McCord v. Housing Authority

272 S.E.2d 247, 246 Ga. 547, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1190
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 24, 1980
Docket36398
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 272 S.E.2d 247 (McCord v. Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCord v. Housing Authority, 272 S.E.2d 247, 246 Ga. 547, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1190 (Ga. 1980).

Opinion

Bowles, Justice.

In 1955 the legislature enacted The Urban Redevelopment Law, Code Ann. § 69-1101 et seq., to “provide for the rehabilitation, clearance and redevelopment of slums in cities and towns in this State.” Ga. Laws, p. 354. Under The Urban Redevelopment Law a municipality was given the right to “exercise the power of eminent domain [over] any real property it may deem necessary for its purposes.” Ga. Laws, p. 363; Code Ann. § 69-1108. Exercise of the power of eminent domain under this section must be pursuant to the formulation of an urban redevelopment plan which necessitates the [548]*548acquisition of specific real property to effectuate its purposes.

In 1971 the General Assembly amended Code Ann. § 69-1108 by adding subsection (c) to distinguish between the procedures to be followed in acquiring property for a public use and in acquiring property for a non-public use. The new subsection provides that when a municipality exercises the power of eminent domain over property which will not be put to public use, (1) it must “notify the owner of the real property proposed to be acquired, in writing, of the planned use of such property as set forth in the urban redevelopment plan for the urban redevelopment area wherein such property is located.” Then (2) “within 30 days after being so notified, the owner of such property shall have the option of notifying the municipality, in writing, of his willingness and intention to develop and maintain such property in accordance with said urban redevelopment plan. In the event of multiple ownership of such property, unanimous agreement by the owners shall be required, and the failure of any one owner to notify the municipality, within the time limitation herein specified, of his willingness and intention to develop and maintain such property in accordance with said urban redevelopment plan shall be deemed to be a failure to exercise the option herein provided.” (3) “When the owner of such real property exercises the option [above], the municipality shall make an investigation to determine the ability of the owner to develop and maintain such property in accordance with the urban redevelopment plan. In making such investigation, the municipality shall examine the financial and legal ability of such owner and such other factors as may be relevant to making such determination.” (4) “If the municipality determines that the owner of such real property has the ability to develop and maintain such property in accordance with the redevelopment plan, the owner shall have the right to retain ownership of such property by executing an agreement with the municipality to develop and maintain such property in accordance with the urban redevelopment plan ...”

In 1970 The Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta in conjunction with the City of Atlanta formulated an urban redevelopment plan known as The Vine City Redevelopment Plan. This plan requires The Housing Authority to “encourage a comprehensively planned and designed redevelopment of a ten-acre transit related multi-use commercial/residential complex directly south of the Vine City Transit System.” The Vine City Plan was revised a number of times and in April 1977 The Housing Authority notified the individual owners (approximately 50) of each parcel comprising the ten-acre tract that the city intended to acquire their property either by voluntary agreement or by condemnation [549]*549proceedings to use in effectuating the Vine City Plan. Owners of the individual parcels were informed that “planned use of the property for redevelopment is industrial.” At this time The Housing Authority also informed every owner of land within the ten-acre tract that under Code Ann. § 69-1108 (c) (2) they had the option of notifying The Housing Authority of “their willingness and intent to develop and maintain the property in accordance with the Plan.” The Housing Authority did not inform the individual owners of the size of the tract the Authority intended to develop; the Authority merely advised each owner that it was interested in his individual parcel.

Appellants, three tenants in common, are the owners of a 47' by 100' parcel of land contained in the proposed Vine City Redevelopment tract. They sent timely notification to The Housing Authority of their intention to develop and maintain their property in accordance with the Vine City Plan; appellants requested that The Housing Authority keep them apprised of specific developments in the Plan so that they could act in accordance with it. Appellants then submitted a redevelopment proposal and statement of qualifications to The Housing Authority. Appellants were the only owners of land within the 10-acre tract who elected to exercise their option under § 69-1108 (c). All other owners voluntarily agreed to sell their land to The Housing Authority.

One year after notifying appellants of their option under § 69-1108 (c) The Housing Authority wrote appellants to advise them that they had not properly exercised the option as they had not obtained the agreement of all other owners of the property in the 10-acre tract to develop their property in accordance with the Plan. The Housing Authority stated that “any proposed use of the property must be a 10-acre tract comprehensively planned,” and that development by an owner of his individual parcel as appellants proposed would be prohibited as “spot planning and design.” The Housing Authority further notified appellants that unless it received timely notice of their intention to comply with the Vine City Plan, i. e., notice of an agreement between appellants and all other owners of the 10-acre tract to develop the property themselves, it would take the necessary actions to acquire their parcel.

In August 1978 appellants obtained a temporary restraining order against The Housing Authority to enjoin them from exercising the power of eminent domain with respect to their property.

On September 7, 1979 the City of Atlanta ran a newspaper advertisement stating that it would accept bids from private developers for purchase and proposals for redevelopment for apartment or highrise housing to be constructed on approximately eight acres of the Vine City tract.

[550]*550Appellants filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County to permanently enjoin The Housing Authority from seeking to exercise the power of eminent domain over their property. The trial court denied the injunction finding that, as a matter of law, appellants’ property was “inadequate to comply with any type of development allowed by the [Vine City] Plan.” The court further found that the word “property” in Code Ann. § 69-1108 (c) as applied to the facts of this case refers to the entire ten-acre tract rather than to appellants’ parcel. The court also found that “the term ‘multiple owners’ refers to owners of each and every parcel comprising the aforesaid ten acre tract, not to the three plaintiffs owning [the parcel in question].”

Appellants bring this appeal, enumerating as error the trial court’s interpretation of the statute and the ruling that, as a matter of law, their parcel of land is too small to be developed in accordance with the Vine City Redevelopment Plan.

I. This is a case of first impression. In interpreting any statute “the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view, at all times, the old law, the evil and the remedy.” Code Ann. § 102-102 (9).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
272 S.E.2d 247, 246 Ga. 547, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccord-v-housing-authority-ga-1980.