Smith, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Murphy, C. J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 471 infra.
[458]*458We are presented with two questions in this case: (1) Whether appellant James McClain preserved for appellate review the issue of whether statements obtained from him in violation of Maryland District Rule 709 a were not admissible in evidence, as we ultimately held in Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978), and if so (2) whether Johnson is applicable to a case tried before our decision there but reached for appellate review after that decision. We answer both questions in the affirmative. Hence, we shall reverse the unreported decision of the Court of Special Appeals in McClain v. State, No. 867, September Term, 1978.
For purposes of our decision here it is not necessary to go into all of the lurid details of the alleged crime. Suffice it to say that McClain was convicted of murder in the first degree by a Baltimore City jury. The victim was a ten-month old baby allegedly thrown down the trash chute of a high-rise residential building. He was arrested at 2:43 P.M. on September 11, 1976, and completed the giving of an inculpatory statement at 2:55 P.M. on September 12.
Former Maryland District Rule 709 a read:
A defendant shall be taken before a conveniently available judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) twenty-four hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant’s arrest upon a warrant, or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the charging of the defendant. Such charging shall take place promptly after arrest.
It was this rule which was applicable to McClain’s case.1
[459]*459In Johnson Judge Levine said for the Court:
In our opinion the protection of the right of an accused to prompt production before a judicial officer following arrest will be most effectively accomplished by a per se exclusionary rule. Not only is such a rule calculated to deter unlawful detentions and to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system, but it is likely to assure more certain and even-handed application of the prompt presentment requirement and will provide to trial courts, the bar and law enforcement officials greater guidance as to the permissible limits of custodial interrogation prior to an initial appearance. Commonwealth v. Davenport, [471 Pa. 278,] 370 A.2d [301,] 306 [(1977)]. [Id. at 328.]
We therefore hold that any statement, voluntary or otherwise, obtained from an arrestee during a period of unnecessary delay in producing him before a judicial officer, thereby violating M.D.R. 723 a, is subject to exclusion when offered into evidence against the defendant as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. A statement is automatically excludible if, at the time it was obtained from the defendant, he had not been produced before a commissioner for his initial appearance within the earlier of 24 hours after arrest or the first session of court following arrest, irrespective of the reason for the delay. [Id. at 328-29.]
[460]*460The State concedes that there was not compliance with M.D.R. 709 a. It contends, however, that the objection to the admissibility of the statement was not based upon a ground similar to that before the Court in Johnson. Hence, it claims the point is waived. It further contends that in any event the rule enunciated in Johnson should be applicable only to cases tried subsequent to April 6,1978, the date of our decision in Johnson.
I
McClain’s attorney said in his argument on the motion to suppress the statements:
In this case the defendant was not given the opportunity to obtain counsel, either court appointed or privately retained or by virtue of the fact that the officer held the defendant without charging the defendant and the defendant did not have an opportunity to be taken before the Commissioner. If charged immediately, he should have been taken before the Commissioner for the purpose of normally advising him of his rights and then the Commissioner would be able to make a determination that the defendant either should have or should not have counsel at that time, depending on the results as to what the Commissioner decided. The defendant did not have this opportunity. The defendant was arrested and after he refused to give a statement and saying he had no knowledge of what happened, he was held overnight and was not given the opportunity to go before the Commissioner or not given the opportunity to have private counsel, obviously the defendant couldn’t have private counsel, he has a public defender representing him at trial. ... I think at that point the officer’s obligation was either to charge the defendant or to release the defendant and not start all over again the following day and [461]*461try to pry or force to bring on him psychologically to do away with his will to resist. It is conceivable that the officer, by going back the next day and asking him again and asking him the questions on the explanation of rights, that he was trying to get the defendant to tell him what he wanted him to tell him. From the facts in this case, the defendant should have been taken before the Commissioner on the eleventh of September and he should have had the opportunity to avail himself of either private attorney or a court appointed attorney. . . .
... I say as an alternative they should have released him, he was not either charged or released, but was held incommunicado by the police without being in any kind of official status in the system. He was held in limbo, if you will; he had no way of getting an attorney to get him before a judge. If he had private counsel to get him before a court, what private counsel would have done was to file a habeas corpus and try to interpose himself. The fact is that the defendant was not charged. I respectfully suggest that the Statement made by the Defendant should be ruled inadmissible in evidence. . . .
The Court of Special Appeals said:
The record discloses that at the suppression hearing and at the trial on the merits of the case, appellant’s objection to the admissibility of the inculpatory statement was based on the fact that the statement was not voluntary in the traditional sense. Although appellant, on the motion to suppress argued, among other things, about the delay in charging and presenting him before a judicial officer, this argument was in the context of the voluntariness of the statement rather than the per se exclusionary rule which was never mentioned. Because appellant stated the specific ground for his objection to the admissibility of the statement, both at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at the [462]*462trial on the merits of the case, he is bound by the ground stated and is deemed to have waived other grounds not mentioned. Von Lusch v. State, 279 Md. 255, 262-63 [, 368 A.2d 468] (1977).
Accordingly, we conclude that the issue of the State’s violation of Maryland [District] Rule 723a is not properly before this court.
We disagree. The argument was directed at voluntariness but it included that a statement was obtained while McClain was held in violation of M.D.R. 709 a. It may well be, as suggested from the bench at argument in this case by one of the judges in the majority in Johnson, that bench and bar prior to our decision in Johnson had been of the view that the fact an individual was held in violation of the rule was simply one of the factors to be taken into consideration in weighing the voluntariness of the statement. It certainly was not incumbent upon trial counsel to object on the ground that on April 6, 1978, we would decide Johnson as it was decided. We hold that the issue was raised.
II
We discussed the matter of retroactivity of court decisions in Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 701-07, 344 A.2d 80 (1975), and most recently in State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 336-38, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). As we pointed out in Wiggins, the genesis of the modern retroactivity doctrine in criminal litigation is Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965), in which Mr. Justice Clark said for the Court:
[T]he accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective. [Id. at 628.]
* * *
[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. As Justice Cardozo said [in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932)], "We think the [463]*463federal constitution has no voice upon the subject.” [Id. at 629.]
As we noted in Hicks the Supreme Court has mandated the retroactive application of cases:
[W]here the rule involved affects the integrity of the fact-finding process, or where it is a non-procedural rule that would render a trial constitutionally impermissible (e.g., a new double jeopardy ruling), or where it renders a certain type of punishment impermissible .... [Id. 285 Md. at 336.]
We went on to say in Hicks:
Where retroactivity is not mandated under the above criteria, a balancing test involving three prongs is employed to determine whether the new ruling should be applied prospectively only. Those three considerations are: (1) the purpose of the new ruling; (2) the reliance placed upon the old ruling; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of the new ruling. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-297, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965); Wiggins v. State, supra, 275 Md. at 700-701, 718, 737-741. [Id. at 337.]
This case is unlike many cases in which a retroactive application of a new rule has been sought in that it is not a collateral attack on a prior judgment nor is it one on direct review where the point was not raised in the trial court and it is sought to be raised on appellate review. Here, as we have already held, the point was raised below and McClain simply seeks to have applied in his case the same rule which was applied in Johnson’s case.
The courts and the scholars have been involved in a battle of semantics where retroactivity and prospectivity of appellate decisions are concerned. In fact, the decision in [464]*464Johnson amounts to a retroactive application of a new rule because it makes applicable to his case a rule of law relative to admission of statements which had not been enunciated at the time of trial. We regard the point before us as not being so much the issue of retroactivity as it is the question of what law is applicable on direct appellate review of a conviction.
In Linkletter Mr. Justice Clark cited for the Court United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L. Ed. 49 (1801), for the proposition "that a change in law will be given effect while a case is on direct review. . . .” 381 U.S. at 627. In Schooner Peggy Chief Justice Marshall concluded the opinion by saying for the Court, "[T]he court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.” Id.Id. 5 U.S. at 110. Schooner Peggy has been cited and followed many times by this Court in various contexts. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 363, 204 A.2d 54 (1964); Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, 483 (1880); Wade v. St. Mary’s Indust. School, 43 Md. 178, 181 (1875); Price v. Nesbitt, 29 Md. 263, 266 (1868); Day v. Day, 22 Md. 530, 539 (1865); Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322, 327 (1858); and State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195, 206 (1858). To similar effect among our older cases, but not citing Schooner Peggy, are the separate opinion of Chief Judge Alvey in Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 605, 5 A. 540, 6 A. 673 (1886); Smith v. State, 45 Md. 49 (1876); Atwell v. Grant, 11 Md. 101, 104 (1857); and State v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 12 G. & J. 399, 437 (1842). More recent cases to similar effect include Aviles v. Eshelman Elec. Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977); Co. Council v. Carl M. Freeman Assoc., 281 Md. 70, 76, 376 A.2d 860 (1977); Hays and Wainwright v. State, 240 Md. 482, 485-86, 214 A.2d 573 (1965); Yorkdale v. Powell, 237 Md. 121, 124, 205 A.2d 269 (1964); Woman’s Club v. State Tax Comm., 195 Md. 16, 19, 72 A.2d 742 (1950); Tudor Arms Apts. v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342, 351, 62 A.2d 346 (1948); and Cockerham v. Children’s Society, 185 Md. 97, 102, 43 A.2d 197 (1945).
Although this Court has followed the Linkletter formula [465]*465in a number of cases, this formula in no case has led us to refuse to apply a new rule to a case on direct review pending at the time of the formulation of the new rule in which the issue of the new rule was raised.
In Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966), the Court was faced with the question of whether its decision in Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965), holding that a jury composed of persons who were required to swear to their belief in God as a condition of service was not properly constituted should be retrospectively applied in a civil case where the point had not been raised. The ruling was not made retroactive in its application. In the process of that opinion Judge Oppenheimer said for the Court, "A change in law will generally be given effect while a case is on direct review whether the litigation is criminal or civil. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627 and cases therein cited.” Id. at 469-70. We have already quoted that statement from Linkletter with its citation to Schooner Peggy. The courts and commentators were of the view that what the Supreme Court had done was to hold that a new rule must be applied to all those cases which were still subject to direct review by the Supreme Court at the time the new rule was handed down. See, e.g., the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1969), and Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be RethoughtA Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 417, 431 (1969).
However, in Desist the Court declined to apply its holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), to a case where the point had been raised in the trial court and the United States Court of Appeals prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz. Katz held that the reach of the Fourth Amendment could not turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. In Desist the Court said, "The petitioners argue that even if Katz is not given fully retrospective effect, at least it should govern those cases which, like the petitioners’, were pending on direct review when Katz was decided.” Id. at 252. Mr. Justice Douglas was prompted to [466]*466dissent saying the decision not to apply Katz in Desist "d[id] not seem to [him] to be the administration of justice with an even hand.” Id. at 255. He added:
It still remains a mystery how some convicted people are given new trials for unconstitutional convictions and others are kept in jail without any hope of relief though their complaints are equally meritorious. At least the Court should not say as respects Katz that it is given "wholly prospective application,” when it was made retroactive in his case. [Id. at 255-56.]
In that same case Mr. Justice Harlan said in his dissent:
The unsound character of the rule reaffirmed today is perhaps best exposed by considering the following hypothetical. Imagine that the Second Circuit in the present case had anticipated the line of reasoning this Court subsequently pursued in Katz v. United States, supra, at 352-353, concluding — as this Court there did — that "the underpinnings of Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928),] and Goldman [v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942),] have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.” Id., at 353. Would we have reversed the case on the ground that the principles the Second Circuit had announced — though identical with those in Katz — should not control because Katz is not retroactive? To the contrary, I venture to say that we would have taken satisfaction that the lower court had reached the same conclusion we subsequently did in Katz. If a "new” constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced. Anything else would belie the truism that it is the task of this Court, like that of [467]*467any other, to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case. It is only if our decisions can be justified in terms of this fundamental premise that they may properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the commands of a super-legislature. [Id. at 259 (emphasis in original).]
Mr. Justice Harlan was convinced that a new rule in its application should be considered differently for purposes of direct review than for purposes of collateral attack or review. He expanded on his views in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1971), stating in a concurring and dissenting opinion:
If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all. fid. at 679.]
I continue to believe that a proper perception of our duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution to resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct review, mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was. Inquiry into the nature, purposes, and scope of a particular constitutional rule is essential to the task of deciding whether that rule should be made the law of the land. That inquiry is, however, quite simply irrelevant in deciding, once a rule has been adopted as part of our legal fabric, which cases then pending in this Court should be governed by it. fId. at 681.]
In conclusion, the Court in deciding these cases seems largely to have forgotten the limitations that [468]*468accompany its functions as a court of law. For the retroactivity doctrine announced today bespeaks more considerations of policy than of legal principle. Treating direct and collateral review as if they were of one piece seems to me faulty analysis, ignoring, as it does, the jurisprudential considerations that differentiate the two kinds of adjudicatory functions. As a court of law we have no right on direct review to treat one case differently from another with respect to constitutional provisions applicable to both. As regards cases coming here on collateral review, the problem of retroactivity is in truth none other than one of resettling the limits of the reach of the Great Writ, which under the recent decisions of this Court has been given almost boundless sweep. [Id. at 701-02.]
Mr. Justice Marshall in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665, 91 S. Ct. 1148, 28 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1971), said that he had "stud[ied] afresh the pattern of the Court’s retroactivity decisions since Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),” and then said:
Sound jurisprudential reasoning, so well articulated by Mr. Justice Harlan in his separate opinion covering the present cases, post, p. 675, in my view requires that cases still on direct review should receive full benefit of our supervening constitutional decisions. [Id. at 665.]
Mr. Justice Marshall again expressed such views in his concurring opinion in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 245, 97 S. Ct. 2339, 53 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1977). In that same case Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment holding that Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975), should be retroactively applied but opined that "[t]he retroactivity doctrine that has emerged [from Linkletter and its progeny] is far from satisfactory.” Id. at 246. He went on to say that he was “now persuaded that it would be wiser to adopt the view urged by [469]*469Mr. Justice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675, 702 (1971) (separate opinion),” adding:
When the Court declines to hold a new constitutional rule retroactive, one chance beneficiary — the lucky individual whose case was chosen as the occasion for announcing the new principle — enjoys retroactive application, while others similarly situated have their claims adjudicated under the old doctrine. This hardly comports with the ideal of "administration of justice with an even hand.” Desist v. United States, supra, at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting). [Id. at 247.]
This summer in Brown v. Louisiana, U.S., 100 S. Ct. 2214, 65 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1980), Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, saying:
This Court announced its decision in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), while the petitioner’s objection to the nonunanimous verdict was pending on direct appeal. Ante, at 2218 (slip op., at 3). Since I believe that new constitutional rules should apply retroactively "in cases still pending on direct review,” Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 248 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment), I concur in the judgment reversing the petitioner’s conviction. [Id. at 100 S. Ct. 224.]
He was joined by Mr. Justice Stevens.
A view similar to that of these justices is expressed in Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650, 675 (1962), where he says, "There ought to be a less capricious way to treat relevantly identical litigants.” For similar views see Haddad, op. cit. at 438; Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term — Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 61 n. 23 (1965); and Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 764 (1966). A less [470]*470capricious way was found by the courts when they made decisions applicable upon direct review in Lopez v. Bowen, 495 P.2d 64, 66 (Alaska 1972); Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134, 143 n. 28 (Alaska 1969); Brumley v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1964); New Jersey v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481,181 A.2d 761 (1962); and People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 179 N.E.2d 478 (1961). Cases on the subject are analyzed and discussed in Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966), and Annot., 22 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1969).
We have no constitutional question in this case. However, we believe that the legal principles enunciated by Justices Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens more nearly conform with fairness and traditional Maryland holdings than would a determination that Johnson is not applicable to this case. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said for the Court in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932), "The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. ... In making this choice, she is declaring common law for those within her borders.” In our view it would be unjust and unfair to hold that Johnson, who raised an issue, is to have the benefit of the holding in his case, but McClain, who raised the same issue, is not to have the benefit of that holding. It makes fish of one and fowl of the other. It simply does not comport with the American tradition of equal justice under the law. We hold that Johnson is applicable to McClain’s case.
Our holding here is not to be interpreted as being applicable to any case other than one arising under similar facts and circumstances.
Judgment reversed; case remanded to the Court of Special Appeals for passage of an order reversing the judgment of the Criminal Court of Baltimore and further remanding the case for a new trial; costs to be paid by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.