McClean's Executors v. Miller

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of District of Columbia

McClean's Executors v. Miller

15 F. Cas. 1267, 2 D.C. 620, 2 Cranch 620

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of District of Columbia

DecidedNovember 15, 1825

StatusPublished

This text of 15 F. Cas. 1267 (McClean's Executors v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McClean's Executors v. Miller, 15 F. Cas. 1267, 2 D.C. 620, 2 Cranch 620 (circtddc 1825).

Pincite

Opinion

Cranch, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court:

By the terms of the dissolution of the partnership between Cawood and McClean, the whole joint effects were transferred to Cawood, who undertook to pay the joint debts. These facts were known, at the time, by the defendant, Miller, who then had a joint claim against the copartners. With this knowledge he could not, with a good conscience, collude with Cawood, in applying the joint funds to a new debt contracted with Cawood, leaving McClean liable to pay the joint debt out of his separate estate. He knew that McClean had deposited those funds in the hands of Cawood, to pay the joint debt, and that Cawood had undertaken so to apply them. If the joint funds were transferred to Cawood, so was the debt. Mr. Miller had no right to separate them. The same act, which made Cawood master of the funds, made him debtor for the debt. It is like a trust. A party obtaining possession of the trust-fund, with a knowledge of the trust, is bound to see it executed to the extent of the funds which come to his hands. If Mr. Miller, knowing the facts, took the funds as security for new advances made to Cawood, it was so far to be considered in equity, as a fraud upon McClean, as to postpone his (Mr. Miller’s) security upon the new contract with Cawood, to that upon his old claim against Cawood and McClean.

[622]*622This is the view which the Court has always taken of the case, and there is nothing in the affidavit or deposition of Cawood, to which the attention of the Court was called at the last term, to vary that view. Mr. Miller, in his answer, fully admits his knowledge of the terms of the dissolution, as they are alleged in the bill. That knowledge is decisive of the case.

Independent, however, of that view of the subject, the account rendered by Mr. Miller to Mr. McClean, and exhibited with the bill, shows (when the several items are arranged according to the natural order of their dates,) that the joint debt was paid. It appears that on the 5th of April, 1816, Mr. Miller had received from the joint funds, more than enough to discharge the whole of his joint claim against Daniel Cawood & Co., and of his separate claim against Daniel Cawood ; so that the joint debt was in fact paid.

It is not, however, necessary to reply on this ground, as we consider the former view of the ease conclusive against the defendant.

The former decree of the Court, perpetuating the injunction, must stand confirmed.

The CouRT

(Thruston, J., absent,)

decreed a perpetual injunction. •

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cranch, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court:

By the terms of the dissolution of the partnership between Cawood and McClean, the whole joint effects were transferred to Cawood, who undertook to pay the joint debts. These facts were known, at the time, by the defendant, Miller, who then had a joint claim against the copartners. With this knowledge he could not, with a good conscience, collude with Cawood, in applying the joint funds to a new debt contracted with Cawood, leaving McClean liable to pay the joint debt out of his separate estate. He knew that McClean had deposited those funds in the hands of Cawood, to pay the joint debt, and that Cawood had undertaken so to apply them. If the joint funds were transferred to Cawood, so was the debt. Mr. Miller had no right to separate them. The same act, which made Cawood master of the funds, made him debtor for the debt. It is like a trust. A party obtaining possession of the trust-fund, with a knowledge of the trust, is bound to see it executed to the extent of the funds which come to his hands. If Mr. Miller, knowing the facts, took the funds as security for new advances made to Cawood, it was so far to be considered in equity, as a fraud upon McClean, as to postpone his (Mr. Miller’s) security upon the new contract with Cawood, to that upon his old claim against Cawood and McClean.

[622]*622This is the view which the Court has always taken of the case, and there is nothing in the affidavit or deposition of Cawood, to which the attention of the Court was called at the last term, to vary that view. Mr. Miller, in his answer, fully admits his knowledge of the terms of the dissolution, as they are alleged in the bill. That knowledge is decisive of the case.

Independent, however, of that view of the subject, the account rendered by Mr. Miller to Mr. McClean, and exhibited with the bill, shows (when the several items are arranged according to the natural order of their dates,) that the joint debt was paid. It appears that on the 5th of April, 1816, Mr. Miller had received from the joint funds, more than enough to discharge the whole of his joint claim against Daniel Cawood & Co., and of his separate claim against Daniel Cawood ; so that the joint debt was in fact paid.

It is not, however, necessary to reply on this ground, as we consider the former view of the ease conclusive against the defendant.

The former decree of the Court, perpetuating the injunction, must stand confirmed.

The CouRT

(Thruston, J., absent,)

decreed a perpetual injunction. •

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

15 F. Cas. 1267, 2 D.C. 620, 2 Cranch 620, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccleans-executors-v-miller-circtddc-1825.