McColley v. State Fund
This text of McColley v. State Fund (McColley v. State Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
No. 94-374 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1995
SHARON McCOLLEY, Claimant and Appellant, v. STATE COMPENSATION MUTUAL INSURANCE FUND, RR 23 1995 Respondent and Insurer for CLERK OF 5lJPROME. COURT OMO CONSTRUCTION, INC., SPATE OF MONTANA
Employer.
APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Don Edgar Burris, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Thomas E. Martello, State Compensation Insurance Fund, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 19, 1995 Decided: February 23, 1995 Filed: Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. Sharon McColley (McColley) appeals the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court denying her claim for workers'
compensation benefits. We affirm.
We find the following issue dispositive:
Did McColley suffer a compensable workers' compensation injury
during the course and scope of her employment on September 28,
1992?
In December 1983 McColley suffered a work-related injury to
her back and neck. Her employer's insurer, State Compensation
Mutual Insurance Fund (State Fund) accepted liability. McColley
received a variety of medical, compensatory and retraining
benefits. She ultimately settled her claim for 500 weeks of
permanent partial disability benefits. McColley experienced
continuing pain in her back and neck and was classified as having
a 3 percent impairment rating.
McColley returned to work as a laborer in July 1990. After
approximately one week on the job, McColley suffered another work-
related injury. Her employer's insurer, Industrial Indemnity,
accepted liability. McColley received disability benefits and
ultimately settled her claim in March 1992 for 465 weeks of
permanent partial disability benefits. Her impairment rating was
increased to 7 percent. McColley again experienced continuing
physical impairment in her neck, back and extremities due to the
injury. In September 1992 McColley again returned to work, this time
as a "flagger" on a road construction crew for Omo Construction,
Inc. She worked one twelve-hour day, consisting of long periods of
continual standing holding a traffic control sign. She did not
return to work after the first day McColley claims that she suffered another work-related injury
as a result of gravel trucks "speeding" by her, creating air
currents which buffeted her about. McColley's claim of speeding
trucks was not corroborated but rather was contradicted by various
witnesses present at the job site on the day in question. Despite
frequent contact with her supervisor, McColley did not report the
speeding trucks. Omo's insurer, State Fund, denied liability.
Issue
Did McColley suffer a compensable workers' compensation injury
during the course and scope of her employment on September 28,
1992? Section 39-71-119, MCA (lYYl), in relevant part, states:
Injury and accident defined. (1) "Injury" or "injured" means: (a) internal or external physical harm to the body; (b) damage to prosthetic devices or appliances, except for damage to eyeglasses, contact lenses, den- tures, or hearing aids; or (c) death.
(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is: (a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain; (b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence; Cc) identifiable by member or part of the body affected; and (d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift. [Emphasis added.1
3 Pursuant to the terms of this section, a compensable injury must be
caused by an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain
The Workers' Compensation Court did not find McColley's testimony concerning the purported speeding trucks credible. The court stated:
After personally observing the claimant, and considering the substance of her t e s t i m o n y , the circumstances surrounding her claim, the demeanor and testimony of other witnesses appearing at trial, and the exhibits, the Court has reached a firm conviction that claimant is not credible and her description of what occurred is not believable. I am persuaded that the trucks going by claimant on September 28 were traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour and that no significant wind currents or buffeting occurred.
We will not reweigh the evidence presented at trial and will uphold
the findings of the Workers' Compensation Court if they are
supported by substantial credible evidence. Nelson v. Semi-Tool,
Inc. (1992), 252 Mont. 286, 829 P.2d 1; Buckentin v. State
Compensation Insurance Fund (1994), 265 Mont. 518, 878 P.2d 262.
We review the conclusions of the Workers' Compensation Court to
determine if the court's interpretation of law is correct.
Stordalen v. Ricci's Food Farm (1993), 261Mont. 256, 862 P.2d 393. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the
findings of the Workers' Compensation Court were supported by
substantial credible evidence and that its interpretation of § 39-
71-119, MCA (19911, was correct. State Fund presented evidence
from individuals working at the construction site on September 28,
1992. Omo's traffic control supervisor and another flagger
testified that the gravel trucks were not traveling at a high rate
4 of speed through the construction zone. Witnesses also testified that the road's general state of disrepair and the operation of
various other pieces of heavy machinery in the vicinity prohibited
the gravel trucks from speeding. Various supervisors who would have been notified of dangerous activities such as speeding trucks
testified that they received no complaints concerning the operation
of the gravel trucks on the day in question. State Fund's witnesses provided substantial credible evidence
that the gravel trucks were not operating at a high rate of speed
through the construction zone on September 28, 1992. Therefore,
there was no unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain as required by § 39-71-119, MCA (1991). Based on our holding as to
this issue, we need not address the other issues raised on appeal.
We affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court. Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as
precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document
with the Clerk of the Montana Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to the State Reporter and West Publishing Company.
5 we concur:
6 February 23, 1995
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following named:
Don Edgar Burris, Esq. P.O. Box 2344 Billings, MT 59103-2344
Thomas E. Martello, Legal Counsel State Compensation Ins. Fund P.O. Box 4759 Helena, MT 59604-4759
ED SMITH CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA
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