McClurkin v. De Gaigney

251 S.W. 617, 199 Ky. 458, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 860
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 1, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 251 S.W. 617 (McClurkin v. De Gaigney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McClurkin v. De Gaigney, 251 S.W. 617, 199 Ky. 458, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Turner, Commissioner—

Affirming.

On'and prior to the 7th of September, 1920, appellee was the owner of an oil and gas lease on the Price Turner farm of about one hundred and "ninety acres near Scottsville in Allen county. On that date by his deed of assignment he sold, transferred and assigned the same to appellant John H. McClurkin in consideration of one thousand dollars in cash and McClurkin’s note for seventy-seven hundred dollars, payable in sixty days, and a lien was retained to secure its payment.

There .was no warranty or guaranty.of any kind or nature embraced in the deed of assignment, either as to the quality or quantity of the oil or gas production, or even as to the title of the property.

Shortly after the note became due, the same being unpaid, appellee instituted this action wherein he sought judgment on the note, and an enforcement of his lien.

In his answer and counterclaim defendant alleges that in purchasing the property and entering into the contract he relied upon certain representations and warranties made to him by the plaintiff; that the property is near Scottsville, Kentucky, and at the time was producing quite a lot of gas and defendant agreed to purchase the same for the purpose of piping the gas to Scottsville and putting the same on- the market, and possibly manufacturing some gasoline therefrom, and also to operate some small oil wells on the lease. He avers [460]*460that the plaintiff understood his said plans and knew what his purpose was in making the purchase, and that plaintiff represented to him that he had caused the gas to be examined and'tested, and same was found to be a highly commercial gas and rich in gasoline, and plaintiff further represented to defendant that he had built up a trade for the oil produced on the lease and had an income therefrom of twelve dollars per day, and further that there was only one dry hole on the lease and defendant says he believed and relied upon suoh statements and representations and was thereby induced to purchase the property; but he says that said representations were untrue and fraudulent and made by the plaintiff with the fraudulent intent to induce the defendant to purchase the property. He then avers that the gas has no commercial value whatever, and contains suoh a great percentage of sulphur that it cannot be used and is absolutely worthless and without commercial value; that it has less than one per cent, of gasoline in it, which makes it of no value for gasoline purposes, and he says that the plaintiff had no regular trade established which gives him twelve dollars a day, or anything near that amount, from the sale of the oil, and that the wells did not at that time produce sufficient oil to bring an income of twelve dollars per day if there had been such market as represented by the plaintiff.

He then tendered back to the plaintiff the reassignment of the lease and asked for a rescission of the contract, and a judgment for the one thousand dollars and interest paid thereon.

In the first paragraph of the reply the material averments in the counterclaim are put in issue, and in the second paragraph the plaintiff affirmatively pleads that defendant is an experienced oil man and purchased the leasehold estate in question in reliance upon his own judgment and after a personal inspection of the same and after personally viewing the leasehold, and that defendant claims to be a geologist, and in this capacity inspected the same before the trade was consummated. It is further alleged that at the time of the inspection and • the deal, defendant knew there was no pipe line extending to the leasehold, and plaintiff told defendant that all the oil he had sold from the lease he had sold to farmers and merchants for farm use and otherwise, and that the oil so sold was hauled from the lease in wagons and conveyances, and plaintiff did not at any time represent or [461]*461warrant that any certain sum could be realized- out of the oil, and defendant was at the time of the sale fully aware of ail these facts.

The chancellor dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim, gave the plaintiff a judgment for the amount of his note and directed the enforcement of the lien, and the defendant has appealed.

The evidence shows that defendant has had large and extensive experience as an oil man; that he is a highly intelligent man and familiar, not only with the practical side of the oil business, acquired by him in different oil fields, but is to a great extent an expert in many of the technical and scientific aspects of it. It is shown that he expressed high approval of the geological formation of the lease in question, and not only professed to have, but in-fact seems to have had, technical knowledge of such things. The defendant had himself had some experience in the gas business in eastern Kentucky, but in the consummation of this deal he not only had the benefit of his own experience in the oil and gas business, but he had the counsel and advice of another expert oil and gas man who was associated with him in the operation and management of a large oil company in the Allen county field.

It is fairly apparent from the evidence -that appellee did exaggerate the amount of his income from the oil produced on the property, but it is equally apparent that appellant knew there was no pipe line connected with the wells on the property and understood fully that appellee’s dealings in the oil -had been in retailing to individaul customers scattered over the country, and that what trade he had was obtained through advertisement in trade journals. It is clear that this feature of the matter carried no great weight with appellant and that he placed no reliance upon it in making his purchase. He was in the habit of making large deals, and did not engage in the retailing of oil by the barrel to individuals-. He -may. have had in mind that he would further develop the property for oil producing purposes at a future time when a pipe line might be accessible, but that appellee’s profit made in the retailing of oil was any incentive for him to enter into this purchase we cannot and do not believe.

On the contrary the record is convincing that the real purpose defendant had in the acquisition of the property was to pipe the gas produced to Scottsville, and there sell it for lighting and heating purposes to the citizens. [462]*462Pie and his witness, Donaldson, each testify that defendant told this to plaintiff prior to and at the time of the purchase, and they each testify that plaintiff told them that he had had the gas from this lease tested and the same was rich in gasoline and good for commercial purposes.

There appears to be no complaint of the quantity of gas produced on the property or any misrepresentation made by plaintiff as to such quantity, but the claim is urgently made that he falsely and fraudulently represented the gas produced thereon was rich in gasoline and good commercial gas, when in truth and fact the evidence tends to show that the 'gasoline content was so small as to make it unprofitable to make gasoline therefrom, and that there was so mubh sulphur in the gas as to make it unfit for commercial-use. On these questions, however, plaintiff emphatically ' denied ' that he made any such representation. He does say that he told appellant he had the gas tested, but that neither, appellee nor his friend, Donaldson, asked to see or examine the report so received by him, and in this latter statement they all three agree.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
251 S.W. 617, 199 Ky. 458, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 860, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcclurkin-v-de-gaigney-kyctapp-1923.