McClintock v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System

2010 ME 65, 1 A.3d 431, 2010 WL 2816709
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 20, 2010
DocketDocket: Ken-09-482
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2010 ME 65 (McClintock v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McClintock v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System, 2010 ME 65, 1 A.3d 431, 2010 WL 2816709 (Me. 2010).

Opinion

LEVY, J.

[¶ 1] The Maine Public Employees Retirement System (the System) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Jabar, J.) vacating the decision of the System’s Board of Trustees that Janet McClintock was not entitled to full creditable service for the time she worked for the Attorney General’s Office on a part-time basis. The System contends that the Board’s decision was proper because (1) under the terms of 5 M.R.S. § 17751(3) (2009), the Board retained the *433 authority to rely on job classifications outlined in System Rule 401 to determine McClintock’s service credits; and (2) McClintock was not a part-time employee eligible for full service credit. We vacate the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Janet McClintock began working as a full-time Assistant Attorney General at the Office of the Maine Attorney General in 1986. She joined the System in August 1987. In 1988, she took her first unpaid leave of absence, and when she returned in January 1989, it was to work three days per week. Since that time, with the exception of another leave of absence in 1991, she has consistently worked three to four days per week. At all relevant times, the Attorney General’s Office has designated McClintock’s position as “full-time, limited period,” which is the designation used for positions funded from any source other than the General Fund.

[¶ 3] The means used by the System to calculate McClintock’s creditable service have changed multiple times since she began working with the Attorney General’s Office, but she has not consistently received full creditable service since she began working part-time hours in 1989. The methods by which McClintock’s creditable service has been calculated arise from the System’s Rule 401, which was first adopted in 1978 1 and then substantially revised in 1991, 2 and statutory amendments to 5 *434 M.R.S. § 17751(3) that were enacted in response to the 1991 revision of the rule. 3

[¶ 4] In early 2004, McClintock contacted the System to review her creditable service. She received a determination from the System’s retirement supervisor in March 2005 that she had accrued only partial creditable service each year after her first unpaid leave of absence in 1989. McClintock spoke with several System retirement specialists, and in March 2006, she received a decision from the designee of the executive director concluding that her service credits had been properly determined.

[¶ 5] In May 2006, McClintock appealed to the Board, arguing that she should be awarded a full year’s service credit for *435 each year that she worked more than 1000 hours since January 1, 1989, because she was a part-time employee entitled to full credit pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 17751(3) and Rule 401. The Hearing Officer filed his final report to the Board affirming the System’s decision in January 2007, and the executive director denied McClintock’s appeal in September 2007.

[¶ 6] The System’s Board of Trustees issued a final order denying McClintock’s requested benefits on August 1, 2008. In its decision, the Board interpreted the term “part-time” as used in section 17751(3) “as referencing the ‘part-time’ employment classification incorporated in the original Rule 401.” It noted: “The determinative distinction in this case is between the concept of a part-time position and that of an employee working part-time hours in a full-time position. Ms. McClintock works part-time hours in a full-time position.” The Board concluded that because the Attorney General’s Office classified MeClintock’s position as full-time, limited period, she was not a “part-time” employee for purposes of Rule 401(2),

[¶ 7] McClintock appealed the Board’s decision to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The court determined that the term “part-time” as used in section 17751(3) was not ambiguous, and referred to part-time employees “in the ordinary sense.” The court reasoned that the word “position” should not be read into the statute so as to qualify the term “part-time,” stating: “Without some indication in the ... statutory scheme that the [term] ‘part-time,’ as used in § 17751, is referring to the budgetary classification of an employee rather than the ordinary meaning of the word, this court finds no ambiguity in § 17751.” The court vacated the Board’s decision, concluding that McClin-tock qualified as a “part-time” employee for purposes of section 17751 and was thus entitled to a full year of creditable service for each year she worked 1000 hours or more. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] “When the Superior Court acts in an intermediate appellate capacity pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, we review [the administrative] agency’s decision directly ... for legal errors, an unsustainable exercise of discretion, or unsupported findings of fact.” Tremblay v. Land Use Regulation Comm’n, 2005 ME 110, ¶ 13, 883 A.2d 901, 904 (quotation marks omitted). The party seeking to overturn the Board’s decision bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. See Anderson v. Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 2009 ME 134, ¶ 3, 985 A.2d 501, 503. When we review an agency’s interpretation of a statute that is both administered by the agency and within the agency’s expertise, we apply a two-part inquiry:

Our first inquiry is to determine de novo whether the statute is ambiguous. An ambiguous statute has language that is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations. Second, we either review the [agency’s] construction of the ambiguous statute for reasonableness or plainly construe the unambiguous statute. We accord great deference to the [agency’s] interpretation if the statute is considered ambiguous, but will apply a different interpretation if the statute plainly compels a contrary result.

Dep’t of Corr. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2009 ME 40, ¶ 8, 968 A.2d 1047, 1050 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

A. Construction of the Term “Part-time”

[¶ 9] The relevant portion of subsection 17751(3) states: “The board shall provide in its [relevant] rule ... that any part-time or seasonal state employee who *436 was employed during [the relevant period] is credited with a full year of creditable service for each year in which that employee is employed for 1,000 or more hours.” Consistent with the Superior Court’s approach, McClintock asserts that “part-time ... employee” is an unambiguous term because it plainly refers to a person who is employed for or working less than the amount of time considered customary or standard. The System counters that the term “part-time” has no plain meaning and should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the position-based classification system that the System has employed for many years.

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Related

Reva Merrill v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System
2014 ME 100 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2014)
Kennebec County v. Maine Public Employees Retirement System
2014 ME 26 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2010 ME 65, 1 A.3d 431, 2010 WL 2816709, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcclintock-v-maine-public-employees-retirement-system-me-2010.