McClellan v. Carter

Court of Appeals of Georgia

McClellan v. Carter

117 S.E. 118, 30 Ga. App. 150, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 323

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 11, 1923

Docket14115

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 117 S.E. 118 (McClellan v. Carter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McClellan v. Carter, 117 S.E. 118, 30 Ga. App. 150, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923).

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Opinion

Bloodworth, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) Only the 2d headnote needs elaboration. While we recognize the general rule that public officers, when acting in good faith and within the scope of their duty, are not liable to private action, we recognize also that it is well settled that when they do things not authorized by law, or act in a wanton or malicious way and with intent to injure the property of another, they are responsible for a violation of their duty. The petition in this case not only alleges that the acts of the defendant were unauthorized by law, careless, and negligent, and without the scope of his authority as cattle inspector, but that they were wanton and clone intentionally and with intent to injure and damage petitioner. It also shows that the defendant did not give to the animal that necessary care and attention which is required by law.

We think the petition was good as against a general demurrer.

Judgment reversed.

Broylesj C. J., and Luke, J., concur.

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Bloodworth, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) Only the 2d headnote needs elaboration. While we recognize the general rule that public officers, when acting in good faith and within the scope of their duty, are not liable to private action, we recognize also that it is well settled that when they do things not authorized by law, or act in a wanton or malicious way and with intent to injure the property of another, they are responsible for a violation of their duty. The petition in this case not only alleges that the acts of the defendant were unauthorized by law, careless, and negligent, and without the scope of his authority as cattle inspector, but that they were wanton and clone intentionally and with intent to injure and damage petitioner. It also shows that the defendant did not give to the animal that necessary care and attention which is required by law.

We think the petition was good as against a general demurrer.

Judgment reversed.

Broylesj C. J., and Luke, J., concur.

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117 S.E. 118, 30 Ga. App. 150, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcclellan-v-carter-gactapp-1923.

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