McCloud v. Baker

2022 Ohio 1307
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided April 15, 2022·No. 21CA3·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HOCKING COUNTY

TYLER MCCLOUD, ET. AL., :

:

Petitioners-Appellees, : Case No. 21CA3 :

v. :

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT MARION BAKER, : ENTRY :

Respondent-Appellant. :

APPEARANCES:

William L. Archer, Jr., Circleville, Ohio, for Appellant.

Jonathan Getson, Baum Law Office, Lancaster, Ohio, for Appellees.1

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Marion Baker, “Appellant,” appeals the decision of the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas, filed February 5, 2021, which found by a preponderance of evidence that Appellant did engage in menacing by stalking towards Appellee Tyler McCloud, “Tyler,” and his wife, Kayla Painter, and that a civil stalking protection order was necessary to protect the persons named in the order.2 Appellant contends that the trial court’s

1 While Tyler McCloud was represented by Attorney Getson in the trial court proceedings, neither Mr. McCloud nor any attorney on his behalf has filed a brief in this appeal. 2 While Tyler McCloud and Kayla Painter testified they are married, Kayla is referenced in these proceedings as Kayla Painter. Furthermore, while Kayla is listed as a protected party, she was not a petitioner in this matter. Therefore, in the interest of clarity throughout the opinion, we have decided to

Hocking App. No. 21CA3 2

decision is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to its findings and in issuing the protection order. As such, we find no merit to Appellant’s sole assignment of error and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

{¶2} Tyler McCloud and Kayla Painter reside on property Kayla purchased in 2017, which adjoins Appellant’s property. The nearest public roadway is Long Run Road. Tyler and Kayla’s access to Long Run Road is by means of an easement and common driveway shared by Appellant and Kayla.

{¶3} Appellant once owned Kayla’s property. When Appellant originally sold the property in 2004, the deed included a provision that required the new owners to pay for one-third of all maintenance costs as to the easement.3 Kayla is also subject to this provision to be responsible for costs of maintenance. The maintenance provision in Appellant’s deed, which was made an exhibit to these proceedings, reads as follows:

Grantees agree to be responsible for one-third of all maintenance costs associated with the roadway over which they are acquiring an easement, as set forth in Exhibit A,

reference Tyler McCloud as “Tyler” instead of Appellee. When both are referred to we will use “McClouds.” 3 Appellant first sold the property now owned by Kayla to Philip Estep and Annette Estep.

including costs related to maintenance of the roadway, bridge and culverts, up to the point at which the roadway splits and becomes exclusive to the Grantees, from which point Grantees will be responsible for the entire maintenance costs related to the same.

{¶4} Sometime in early October 2020, the parties had a dispute about the costs of gravel for driveway maintenance. On October 20, 2020, Tyler brought a petition for a civil stalking protection order, which the trial court granted ex parte. Kayla was named as an additional protected party. The matter came on for full hearing on October 30, 2020 and on December 28, 2020. Appellant and Tyler both presented several witnesses whose testimonies will be summarized herein.

{¶5} On February 5, 2021, the trial court issued a full civil stalking protection order to be in effect until October 20, 2022. The trial court concluded:

This Court believes that Mr. Baker’s actions caused the McClouds mental distress. This Court believes that the events that caused this include: Mr. Baker riding near the common driveway in his golf cart with a shotgun; sitting in the golf cart staring at the McCloud’s home; leaving the backhoe on the township right-of-way in order to obstruct the driveway; telling Mr. McCloud that he, Mr. Baker, would have his grandson or nephew “take care of” Mr.

McCloud; and Mr. Baker coming too close to the McCloud home after the issuance of the ex parte order.

The fact that the McClouds are scared and concerned about their safety is clear. They have put up cameras to monitor the area around their home due to the actions of Mr. Baker. This Court also believes that there is a pattern

of conduct. All the actions that have occurred have happened since the summer of 2020. * * * This Court believes that Mr. Baker acted while he was aware that Mr.

and Mrs. McCloud would suffer mental distress as a result of his actions.

{¶6} This timely appeal followed. Where necessary, additional pertinent facts are set forth below.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION FINDING THAT APPELLANT ENGAGED IN A PATTERN OF CONDUCT THAT CONSTITUTED MENACING BY STALKING IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶7} Because the decision on whether to grant a civil protection order is within the trial court's sound discretion, we will not reverse it absent an abuse of that discretion. See McNaughton v. Cochenour, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 155CA3479, 2015-Ohio-4648, at ¶ 17; McKinley v. Kuhn, 4th Dist. Hocking App. No. 10CA5, 2011-Ohio-134, ¶¶ 12-13; Smith v. Wunsch, 162 Ohio App.3d 21, 2005-Ohio-3498, 832 N.E.2d 757, at ¶ 10 (4th Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’ ” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A trial court abuses its discretion when it has taken “a view or action that no conscientious judge

could honestly have taken.” State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio- 4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23. To establish an abuse of discretion “the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason, but instead passion or bias.” Smith v. Wunsch, 162 Ohio App.3d 21, 26, 2005- Ohio-3498, 832 N.E.2d 757, 761, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.) citing Vaught v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 98 Ohio St.3d 485, 2003-Ohio-2181, 787 N.E.2d 631, ¶ 13; Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1 (1996).

{¶8} “Moreover, an ‘appellate court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court so long as there is some competent, credible evidence to support the lower court findings.’ ” McNaughton, supra at ¶ 18, quoting State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Environmental Enterprises, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 147, 154, 559 N.E.2d 1335 (1990). When an appellate court reviews a trial court's judgment, it must generally defer to the fact- finder's weight of the evidence and credibility determinations. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Seasons Coal:

A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the

credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of an error in law is a legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence is not. The determination of credibility of testimony and evidence must not be encroached upon by a reviewing tribunal, especially to the extent where the appellate court relies on unchallenged, excluded evidence in order to justify its reversal. Id. The trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness who appears before it. McKinley v. Kuhn, at ¶ 13.

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

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