FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RALPH MCCLAIN, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-992 : Plaintiff, : : v. : : H.K. HOOVER, : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Factual Background This pro se prisoner lawsuit was removed to federal court and the parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. In his complaint, McClain alleged various violations of his constitutional rights in 2019 while he was incarcerated at SCI Rockview. Based upon these allegations, McClain’s complaint seeks an array of relief, including injunctive relief. It is undisputed that McClain is no longer housed at SCI Rockview and has not been held at that facility for more than two years. Given that McClain is no longer incarcerated at the facility where these events allegedly took place, on October 29, 2021 the defendant moved to dismiss his request for injunctive relief as moot.(Doc. 12). 2021, we entered an order directing McClain to respond to the motion by December 3, 2021. That motion also advised McClain in clear and precise terms that: [T]he Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions, and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant’s brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.’” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09- 1704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug.26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (1991)). Therefore, a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motion being deemed unopposed and granted.
(Doc. 15). time for response has passed. Therefore the motion will be deemed ripe and will be granted. II. Discussion
A. Under The Rules of This Court This Motion to Dismiss Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted.
At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in this motion, since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motion or otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates and impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this court warrants dismissal of the action, since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant=s brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added). It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (quoting Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules, or this Court’s order, by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel
the court to consider: [A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that Athe Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....@ McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998).
Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010). With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by those rules when the rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.’” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party=s refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules. These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this motion. This failure now unopposed. B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court, and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted: To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
5 determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors,
[courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation’ to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,’ [and it is] clear that
‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.’” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district
court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 F. App’x 509 (3d Cir. 2007);
Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 F. App’x 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x 728 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in
favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, shows that the failure to respond to
6 orders. Similarly, the second Poulis factor— the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders—also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this
factor—the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions—is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed: “Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). . . . However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
In this case, the plaintiff’s failure to litigate this claim, or to comply with court orders now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff’s continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 F. App’x 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 F. App’x 506
7 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal). When one considers the third Poulis factor—the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff’s part—it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In
this regard, it is clear that “ ‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to comply with court
orders or respond to a defense motion as directed. Thus, the plaintiff’s conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness in
complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. The fourth Poulis factor—whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith—also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that
it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to comply with instructions of the Court, the Court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff’s actions
are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the Court’s instructions.
8 sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g.,
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff
on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the
Court. Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff’s claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff’s claims, since the plaintiff is now wholly
non-compliant with the court’s instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for denying amotion to
dismiss. Furthermore, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,’ [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a
9 complaint.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263(quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff’s claims,
standing alone, cannot prevent imposition of sanctions. In any event, we find that the plaintiff=s transfer from SCI Rockview custody renders moot his current motion for injunctive relief from the defendants, corrections
officials at this state prison who formerly oversaw the conditions of the plaintiff=s imprisonment, but have not had McClain in their custody for the past two years. Therefore, the defendant’s motion prevails on its merits. The mootness doctrine recognizes a fundamental truth in litigation: “[i]f
developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff=s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum
Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). In this case, McClain seeks injunctive relief relating to matters that allegedly took place at SCI Rockview in 2019, yet it is entirely undisputed that he is no longer in the defendants= custody, has not been housed at SCI Rockview since December of 2019, and therefore no longer receives
services from the prison defendant named in this case. This simple fact raises a threshold, and insurmountable, obstacle to this prayer for injunctive relief relating to conditions at a prison where McClain is no longer
10 incarcerated. Upon consideration, we conclude that the plaintiff=s 2019 transfer from SCI Rockview prison renders McClain’s request for injunctive relief moot. In this
setting, the Court of Appeals has observed that, when addressing inmate requests for injunctive relief: As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the inmates' claims are moot because Aa federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.@ Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quotations omitted); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir.1993). An inmate's transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims. Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 197 (former inmate's claim that the prison library's legal resources were constitutionally inadequate was moot because plaintiff was released five months before trial).
Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003). See Griffin v. Beard, No. 09- 4404, 2010 WL 4642961 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2010) (transfer from SCI Huntingdon renders inmate injunctive relief claim moot). Indeed, as this court has previously observed, in a case such as this, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief against his jailers but is no longer housed at the prison where these injunctive claims arose: [H]is request[] to enjoin the defendants from interfering with his [rights] is academic. See Muslim v. Frame, 854 F.Supp. 1215, 1222 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In other words, [the prisoner-plaintiff=s] transfer to another institution moots any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3rd Cir. 1993); Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3rd Cir. 1981).
Fortes v. Harding, 19 F.Supp.2d 323, 326 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
11 injunctive relief as moot since the prisoner-plaintiff is no longer housed at this prison. III. Conclusion Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this motion to dismiss McClain’s prayer
for injunctive relief, (Doc. 12), is GRANTED. An appropriate order follows. S/Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: December 9, 2021. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RALPH MCCLAIN, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-992 : Plaintiff, : : v. : : H.K. HOOVER, : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : Defendant. :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of December 2021, in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s motion to dismiss McClain’s prayer for injunctive relief, (Doc. 12), is GRANTED.
S/Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge