office to represent him in state 4) court. See Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 190 n.7 (2009) (“[A] district court may determine 5 | ona case-by-case basis that it is appropriate for federal counsel to exhaust a claim in the 6| course of her federal habeas representation.”’) 7 Accordingly, 8 IT IS ORDERED McCray’s Motion for Temporary Stay and Abeyance and for 9| Authorization to Appear in Ancillary State-Court Litigation (Doc. 59) is denied. 10 Dated this 26th day of February, 2020. 11 12 5 . fe □ Zi □ 13 norable' Diang4. Huretewa 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -17-