UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LORI J. MCCALLISTER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 22-cv-1330 (CRC)
LOUIS DEJOY, in his official capacity as United States Postmaster General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Lori McCallister, a postal inspector with the United States Postal Service,
worked remotely for years to support the Service’s national headquarters in Washington, D.C. In
August 2020, however, McCallister’s supervisor ordered her to relocate to Washington. That
prompted McCallister to file this lawsuit against Postmaster General Louis Dejoy in his official
capacity, claiming that her transfer constituted sex discrimination and retaliation for her initiation
of Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) proceedings.
The Court previously dismissed McCallister’s retaliation claim but permitted her sex
discrimination claim to proceed. Now with the benefit of discovery, the Service moves for
summary judgment. Because McCallister has identified no evidence indicating that the Service’s
reasons for transferring her were pretextual, nor any proper comparator who received more
favorable treatment, the Court will grant the motion.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff Lori McCallister began working as a postal inspector for the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service in 2007. Def.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 30-2, ¶ 1. In 2015, she became a GS-14 postal inspector program manager in the Service’s Communications,
Governance and Strategy Group at the agency’s national headquarters in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶
2; McCallister Dep., ECF No. 32-2, at 9:2–4. McCallister’s husband, Josh McCallister, is a
fellow postal inspector who was promoted to Assistant Inspector in Charge for the Boston
Division in 2017. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4. After Mr. McAllister’s promotion, the Service permitted Ms.
McCallister to continue her program manager role remotely from Manchester, New Hampshire.
Id. ¶ 5. McCallister disputes that this was a formal “trailing spouse” arrangement, instead
complaining that the Service “left [her] in limbo as to the status of her position.” Pl.’s Stmt. of
Material Facts in Dispute, ECF No. 32-1, ¶ 1.
In January 2019, during McCallister’s remote tenure in New Hampshire, Carroll Harris,
the Acting Inspector for the Communications, Governance and Strategy Group, became her
supervisor. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 7. After he became her supervisor, Harris told McCallister and
another program manager, Maria Albright, that he preferred for program managers to work in the
Service’s national headquarters office in Washington, rather than remotely. Id. ¶ 8. McCallister
also asserts that Harris told her he needed to “put eyes on” on her to make sure that she was
working. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; McCallister Decl. ¶ 2.
In August 2020, Harris informed McCallister and Albright that their positions were being
reassigned back to national headquarters, requiring a move to Washington. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9.
The reasons for the transfer are disputed. The Service asserts that Harris requested the transfer
so that McCallister and Albright would have “optimal awareness of ongoing activities and
increased output from the positions.” Id. ¶ 11. The Service further notes that “the Deputy Chief
Inspectors that Plaintiff and Albright supported were located at National Headquarters,” making
co-location beneficial. Id. ¶ 10. McCallister, on the other hand, claims that the Service’s stated
2 reasons are merely pretext for sex discrimination. And she has identified several putative
comparators who she says were not asked to transfer. The Court will elaborate below on the
Service’s asserted reasons for transferring McCallister, and her objections to them.
McCallister’s reassignment to the national headquarters began in December 2020. Def.’s
Ex. 1, McCallister Dep. at 48. At that time, she was only required to be in the office one day
each week, due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Id. In May 2024, however, McCallister
began reporting to work at the national headquarters three days each week during a typical
workweek. Id. at 51–52.
B. Procedural History
In December 2020, McCallister filed a formal EEO complaint alleging that her relocation
and an alleged change to her relocation date constituted unlawful sex discrimination. Compl. ¶
5; see also Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5-2, Puchala Decl., Ex. 6 (EEO discrimination complaint).
McCallister then filed suit in this Court, bringing sex discrimination and retaliation claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Postal Service filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court
granted in part and denied in part. The Court dismissed McCallister’s retaliation claim because
she had not administratively exhausted it. Mem. Op., ECF No. 14, at 6–11. The Court denied
the Postal Service’s motion to dismiss McCallister’s discrimination claim, however, holding that
it was “at least plausible that McCallister’s alleged comparators, who are postal inspectors with
the same pay grade and supervisor as McCallister, are similar enough to her to support an
inference of discriminatory motive.” Id. at 14.
Following discovery, the Postal Service filed a motion for summary judgment, which
McCallister has opposed. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
3 II. Legal Standards
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48
(1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895–96 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is “material” if it is
capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895; Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must resolve all factual
disputes and draw “all justifiable inferences” in favor of the non-moving party. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. Pepco, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But the non-
moving party’s opposition must consist of more than mere allegations or denials; instead, it must
be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “[T]he moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the
non-moving party ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Eddington v. U.S.
Dep’t of Def., 35 F.4th 833, 836–37 (D.C. Cir. 2022). When “determining a motion for
summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its
statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of
genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” Local Civ. R. 7(h).
4 To make an actionable claim of discrimination under Title VII, McCallister must allege
that she has suffered an adverse employment action because of her race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490,
493 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Here, the Postal Service has offered evidence, pursuant to the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for transferring
McCallister. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973)). Consequently, to overcome the
Service’s summary judgment motion, McCallister must offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to infer that the Service’s asserted reasons were not the actual reasons for her transfer, and
that the reasons were discriminatory. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. In considering that question,
the Court asks “whether the jury could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) the
plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's
proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be
available to the plaintiff . . . or any contrary evidence that may be available to the employer.”
Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
III. Analysis
A. Reasons
The Service offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for transferring McCallister to
the national headquarters. Her supervisor Carroll Harris recommended the transfer so that
McCallister could “more fully support” the functions of deputy chief inspectors physically
located in Washington. Def.’s Ex. 2 (“August Domicile Letter”), ECF No. 30-4. Allowing
McCallister to keep working remotely in New Hampshire, on the other hand, “put [her and
5 Albright] at a disadvantage for situational awareness” and “easy interaction” with program
managers in D.C. and limited their “contribution to rapidly evolving projects managed from
within” the national headquarters. Id. Harris added at his deposition that when employees are
physically located in the same space, they can better “optimize their ability to maintain
awareness of each other’s activities and to interface.” Harris Dep., ECF No. 30-4, at 18:2–3.
Moreover, moving McAllister to the national headquarters, in Harris’s view, better enabled
managers to assign irregular duties to her as they arose. Id. at 18:5–9.
McCallister casts the Service’s stated reasons as pretextual in several ways. First, she
notes that the transfer letter she received lacked an explanation, and suggests that the Service’s
reasoning was provided only after she challenged her relocation. Opp’n at 10. True, the August
21, 2020 letter informing McCallister of her transfer did not contain a justification for the
decision. Pl.’s Ex. B, ECF No. 32-6, at 9 (“Reassignment Letter”). But Harris included the
reasoning just described in an internal memorandum sent to management on August 1, 2020.
See August Domicile Letter. And the reasons provided in that memorandum are consistent with
Harris’s deposition testimony. Compare August Domicile Letter, with Harris Dep. at 17:18-21,
18:1-9. Accordingly, McCallister’s characterization of Harris’s explanation as post-hoc is
unavailing.
Second, McCallister notes that the West Coast Deputy Chief Inspector, Patricia
Armstrong, worked “thousands of miles” away from the national headquarters, so McCallister
did not need to be in Washington to support her. Opp’n at 11. 1 The Service acknowledges that
Armstrong was on detail at certain points during McCallister’s tenure. Reply, Ex. 9 (“Supp.
1 The deposition McCallister cites for this proposition, however, includes no information about Armstrong’s location.
6 Harris Dep.”), ECF No. 35-1, at 62:23–25. It emphasizes, however, that McCallister supported
not one but four deputy chief inspectors. Id. And the other three inspectors were located in
Washington—a fact McCallister does not dispute. Ms. Armstrong’s detail to locations outside of
Washington therefore does not, in itself, demonstrate pretext.
McCallister also makes much of the fact that Harris allegedly “believed he needs to ‘put
eyes on’ Plaintiff and other female Postal Inspectors in order to make sure that they are
working.” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 2. According to McCallister, Harris told her “that those that sit in the
building he knows [. . . ] what they do because he can see them, [but] [Albright] and I, he doesn’t
know what we do because we’re not there.” McCallister Dep., ECF No. 32-2, at 29:17–21. And
she claims that “Harris stated numerous times he needs to ‘put eyes on’ me in order to make sure
that I am working.” McCallister Decl. ¶ 2. Even on McCallister’s telling, Harris’s comments do
not demonstrate pretext for sex discrimination. Instead, they are consistent with the reasons
Harris gave for the transfer—his belief that in-person work affords greater visibility into
employee engagement. See Harris Dep. at 17:18-21, 18:1-9 (noting that employees in the same
physical location increase “their ability to maintain awareness of each other’s activities.”). And
even if Harris’s assumption that McCallister worked less productively while remote is incorrect,
that does not render it discriminatory. The “issue is not the correctness or desirability of [the]
reasons offered . . . [but] whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.”
Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting McCoy v.
WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)). Nothing in the record suggests that
Harris did not honestly hold his opinions about remote work.
Lastly, McCallister points out that since the “vast majority of employees worked
remotely” during the Covid pandemic, Harris would have had no reason to transfer her in August
7 2020. Opp’n at 11. McCallister acknowledges, however, that even during the pandemic, she
“was in National Headquarters one day a week.” McCallister Dep., ECF No. 30-4, at 48:14–16.
One in-person day at the office each week is more than zero. And McCallister also testified that
her number of in-person days increased progressively, to two and then three days each week. Id.
at 48:20–22. Transferring McCallister thus allowed the Service to benefit from one in-person
day from the start. And she was thereafter readily available for more in-person days, which the
Service ultimately increased. The constraints of the pandemic thus do not render Harris’s
reasoning pretextual, either. And once again, even if insisting on any amount of in-person work
appeared unreasonable in August 2020, the wisdom of that decision is not at issue here. See
Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183.
Accordingly, the Service has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
transfer.
B. Comparators
The Court now turns to the heart of McCallister’s case: five similarly situated male
comparators who she says received more favorable treatment than she did. For a female plaintiff
to demonstrate that she was the victim of gender discrimination through comparator evidence,
“[she] must [ ] demonstrate that ‘all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were
nearly identical to those of the male’ employee.” Chambers v. District of Columbia, No. 14-cv-
2032, 2024 WL 3756315, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2024) (citing Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255,
261 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Factors relevant to this assessment “include the similarity of the
plaintiff's and the putative comparator’s jobs and job duties, [and also] whether they were
disciplined [or transferred] by the same supervisor[.]” Id. (citing Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail
Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
8 1. Paul Krenn
McCallister first identifies Paul Krenn, a male program manager who she claims had
“nearly identical job duties” and was not reassigned by Harris. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8. Krenn retired
from the Postal Service on October 27, 2017. Def.’s Ex. 6 (“Krenn Retirement
Announcement”), ECF No. 30-4. At that time, although his position was “National Headquarters
Program Manager/Postal Inspector,” id., he worked remotely in Arizona. Harris Dep., ECF No.
33-1, at 77:3–6. McCallister argues that because Harris did not attempt to relocate Krenn while
under his supervision, he is a proper comparator.
That argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, Krenn no longer worked for the
Service at the time McCallister was transferred in August 2020. Thus, a significant and
“relevant aspect of her employment situation” was not identical to Krenn’s. Chambers, 2024
WL 3756315, at *6. The Service may have faced particular needs in August 2020 that it did not
in years prior.
Second, Krenn’s remote position resulted from an agreement he made with the Service
“to accept a downgraded position and relocate to Arizona from National Headquarters.” Harris
Dep. at 77:3–6. In exchange for accepting a demotion from assistant inspector-in-charge to
program manager, Krenn was allowed to work remotely for two years before he retired. Id. at
77:15–20. Krenn struck that deal with the Service before Harris ever supervised him. Id. at
78:3–4. As McCallister does not offer evidence indicating that she made any similar agreement
with the Service, she is not similarly situated to Krenn. Nor has she introduced any evidence
disputing Harris’s testimony on this point. Accordingly, Krenn is not a relevant comparator.
9 2. Nate Maxwell
McCallister next points to Nate Maxwell, who she claims was a program manager hired
by Mr. Harris to work remotely from Houston, Texas. Opp’n at 13–14.
Harris supervised Maxwell for four months from September 2018 until January 2019.
Maxwell Dep., ECF No. 33-5, at 25:18–21. During that time, Maxwell was not ordered to report
to national headquarters. Id. at 25:22–26:3. Then, starting in January 2019, Maxwell’s
supervision was transferred to two other inspectors, Jason Krizmanich and Jennifer McDaniel.
Id. at 26:4–6. Eleven months later, in December 2019, he was ordered to move to Washington
and return to national headquarters in person. Id. at 26:8–14. Maxwell refused to return,
however, instead accepting a downgraded position so that he could remain in Houston. Id. at
19:10–12.
McCallister characterizes the fact that Harris did not ask Maxwell to transfer to
Washington from September 2018 to January 2019—the period during which Harris supervised
him—as evidence of discrimination. But during that period, McCallister was also permitted to
work remotely. And by the time McCallister was told to relocate—August 2020—Maxwell had
already received those same instructions, eight months earlier. True, Harris was no longer
Maxwell’s supervisor, but that only serves to confirm that Maxwell was not similarly situated to
McCallister at the time of transfer. Moreover, Maxwell’s choice to take a demotion rather than
be transferred is another indication that the circumstances of his employment were not “nearly
identical” to McCallister’s, as she offers no evidence suggesting she sought or was willing to
accept a similar downgrade. Holbrook, 196 F.3d at 261.
And even if Harris’s decision not to transfer Maxwell two years before he asked
McCallister to relocate is somehow viewed as meaningful, Maxwell had different duties than
10 McCallister. He “was not in direct support of the Deputy Chief Inspectors that were physically
located at National Headquarters,” as was McCallister. Harris Dep. at 51:22–25. Attempting to
rebut this point, McCallister points to Maxwell’s testimony that even as his roles and
responsibilities changed, “the core function of what I did as a program manager always remained
the same.” Maxwell Dep. at 21:1–3. True or not, this statement does not undermine Harris’s
testimony that Maxwell did not directly support the deputy chief inspectors. Maxwell’s job
duties therefore were not “nearly identical” to McCallister’s. Holbrook, 196 F.3d at 261; see
Burley, 801 F.3d at 301. Accordingly, Maxwell was not similarly situated to McCallister and
does not qualify as a proper comparator.
3. Richard Philip Carter
Next up is Richard Philip Carter, another male program manager who McCallister claims
was not ordered to relocate to Washington. Opp’n at 5. That assertion finds no support in the
record.
Carter was detailed as an acting program manager from March 2017 until sometime in
2020, and Harris supervised him for about the last year of his detail. Carter Dep., ECF No. 33-6,
at 14:16–19, 15:13–18. Sometime in 2020, Harris informed Carter that if he wished to keep his
program manager position, he would need to move to Washington. Id. at 16:16–21. Carter
declined, choosing instead to resume the lower-grade postal inspector position he held prior to
his detail so that he could remain in Greenville, South Carolina. Id. at 15:16–22. Carter
therefore cannot serve as a proper comparator because just like McCallister, he was asked by
Harris to relocate to the national headquarters. And as already noted, McCallister offers no
evidence indicating that she sought a demotion so that she could continue working remotely.
11 4. Kyle Rau and Brian Bundt
Lastly, for the first time in her opposition, McCallister cites two more male employees
who she claims are proper comparators. These can be disposed of in short order. The first, Kyle
Rau, worked in the Contraband Interdiction and Investigative Group, a narcotics program within
the Inspection Service. Opp’n, Ex. G (“Rau Dep.”), ECF No. 33-3, at 12:10–12. As noted,
McCallister worked in a different group—the Communications, Governance and Strategy Group.
McCallister Dep. at 9:2–4. And she offers no evidence at all that Rau was ever supervised by
Harris. See generally Rau Dep. (no discussion of supervision by Carroll Harris). Accordingly,
Rau cannot be described as similarly situated to McCallister.
As for Brian Bundt, he was a Grade-13 postal inspector, not a Grade-14 program
manager like McCallister. Anderson Dep., ECF No. 33-4, at 15:9–17. Moreover, although
assigned to the national headquarters, he was permitted to work remotely in Houston due to
special circumstances. After he was placed on administrative leave, Bundt entered into an
agreement allowing him to work remotely in Houston on certain conditions, including retiring at
his first eligibility. Id. at 14:20–22, 15:4–5, 12–14. Since McCallister does not argue that she
entered into any comparable agreement, she and Bundt are evidently not similarly situated.
12 IV. Conclusion
Because McCallister has provided no evidence from which a jury could conclude that
Harris’s reasons for transferring her were pretextual, the Court will grant the Service’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. A separate Order accompanies this Opinion.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: June 5, 2025