J-S38033-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RONALD G. McCLURE, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : GERALD BRANN, d/b/a BRANN, : WILLIAMS, CALDWELL & SHEETZ, : : Appellee : No. 2104 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered on October 29, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, Civil Division, No. 11 CV 000243
BEFORE: WECHT, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2015
Ronald G. McClure (“McClure”) appeals from the Order entering
summary judgment against him and in favor of Gerald Brann, d/b/a Brann,
Williams, Caldwell & Sheetz (“Attorney Brann”), in this legal malpractice
action. We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court provided the following concise summary
of the facts underlying the instant appeal:
[McClure] entered into a gas lease with Fortuna Energy in 2005; the lease involved an 80[-]acre parcel of land owned by [McClure], himself. At the time of the inception of the lease[, McClure] was married to Janet McClure [(“Janet”) (McClure and Janet collectively referred to as “the McClures”). McClure] later sold the leased parcel to John and Denise Feusner [collectively, “the Feusners”]. [Attorney Brann] represented both the Feusners and [McClure] in the matter of the sale of the property. The original agreement of sale[,] drawn up by [Attorney Brann,] indicated that [the McClures] reserved for themselves one-half of the oil, gas and mineral rights in the property and that, upon the J-S38033-15
death of the survivor of the [McClures], the oil, gas and mineral rights would pass to [the Feusners] or whoever owned the property at that time. As it turned out, the Feusners were unable to secure a loan for the purchase of the property and Robert and Ruth Garrison [collectively, “the Garrisons”] joined them in the purchase. The second agreement of sale reflected the addition of the Garrisons as Buyers and provided that, upon the death of the survivor of the Grantors (McClures), the one- half interest in the gas, oil, and mineral rights in the property would pass to Grantees (Feusners and Garrisons) or whoever owned the property at the time. [The McClures] were divorced in 2011. On 15 June 2011, a divorce hearing was conducted before a Bradford County, Pennsylvania, Hearing Master[,] … at which [McClure] asserted that he never intended that Janet [] share in the retention of the gas, oil, and mineral rights, that the gas lease was his alone, and that he [had] signed documents to the contrary only because [Attorney Brann] told him that Pennsylvania law required him to do so. However, the hearing Master found the conveyance and grant of gas, oil[,] and mineral rights to Janet [] to have been intentional and knowing….
Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/14, at 2 (unnumbered).
In July 2011, McClure filed the within legal malpractice action against
Attorney Brann. McClure alleged that Attorney Brann incorrectly advised
him regarding a transfer of oil, gas and mineral rights to Janet. Ultimately,
Attorney Brann filed an Amended Answer and New Matter, asserting the
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. Attorney Brann filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on June 16, 2014, which the trial court denied.
Attorney Brann filed a Motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order, or
for certification of the issue for immediate appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702
(pertaining to interlocutory appeals by permission); Pa.R.A.P. 1311
(requiring an application for an amendment of an interlocutory order to be
filed within 30 days). After a hearing on Attorney Brann’s Motion, the trial
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court entered an Order on October 29, 2014, which vacated its prior Order
and granted Attorney Brann’s Motion for Summary Judgment. McClure
timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
McClure now raises the following issue for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING [ATTORNEY BRANN’S] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL?
Brief for Appellant at 1.
McClure claims that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that his cause of action is barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Id. at 3. McClure argues that in his prior divorce proceeding, the
hearing master addressed whether Janet had a marital interest in the oil,
gas and mineral rights underlying the property. Id. at 4. In that
proceeding, the hearing master found that Janet did, in fact, have an
interest in the oil, gas and mineral rights. Id. By contrast, McClure argues,
the issue in the instant case “deals not with if [Janet,] in fact[,] has an
interest[,] but instead with how and why that interest was created.” Id.
McClure contends that because the issues are not identical, collateral
estoppel does not bar his current action. Id.
Pennsylvania law provides that
summary judgment may be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that
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no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, summary judgment is proper only when the uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum, only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary judgment. … With regard to questions of law, an appellate court’s scope of review is plenary. The Superior Court will reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court has committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law based on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration.
Cresswell v. Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 820 A.2d 172, 177
(Pa. Super. 2003) (quotation and emphasis omitted).
Here, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that McClure’s claim
is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel applies if
four elements are present:
(1) An issue decided in a prior action is identical to the one presented in a later action; (2) The prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
Columbia Med. Group, Inc. v. Herring & Roll, P.C., 829 A.2d 1184, 1190
(Pa. Super. 2003).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed McClure’s claim and concluded
that it lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/14, at 4-6 (unnumbered).
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The trial court’s determination is supported by the record, and its legal
conclusion is sound. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s
reasoning, as stated in its Opinion, with regard to McClure’s claim. See id.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/30/2015
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RONALD G. MCCLURE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF OF
BRADFORD COUNTY, vs. PENNSYLVANIA
GERALD BRANN, d/b/a BRANN, No. 11 CV 000243 WILLIAMS, CALDWELL, AND SHEETZ,
DEFENDANTS ..................................................................................................................... .....................................................................................................................
OPINION AND ORDER
Procedural History
On 5 July 2011, Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against Defendant alleging
that Plaintiff was incorrectly advised by Defendant in the matter of the transfer of certain
oil, gas, and mineral rights to Plaintiff's wife in an earlier sale of real property.
Defendant, on 17 April 2014, filed an amended answer to Plaintiff's complaint in which
he asserted the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. A motion for summary
judgment was filed by Defendant on, or about, 18 April 2014, which motion was denied
by Order dated 16 June 2014. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
of 16 June 2014 or appellate certification of the issue addressed in that motion, on, or
about, 15 July 2014. Hearing upon the motion for reconsideration or appellate
certification was held on 11 September 2014. Circulated 06/02/2015 03:09 PM
Overview
Plaintiff entered into a gas lease with Fortuna Energy in 2005; the lease involved an
80 acre parcel of land owned by Plaintiff, himself. At the time of the inception of the
lease Plaintiff was married to Janet McClure. Plaintiff later sold the leased parcel to
John and Denise Feusner . Defendant represented both the Feusners and Plaintiff in
the matter of the sale of the property. The original agreement of sale drawn up by
Defendant indicated that Sellers reserved for themselves one-half of the oil, gas, and
mineral rights in the property and that, upon the death of the survivor of the sellers, the
oil, gas, and mineral rights would pass to Buyers or whoever owned the property at that
time. As it turned out, the Feusners were unable to secure a loan for the purchase of the
property and Robert and Ruth Garrison joined them in the purchase. The second
agreement of sale reflected the addition of the Garrisons as Buyers and provided that,
upon the death of the survivor of the Grantors (McClures), the one-half interest in the
gas, oil, and mineral rights in the property would pass to Grantees (Feusners and
Garrisons) or whoever owned the property at the time. Plaintiff and Janet McClure were
divorced in 2011. On 15 June 2011, a divorce hearing was conducted before a
Bradford County, Pennsylvania, Hearing Master (09FC000497) at which Plaintiff
asserted that he never intended that Janet McClure share in the retention of the gas, oil,
and mineral rights, that the gas lease was his alone, and that he signed documents to
the contrary only because Defendant told him that Pennsylvania law required him to do
so. However, the Hearing Master found the conveyance and grant of gas, oil and
mineral rights to Janet McClure to have been intentional and knowing. In the instant
matter, Plaintiff seeks remuneration for the oil, gas, and mineral rights transferred to
Janet McClure and, in support of his claim, advances the same argument adduced at Circulated 06/02/2015 03:09 PM
the earlier divorce proceeding, viz., that he was improperly influenced by Defendant to
convey the rights to Janet McClure.
Discussion
DEFENDANT argues that summary judgment should be granted, or appellate
certification should be ordered, in the instant case based upon the legal principle of
collateral estoppel, Defendant's argument is founded upon his belief that the instant
issue of whether the acts of Plaintiff in conveying certain gas, oil, and mineral rights to
Janet McClure were intentional, knowing, and voluntary had been decided at Plaintiff''s
divorce proceeding of 15 June 2011. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that collateral
estoppel does not apply because the instant matter does not involve the same parties
as were involved in the divorce proceeding. Upon reconsideration of the record of the
instant case, the transcript of the divorce proceeding, the findings and
recommendations of the Hearing Master in the divorce proceeding, the ensuing court
order granting the divorce, and the arguments advanced by the Parties involved in the
instant matter, this Court agrees with Defendant that the principle of collateral estoppel
is applicable to this case and that, therefore, Defendant's motion for summary judgment
should be granted.
"Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a doctrine that prevents relitigation of an
issue in a later action, despite the fact that it is based on a cause of action different from
the one previously litigated." Griffinv. Cent. SprinklerCorp., 2003 PA Super 160,
823 A.2d 191(citing Balentv. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 669 A.2d 309 (Pa.
1995). Circulated 06/02/2015 03:09 PM
Under Pennsylvania law, in order to prevail upon a plea of collateral estoppel it must
be shown that: (1) the issue presented to the court is identical to one presented in an
earlier action; (2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or in privity
with a party to the prior action; and, (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. See
Ewing v. Ewing, 2004 PA Super 46 (2004), 843 A.2d 1282 (Pa.Super. 2004)(citing
Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 673 A.2d 872 (1996)(Note: Pennsylvania appellate
courts in more recent cases have required an additional showing that the determination
in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment. See, e.g., Caltroppa v. Carlton,
2010 PA Super 85, 998 A.2d 643, 646 (Pa.Super. 2010); Chada v. Chada, 2000 PA
Super 186, 756 A.2d 39 (Pa.Super. 2000)).
Here, the records of Plaintiff's divorce case and the instant case plainly show that the
only issue litigated at the divorce proceeding and asserted in the instant case is whether
Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily conveyed certain gas, oil and mineral rights to Janet .
McClure. In fact, at the divorce hearing of 15 June 2011, Plaintiff sought to obtain
equitable distribution credit in the amount of the value of certain gas, oil, and mineral
rights which he had conveyed to his wife at the time of the sale of property addressed
above. Plaintiff's argument for relief at the hearing was based upon his assertion that
his attorney at the time of the sale, the instant Defendant, told him that he had to sign
the documents that conveyed to Janet McClure, his spouse at the time of hearing, a
share of the gas, oil, and mineral rights to the property being sold notwithstanding that
he claimed to be sole owner of the property. (N.T. at p.43, lines 11-13; p.49, lines 6- \ Circulated 06/02/2015 03:09 PM i
10; p.51, lines 2-9). Plaintiff in his instant malpractice suit, again seeks to recover the
value of the same gas, oil, and mineral rights conveyed to Janet MCCLURE, and for
exactly the same reason advanced at the earlier divorce hearing, viz., as the result of
incorrect counsel provided by Defendant.
Adequate documentation exists to show that Plaintiff was a Party to the earlier
divorce proceeding. (See, e.g., case record of 09FC000497 includinghearing
transcriptof 15 June 2011). The record of the instant case establishes that Plaintiff is
the object of the plea of collateral estoppel being asserted in the case.
It is clear from the transcript of the divorce proceeding of 15 June 2011 that the
hearing was comprehensive in nature, that the Parties, including instant Plaintiff had a
full and fair opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses, and present argument
in support of their respective claims, and that the Hearing Master had the opportunity to
determine the credibility of the testimony offered. Instant Plaintiff was represented by
counsel at the hearing and Defendant in the instant case testified and was cross-
examined by his attorney upon the issue of Defendant's role, if any, in influencing
Plaintiff to sign the documents conveying gas, oil, and mineral rights to Janet
MCCLURE. Plaintiff and Janet MCCLURE also testified and were cross-examined at
the hearing upon the same issue. Additional evidence in the form of the sales
agreement and deed relating to the sale of the property involving the gas, oil, and
mineral rights alluded to above was adduced and considered by the Hearing Master.
Upon considering the testimony and documentary evidence presented, the Hearing
Master found, inter a/ia, that: . .-····~, Circulated 06/02/2015 03:09 PM I i \ .
"[h]usband's [instant PLAINTIFF] argument against his intent to transfer property is not credible given his actual testimony as against the other witnesses. The transfer and grant to wife [Janet MCCLURE] of gas, oil, and mineral rights is considered an intentional and knowing transfer given all testimony and circumstances. It is further found that wife's marital interest in the gas, oil and mineral rights through her marital ownership interest in the real estate is further confirmation of the written transfer intent." (Discussionparagraph of Hearing Master's Recommendations).
Significantly, in terms of the instant matter, the Hearing Master also noted that "[t]he
parties' stipulated settlement deals with all other equitable distribution issues .... "
(Discussion paragraph of Hearing Master's Recommendations). The Court has
read this statement to mean that the issue of the gas, oil, and mineral rights, the same
issue upon which the instant case is based, was the only one litigated at the divorce
hearing; in fact, the hearing transcript shows that issue of the gas, oil and mineral rights
was the only issue litigated at the divorce proceeding.
There is no indication that exceptions to the recommendations of the Hearing Master
were filed or that a hearing de nova was requested.
Following the divorce hearing, the Hearing Master forwarded his recommendations
to the Court. Court records show that, on 5 August 2011, an order of court was entered
to case 09FC000497, the divorce matter in connection with which the hearing of 15
June 2011 was based. In that order, Maureen T. Beirne, President Judge of the
Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, in accordance with the Hearing Master's
recommendation, decreed that "[o]il, gas, and mineral rights reserved on deed dated
July 21, 2009, Bradford County Register and Record instrument #251588 is distributed
half to each party as each party's division of marital property as each party's separate Circulated 06/02/2015 03:09 PM
property." (BCCCP Order to #09FC000497 dtd 5 August2011 at b.). Thus, the
determination made at the hearing was essential to the resulting judgment.
There is no record of an appeal having been taken from the Order of 5 August 2014,
and the Order became final in accordance with Pennsylvania law.
"A judgment is deemed final for purposes of ... collateral estoppel unless or until it is
reversed on appeal." Green v. Green, 2001 PA Super 256, 783 A.2d 788
(2001)(citing Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 673 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1996).
In light of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that all prongs of the collateral
estoppel applicability test, including prong number five, are met and that the principle of
collateral estoppel is properly invoked and applied in the instant case.
Accordingly, the following Order is entered: