McCann v. Johnson County Telephone Co.

76 P. 870, 69 Kan. 210, 1904 Kan. LEXIS 236
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedNovember 7, 1903
DocketNo. 13,252
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 76 P. 870 (McCann v. Johnson County Telephone Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCann v. Johnson County Telephone Co., 76 P. 870, 69 Kan. 210, 1904 Kan. LEXIS 236 (kan 1903).

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, C.J. :

In constructing a telephone line the Johnson County Telephone Company was proceeding to plant poles along the highway in front of the farm of Michael McCann. The poles were placed near the hedge-fence on the line dividing the farm from the highway, and were so located as to interfere with the trimming of the hedge, and also with the cutting of the grass and weeds on the roadside.. He brought a suit in injunction, alleging that the company had not obtained his consent to plant telephone poles on the highway opposite his farm ; that his interest as the owner of the fee had not been conveyed, condemned or otherwise appropriated; arid that no compensation had been paid to him for the proposed use. A temporary order, restraining the company from placing poles opposite the plaintiff’s farm, was issued, bub upon the final hearing it was dissolved and a perpetual injunction was denied.

The question presented now, as at the first hearing of the proceeding, is whether the telephone company may occupy the highway in front of McCann’s farm without obtaining his consent or paying him compensation for the right. Was this a contemplated use when the road was established, or does it constitute an additional servitude ? It is conceded that if the use was not within the original purpose of the highway, the planting of the poles there without consent or compensation would trench upon the constitu[212]*212tional rights of McCann. The adjoining owner of land holds the fee in a rural highway, and retains the ownership of the land for all purposes not incompatible with its use as a public highway. (Caulkins v. Matthews, 5 Kan. 191, 199; Comm’rs of Shawnee Co. v. Beckwith, 10 id. 603.) Owning an estate in the land, he cannot be deprived of it by any corporation until full compensation has been made or secured to him, and a possible or probable benefit from the proposed improvement is not to be taken into consideration. (Const., art. 12, § 4.) But if compensation was paid when the highway was established, or, rather,fif the easement originally given or obtained included such a use as the maintenance of a telephone line, nothing was taken from the plaintiff and the injunction was rightfully refused.

The purpose of a telephone—the transmission of intelligence between people and places—is a public one, which the public may authorize, regulate, and control. The legislature has authorized the organization of such corporations, and has provided that they may build and maintain lines in the streets and highways of the state ; and, further, that they may avail themselves of the power of eminent domain to obtain the right to build and maintain lines upon and over the property of others. (Gen. Stat. 1901, §§1251, 1252, 1342, and 1343.) The highway is established for the use of the public, and the telephone line is not only a public convenience, but it is a recognized public use. Is it a contemplated and appropopriate use of a highway, or is it one outside the scope of a rural highway, and therefore an additional burden, for which compensation must be made to the owner?

. Few questions- have received more consideration from the courts in recent years, or given rise to more [213]*213conflict of judicial opinion, than this one. In some cases the use has been limited to travel, by such methods as were in vogue when the highway was established, while others include all methods, old or new., and hold it to be immaterial whether they were in use, or even thought of, when' the easement was acquired. Some confine the use to moving persons, animals, and vehicles, while others would include stationary appliances used in the propulsion or conveyance of persons and things over the highways. By some it is limited to transportation of persons and things tangible, while others extend it to communications which are transmitted unseen, by electric vibrations. Some treat it as an additional burden when the fee of the highway is in the adjoining owner, and others do not regard it to be such whether the fee is in the public or the adjoining owner. In still others a distinction is made between highways in the country and streets in the city, holding that city streets have always been designed and used for purposes not appropriate to rural highways.

The purpose of the highway is the controlling factor. It is variously defined or held to be for passage, travel, traffic, transportation, transmission, and communication. It is a thoroughfare by which people in different places may reach and communicate with one another. The use is not to be measured by the means employed by our ancestors, or by the conditions which existed when highways were first devised. The design of a highway is broad and elastic enough to include the newest and best facilities of travel and communication which the genius of man can invent and supply. This theory is well brought out in Cater v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co., 60 Minn. 589, [214]*214543, 63 N. W. 111, 28 L. R. A. 310, 51 Am. St. Rep. 543. It was there said :

"If there is any one fact established in the history of society and of the law itself, it is that the mode of exercising this easement is expansive, developing and growing as civilization advances. In the most primitive state of society the conception of - a highway was merely a footpath; in a slightly more advanced state it included the idea of a way for pack animals; and, next, a way for vehicles drawn by animals — constituting, respectively, the ‘iter,’ the ‘actus’ and ■ the ‘ via ’ of the Romans. And thus the methods of using public highways expanded with the growth of civilization, until to-day our urban highways are devoted to a variety of uses not known in former times, and never dreamed of by the owners of the soil when the public easement was acquired. Plence it has become settled law that the easement is not limited to the particular methods of use in vogue when the easement was acquired, but includes all new and improved methods, the utility and general convenience of which may afterward be discovered and developed in aid of the general -purpose for which highways are designed. And it is not material that these new and improved methods of use were not contemplated by the owner of the land when the easement was acquired, and are more onerous to him than those then in use.”

That court held that the construction and maintenance of a telephone line on a country highway did not impose an additional servitude upon it, but was to be regarded more as a newly-discovered method of using an old public easément.

In The Julia Building Ass’n v. The Bell Telephone Company, 88 Mo. 258, 268, the question at issue was whether the erection and maintenance of a telephone line along a street of St. Louis subjected it to a new servitude inconsistent with the purpose of a street, and for which an abutting owner might claim com[215]*215pensation. The court ruled that it was not an additional burden, and in doing' so held that streets were designed not only for travel but also to facili-' tate communications between the citizens of the city, and that when the public acquired the right to a street by any method it could be appropriated not only to such uses as were common at the time but also to all such new uses as advanced civilization might suggest or the public good require; and as showing that the telephone would relieve, rather than add to, the servitude of the street, it was said :

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
76 P. 870, 69 Kan. 210, 1904 Kan. LEXIS 236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccann-v-johnson-county-telephone-co-kan-1903.